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The following dissertation consists of three largely independent papers that are 
united in the general purpose of developing and extending the hard incompatibilist 
view against compatibilist and libertarian positions on free will. Hard incompatibilism 
is the view that the free will required for moral responsibility is incompatible with 
both the truth of causal determinism and its falsity. My position differs from those of 
some philosophers who hold similar views (such as Derk Pereboom and Saul 
Smilansky) in that I believe that this incompatibilism extends to important aspects of 
human life beyond the traditional issues of free will and moral responsibility. I do not 
attempt to independently establish the core claims of hard incompatibilism (by, for 
example, arguing for the inability of compatibilist and libertarian accounts to capture 
what’s required for free, morally responsible action). Rather, I attempt to establish the 
correctness of hard incompatibilism in relatively less explored areas in the free will 
debate – in particular, some central deontic moral concepts and rational deliberation. I 
argue in chapter 1 that determinism is incompatible with moral obligation and, by 
extension, the moral wrongness of actions. In chapter 2 I provide reasons for thinking 
that it should not be psychologically possible for an agent to deliberate rationally 
while believing her deliberative process to be causally determined. In the final chapter 
I assume, in contrast with the first two chapters, that determinism is false, and I 
examine the implications of this assumption for the predicament of the rational 
deliberator. I argue that an indeterministic conception of one’s own agency is 
  
 
  
psychologically incompatible with the sense of control required for rational 
deliberation. 
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CHAPTER 1 
WHY ACTIONS CAN’T BE MORALLY WRONG IF DETERMINISM IS TRUE 
 
1.1 Introduction 
The primary purpose of chapter 1 is to address the question of whether causal 
determinism is compatible with the moral wrongness of actions. I will argue that 
determinism is incompatible with moral obligation, and that, due to the dependence 
relations between these two moral notions, it is also incompatible with the moral 
wrongness of actions. If determinism is incompatible with moral obligation, then it is 
also incompatible with any moral notions that entail obligation, including the moral 
rightness of actions that we are under moral obligation to perform. Whether 
determinism undermines the moral rightness of all actions is unclear, but this issue is 
beyond the scope of this chapter. 
 
1.2 The Derivation 
The following derivation is aimed at establishing these two claims. Premises 
(1) through (6) are intended to show that on the assumption that determinism is true, 
agents cannot be under moral obligations. The final conclusion (7) follows from (6) as 
an assertion of a dependence relation between moral obligation and moral wrongness.1 
The derivation is adapted from several sources.2 It is as follows. 
                                                 
1
 I focus here on actions as opposed to some other standard locus of moral evaluation such as the 
character of the agent or the consequences of the action. I do not try to construct similar arguments for 
these other targets of moral judgment. Of course it is the case that, although moral rightness and 
wrongness attach to actions, we typically reserve judgments about goodness and badness, vice and 
virtue etc., for assessing character and consequences of actions, which will not concern me here. 
2
 These include Copp (2003); Fischer (2003); Haji (1999); and Widerker (1991). 
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(1) Suppose some agent, Jack, performed some action, A, say, stealing from 
the poor-box. 
(2) If Jack’s doing A is morally wrong, then he ought to have refrained from 
doing A. 
(3) If Jack ought to have refrained from doing A, then he was able to refrain 
from doing A. 
(4) If determinism is true, then nobody is able to act differently from how they 
in fact act. 
(5) So, if determinism is true, then given that Jack did A, he was unable to 
refrain from doing A. 
(6) So, if determinism is true, then it’s not the case that Jack ought to have 
refrained from doing A. (3-5) 
(7) Therefore, if determinism is true, then Jack’s doing A is not morally wrong. 
(2,6) 
Premise (3) is of course controversial; defending it is one of the main tasks of 
this chapter. Before doing so, however, let me make three brief remarks about other 
features of the argument. First, the argument as it stands is silent on the issue of the 
compatibility of determinism with moral obligations we are causally determined to 
satisfy. The argument assumes that Jack’s action is one that he was under a moral 
obligation to refrain from performing, and further, that it is for his failing to satisfy his 
obligation to refrain from performing the action that the action is wrong of him. But 
we also perform actions that serve to satisfy obligations (keeping a promise is an 
example), and even if the performance of such an action is determined, such that the 
agent in question could not have done otherwise than perform the action, the argument 
does not entail that this inability to do otherwise undermines the obligation. I believe, 
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however, that it is the case that determinism undermines these kinds of obligations, 
and will provide some reasons for this below (section 1.5). Second, the argument is 
also silent on the issue of the compatibility of determinism with the moral rightness of 
actions. It seems that right actions fall into several categories: actions that we are 
under an obligation to perform and it would be wrong not to perform, e.g., keeping our 
promises, supporting our families; supererogatory actions, which are morally right to 
perform, but we are under no obligation to perform them, and it is thus not wrong not 
to perform them, e.g., giving a high percentage of our income to charity; and non-
obligatory morally right actions that are not supererogatory, such as rescuing one of 
two people, both of whom need our help, but only one of whom we are able to help.3 
The first type of right action is by definition dependent on obligation, so it will not 
require much argument to show that the moral rightness of these actions is undermined 
by determinism if the above argument is successful. Supererogatory actions are a 
much more difficult matter, as by definition these are actions that we are under no 
obligation to perform. So too are non-obligatory non-supererogatory morally right 
actions. It is an interesting question whether the rightness of these kinds of actions is 
also incompatible with determinism, although, as mentioned above, beyond the scope 
of this chapter. 
Third, regarding premise (4), for the purposes of this chapter determinism will 
be understood as the thesis that ‘there is at any instant exactly one physically possible 
future’ (cf. van Inwagen 1983, 3). Exactly how to specify what this definition involves 
is not a simple matter, but I think it is safe to say that however determinism is 
understood, it implies the inevitability of our actions, in the sense that at any point in 
                                                 
3
 I intend this distinction between obligatory right actions and non-obligatory, non-supererogatory right 
actions to roughly reflect the distinction Kant draws between perfect and imperfect duties 
(respectively). I use the distinction as a means of classification only, and do not intend for it to carry 
any theoretical implications. See Kant (1785/1981, Ak 421). 
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time prior to the performance of an action there existed conditions that causally 
necessitated that that action would be performed precisely when, and in the manner in 
which, it actually comes to be performed. If determinism is true, this inevitability is 
true of all actions and all events. Thus when we act we are constrained by all the 
relevant causal antecedents to act in precisely the ways we do act, and are never able 
to deviate from the performance of the actions that we are causally constrained to 
perform. If this is the case, then it follows on any construal of ‘ability’ other than mere 
logical possibility,4 that we are never able to do anything but what we in fact do. 
In section 1.3, I will examine and refine the maxim ‘ought’ implies ‘can,’ of 
which premise (3) is an instance. I will indicate what I consider to be plausible 
interpretations of its ‘ought’ and ‘can’ components, and in section 1.4 I will defend the 
maxim against a counterexample. In section 1.5 I will an attempt to show that if 
determinism is incompatible with moral obligations that we are causally determined to 
violate, then it is also incompatible with moral obligations we are causally determined 
to satisfy.5 Having established that determinism is incompatible with moral obligation, 
in section 1.6 I will argue that actions or omissions can be morally wrong only if 
                                                 
4
 It might be thought that ‘S can do A at t’ is true so long as there is no logical contradiction involved in 
the proposition that S A’s at t. It seems quite clear, however, that the commonsense notion of ability that 
we employ when making claims about what someone can do at a particular time takes into account 
causal constraints applicable to S at t. To use one of David Lewis’ examples, even though on one 
reading of ‘can’ it is true that I can speak Finnish (the ‘facts about my larynx and nervous system are 
compossible with me [as opposed to an ape] speaking Finnish’), on the reading that is relevant to ability 
at a time (another set of facts that includes the fact than I never learned how to speak Finnish), I cannot 
speak Finnish. See Lewis (1986, 77). If determinism is true these causal constraints are pervasive, so 
that there is nothing that we can do at any particular time except what we are determined to do. This is a 
contentious matter, about which I have more to say below. 
5
 It is important for me to establish that determinism is incompatible with all moral obligations rather 
than merely obligations we are causally determined to violate, for two reasons. One is simply for the 
sake of completeness. The other is due to my claim that determinism is incompatible with the moral 
rightness of actions that we are under moral obligation to perform. If the argument only establishes that 
determinism is incompatible with moral obligations we are causally determined to violate, then this 
incompatibility would not extend to any actions considered to be morally right. 
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agents are under moral obligation with respect to them. I establish this claim by 
defending it against an objection. 
 
1.3 Understanding ‘Ought’ Implies ‘Can’ 
The key premise of the argument is premise (3), which states that if Jack ought 
to have refrained from doing A then he was able to refrain from doing A, and is an 
instance of the principle that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’ (OIC). This principle can be 
considered an analog of the Principle of Alternate Possibilities (PAP), which states 
that ‘a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done 
otherwise’ (Frankfurt, 1969). I believe that both OIC and PAP are equally very 
plausible, and that alleged ‘Frankfurt-style’ counterexamples to PAP fail to establish 
that there can be situations in which a person really could not do any morally relevant 
thing other than what he did, and yet is morally responsible for doing it (I will not 
provide an argument for this here). Essentially, the reasoning in both cases is the same, 
in that PAP can be seen as a version of OIC applied to moral responsibility. 
Before looking at objections to OIC it will be worthwhile to try to formulate 
the maxim more precisely, which will enable us to see more clearly what it says, 
whether it is true, and whether it can do the work in the argument that I am intending 
for it to do. I will look first at the ‘ought’ or obligation component, and then at the 
‘can’ or ability component. Ishtiyaque Haji identifies three important distinctions that 
must be borne in mind when considering the maxim. The first is a distinction between 
moral and other kinds of obligation, such as legal, prudential, aesthetic, and what he 
refers to as the ‘plain’ or ‘overarching’ ought. It is a contentious matter whether 
overarching obligations exist, but if they do they would seem to arise in situations 
where we believe ourselves to have conflicting obligations of different kinds, e.g., 
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moral and prudential. We may be considering each of these obligations, realizing that 
we cannot satisfy them both, and asking ourselves, “Given that I have a moral 
obligation to do A and a prudential obligation to do B, and given that I cannot do both 
A and B, what ought I to do?” 6 While OIC may be applicable to these other kinds of 
obligation (for instance, maybe we don’t have legal obligations at particular times 
when we are unable to satisfy them) it is only moral obligations that need concern us 
here. A second distinction captures different uses of the term ‘ought’: sometimes we 
use the term to express what Haji calls a moral ideal or desideratum. We might, for 
instance, exclaim that “There ought not to be evil in the world,” or “There ought to be 
enough food for everyone to eat,” believing that there is little chance that these ideals 
can be realized. OIC clearly does not apply to this sense of ‘ought.’ Following W. D. 
Ross, Haji also draws a distinction between ‘absolute’ or ‘overall’ moral obligation, 
and ‘prima facie,’ or what might more accurately be referred to as ‘pro tanto’ (‘as far 
as it goes’) moral obligation. This distinction relates to situations in which we perceive 
ourselves to have conflicting moral obligations. For example, we may be faced with a 
decision whether to lie in order to prevent a co-worker from losing his job. The 
obligation not to lie and the obligation to help the co-worker are considered pro tanto 
moral obligations; the overall obligation, then, is the function of the stringency of 
these pro tanto obligations. Again, it is these overall obligations and not the pro tanto 
ones that are relevant when considering OIC (cf. Haji 2002, 14-15).7 
As Haji points out, these pro tanto obligations are “real” as opposed to “on first 
glance” or “on the face of things” obligations. However, there is yet another 
                                                 
6
 Assuming that we do sometimes have these overarching obligations, I am agnostic, as is Haji, as to 
whether they are moral obligations. If they are, I see no reason why OIC should not also apply to them, 
in the sense that we cannot have overarching (moral) obligations that we cannot satisfy. 
7
 Copp refers to the kind of obligation I am trying to characterize by employing these distinctions as 
‘moral requirement.’ According to Copp (2003, 273), to be morally required to do a particular thing is 
to have no morally acceptable option but to do that thing. 
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distinction that can usefully be made, by contrasting two different kinds of judgments 
of obligation, which we might refer to as prima facie and all things considered 
judgments of obligation. A prima facie judgment of obligation in this sense might be 
thought of as a hasty judgment, or a judgment made in the absence of a full 
appreciation of all the relevant facts, or perhaps a general judgment that would 
ordinarily apply to cases of a similar kind to the one under consideration. In David 
Copp’s terminology, to judge that someone has an all things considered moral 
obligation [is morally required] to do a thing entails judging that the person has no 
morally acceptable option but to do that thing. 
Some examples should help to clarify this distinction between prima facie and 
all things considered judgments of moral obligation. For instance, we may initially 
perceive ourselves as having an obligation to call the police when we see someone 
being attacked in the street, until we realize the people involved are stuntmen acting in 
a movie. Or, of more relevance to OIC, we may judge that a person has an obligation 
to refrain from screaming blasphemous obscenities in church, until we realize that she 
suffers from Tourette’s disorder, and is unable to refrain. Or we may judge that a 
firefighter has an obligation to rescue someone from a burning house, until we realize 
that he has just now become paralyzed. As a justification for this interpretation of the 
‘ought’ in OIC, as well as a motivation for the truth of the maxim so interpreted, we 
may consider what Copp calls the ‘fairness’ argument. The idea is that just as it would 
seem unfair to demand or require of a person that she do something she is unable to do 
(to require someone to, for example, lift a car above her head), there seems to be a 
kind of unfairness involved in a person’s having a moral obligation she is unable to 
satisfy. True, agent-requirements are not necessarily moral requirements; in the moral 
case there is no one doing any requiring or demanding, no one who could be blamed 
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for being unfair. Nevertheless, as Copp points out, if it’s not the case that there is any 
(moral) unfairness in an agent’s being morally required to do something she can’t do, 
it’s hard to see why there would be unfairness in one agent’s requiring of another that 
she do something she can’t do (Copp 2003, 271-2, 278).8 
There is also a need to refine the ‘can’ component of OIC. Haji formulates 
stronger and weaker versions of OIC in this respect. For my purposes the weaker of 
these will suffice. It is as follows. 
Agent, S, ought to do something A, only if [1] S has the opportunity to do A, 
[2] S is physically and psychologically able to do A, and [3] A’s 
accomplishment is not “strictly out of S’s control” (Haji 1999, 182; 2002, 23-
4).9 
The first condition captures the idea that an agent cannot have an obligation to do 
something unless she is in a position in which she can exercise her ability to do it. 
‘The concern is that not being relevantly situated or not having the cooperation of the 
environment would prevent one from exercising the pertinent abilities’ (Haji 2002, 
22). Haji endorses Kadri Vihvelin’s characterization of what it is to have the 
opportunity to do something: ‘[Opportunity] include[s] all circumstantial factors, both 
those inside and outside the skin, which would enable someone to exercise a relevant 
ability. On this view, someone lacks the opportunity to do x just in case there is 
something that prevents or would prevent a successful exercise of the relevant ability, 
regardless of whether it’s something external (locked door, chairs, lack of piano) or 
                                                 
8
 Understanding OIC in terms of moral requirement also helps to block objections to it such as 
Fischer’s. Fischer claims that because the goal of practical reasoning is to determine what we have 
sufficient reason to do, the ‘ought’ in OIC should be analyzed in terms of what the agent in question has 
sufficient reason to do. Understood in this way, the proposition that S ought to do A is compatible with 
S being unable to do A. See Fischer (2003, 247-8). 
9
 The stronger version contains two additional requirements. These are, first, that the agent ‘has the 
relevant ‘know-how’ to do A,’ and second, that the agent is ‘not ignorant of germane facts (this is 
meant to capture the ‘know-that’ requirement)’. 
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something internal (broken legs, cramps, state of unconsciousness)’ (2002, 22). 
Concerning the second condition, that S be physically and psychologically able to do 
A, Haji emphasizes that it does not include a ‘know-how’ requirement, and so does not 
amount to what Vihvelin calls ‘volitional ability.’10 Haji does not give much in the 
way of a positive explanation of what it is to be physically and psychologically able to 
do something while lacking the volitional ability to do it. So I’ll assume he intends this 
condition to exempt S from having an obligation if S is, for instance, paralyzed, tied 
up, or suffering from convulsions (on the physical side) or in the grip of a psychotic 
episode or extreme phobia (on the psychological side), i.e., any physical or 
psychological impairment or impediment that would prevent S from doing A excluding 
S’s simply not knowing how to do A. The final condition, that A not be ‘strictly out of 
S’s control’ is explained as follows: ‘if it were always the case that when an agent 
formed a here-and-now intention – that is, an intention to perform an action right away 
– it became highly improbable that she would act as she intended, then even if she did 
succeed in doing that thing, her accomplishment of it would be strictly out of her 
control.’ 
I think these refinements of the notion of ability as it relates to OIC are quite 
plausible and (perhaps with the exception of the final condition) uncontroversial, 
although they are also compatible with the assertion that agents have the ability to 
perform actions they are causally determined not to perform. However, the 
commonsense notion of ability captured by these conditions does not take determinism 
into account. It seems to me that when determinism is taken into account there is a 
strong intuitive sense in which one lacks the ability to do that which one is causally 
                                                 
10
 For Vihvelin, a person has the ‘volitional ability’ to do x ‘just in case it’s true that there are some 
reasonably specifiable circumstances C… such that if she tried, in circumstances C, to do x, she would 
(probably) succeed.’ 
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determined not to do. Therefore, another refinement suggests itself. It is the 
requirement of what Fischer (in a somewhat different context) refers to as ‘access 
control,’ and is spelled out in terms of possible worlds. It is the idea that in order to 
have the ability to perform some action, an agent must have genuine access to the 
possible world in which she performs it, and one has genuine access to a possible 
world only if it shares the same past and natural laws with the actual world (Fischer 
2003, 249). Given the above definition (page 3) if determinism is true then there is 
only one possible future, that is, only one possible world that anyone has genuine 
access to. So, if determinism is true, then one does not have the ability to do what one 
is causally determined not to do, since the world in which one does what one is 
causally determined not to do is not genuinely accessible.11 
With these refinements in hand, I think a number of objections to OIC can be 
adequately addressed, and in a similar manner. For example, one such objection arises 
from consideration of moral dilemmas. A moral dilemma can be characterized as a 
situation in which an agent S has a moral obligation to perform action A and an 
equally compelling moral obligation to perform action B, but cannot perform both. 
The reply involves both the abovementioned point about interpreting the ‘ought’ in 
OIC in terms of all things considered moral requirement, and also the argument from 
fairness. For a moral dilemma to constitute a counterexample to OIC it must be the 
case that both A and B are morally required of S. Given the above characterization of a 
                                                 
11
 This last refinement is likely to be resisted by proponents of conditional analyses of ability. These 
essentially involve the idea that all that is required in order for it to be true that an agent has the ability 
to perform some particular action that s/he in fact did not perform (or is causally determined not to 
perform) is that the agent would have performed it if some factor had been different, for example, if s/he 
had wanted to perform the action, or if some event in the past or the laws of nature had been different. I 
will not bother trying to refute these claims here. Roderick Chisholm has provided what I consider to be 
a decisive refutation of conditional analyses. See Chisholm (1982, 26-7). More recently, some writers 
have attempted to improve upon earlier versions of conditional analyses by interpreting claims about 
ability to do otherwise as involving dispositions to act, and offering conditional analyses of dispositions 
that, they claim, are compatible with determinism, and immune from the kinds of counterexamples 
often employed against dispositional analyses.  
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moral requirement, the objector must hold then that S has no morally acceptable 
option but to perform both A and B. But this is not possible for S to do. It seems that 
the objector must deny the interpretation of OIC whereby the ‘ought’ refers to a moral 
requirement, or at least to deny that this interpretation is applicable in cases of moral 
dilemmas. But the argument from fairness seems clearly to apply here too. Just as it 
seems unfair to require of someone that she perform an action she cannot perform, it 
seems equally unfair to require a person to perform two actions such that she cannot 
perform both (See Copp 2003, 278-82).12 
 
1.4 An Objection to OIC 
Pete Graham (unpublished) proposes an interesting argument against OIC, 
based on a certain form of counterexample. The form of the counterexample is based, 
in turn, on a certain sort of obligation that people can have: 
‘Suppose that Jones’s [A]-ing is morally permissible only because Smith’s [B]-
ing is (or would be) morally impermissible. If OIC were true, then Smith’s 
being rendered incapable of refraining from [B]-ing in such a case should 
render Jones’s [A]-ing morally impermissible. But, if it is not intuitive that so 
incapacitating Smith has this effect on the permissibility of Jones’s [A]-ing, 
that is good intuitive grounds for thinking that OIC is false’ (Graham, 7). 
To illustrate this, Graham gives the following example: 
‘TRANSPLANT: A surgeon has ten patients, each of whom will die of organ 
failure if they don’t receive an organ transplant. The surgeon really wants to 
save her patients and is convinced (perhaps brainwashed) by Consequentialist 
arguments to the effect that it would be morally permissible to kill two people 
                                                 
12
 There are a number of other objections discussed by Copp that can be responded to similarly, by 
attending to the refinements to OIC given above, which I will not discuss here. 
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in order to save them. “Luckily” she notices that in another room of the 
hospital there are two innocent and unconscious tonsillectomy patients who are 
perfect organ matches for her patients. The hospital janitor, aware of the 
situation, searches in vain for a way to prevent the surgeon from killing the 
two. As events are unfolding very quickly, it turns out that the only means by 
which he can stop her from chopping up the two innocent patients is by 
shooting her with his pistol. He does so and thereby kills her.’ 
Graham makes two points about this example: 
(1) It is morally permissible for the janitor to kill the surgeon, 
and the best explanation of this is 
(2) if the janitor had not killed the surgeon, then the surgeon would have 
morally impermissibly killed two innocent people (Graham, 8). 
He then alters the example to TRANSPLANT (COMPULSION) which is the same as 
TRANSPLANT except that the surgeon is psychologically compelled to kill the two in 
order to save the ten. Graham claims that in TRANSPLANT (COMPULSION), just as 
in TRANSPLANT, (1) is true, and the best explanation of (1)’s being true is that (2) is 
true. Now with TRANSPLANT (COMPULSION) he thinks he has a counterexample 
to OIC, because if (2) is true, and if 
(3) if the janitor had not killed the surgeon, then the surgeon would have killed 
the two innocent people and been unable to refrain from killing them 
is also true, then it must be the case that 
(4) if the janitor had not killed the surgeon, then the surgeon would both have 
morally impermissibly killed the two innocent people and have been 
unable to refrain from killing them (Graham, 9). 
Hence, OIC is false, as the surgeon is unable to refrain from killing the two innocent 
patients, and yet is under a moral obligation to refrain from killing them. Graham then 
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goes on to discuss a number of alternative explanations for the truth of (1) other than 
(2) and rejects them as being unsatisfactory. 
If Graham’s argument is sound, i.e., if TRANSPLANT (COMPULSION) is 
indeed a counterexample to OIC, then my argument is in trouble. However, I think 
there is reason to question whether this is the case. Graham recognizes that the crucial 
step in his argument is the claim that the best explanation of the truth of (1), that it is 
morally permissible for the janitor to kill the surgeon, is (2), that if the janitor does not 
do so, the surgeon will morally impermissibly kill the two innocent patients. It seems 
to me that in TRANSPLANT, this would be a good, intuitively plausible candidate for 
a correct explanation of the moral permissibility of the janitor’s killing the surgeon, 
although perhaps not a complete one (I have more to say about this below). However, 
it is much less clear that (2) is the best, or even a plausible, explanation of (1) in 
TRANSPLANT (COMPULSION). This is in part because it is not obvious that 
genuinely compelled actions can be morally impermissible. Due to the kinds of 
considerations raised above with respect to the argument from fairness, if the surgeon 
was genuinely compelled, then it’s not clear that her killing the patients is 
impermissible, and hence not clear that (2) is even true, let alone a plausible 
explanation of (1). 
So what does explain why the janitor is permitted to kill the surgeon in 
TRANSPLANT (COMPULSION)? I propose that a reasonable alternative explanation 
is that the surgeon’s intended action seriously threatens the lives of two innocent 
people. The janitor’s action is not only permissible, but I think (setting aside concerns 
about determinism), obligatory, because it is generally obligatory for a person to do 
what they can to help neutralize serious threats to innocent human life. So I contend 
that Graham’s (2) should be replaced, in this case, by: 
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(2`) if the janitor does not kill/stop13 the surgeon then the janitor will have 
morally impermissibly failed to have neutralized a serious threat to the two 
innocent patients; 
and this is what explains (1) in TRANSPLANT (COMPULSION). And as far as 
TRANSPLANT is concerned I think it is the conjunction of (2) and (2`) that explains 
(1). 
Furthermore, (2`) is a more straightforward explanation that seems to apply to 
a wider range of cases than does (2). That is, it seems clear that (2) is only (prima 
facie) relevant in cases involving threats posed by persons. If, for instance, the threat 
to the patients were posed by a poisonous snake it seems obvious that the 
permissibility of the janitor’s killing the snake would not derive from any moral issue 
concerning the potential behavior of the snake; it would derive purely from the fact 
that the snake would be posing a serious threat to the patients. It is only in cases where 
the threat is posed by a person that any moral issue concerning the source of the threat 
can become relevant. And, as we have seen, it is not implausible that these moral 
issues can only play the kind of justificatory role at issue here in a certain subset of 
these cases, e.g., where the person posing the threat is able to refrain from carrying it 
out. 
It may be objected here that my (2`) is really just part of the explanation of 
why the janitor’s action is permissible. It may be thought that we also need the claim 
that the surgeon’s killing the innocent people would, in the circumstances, be 
impermissible, and so Graham’s explanation of (1) stands as the best candidate. In 
                                                 
13
 The fact that the surgeon is a person, having rights, and not some non-human threat such as a disease 
or an avalanche, means that proportionality requirements must be adhered to. It is not permissible for 
the janitor to kill the surgeon if there is open to him a less harmful way of neutralizing the threat. 
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TRANSPLANT this does seem reasonable, but if it is doubtful, as I contend, that the 
surgeon’s intended act of killing the two patients in TRANSPLANT (COMPULSION) 
is impermissible, due to its being compelled, and if there is a suitable, unproblematic 
alternative explanation available, then there seems to be no reason not to exclude 
Graham’s (2) from the explanation of this case entirely. 
It may also be objected that whatever explains (1) in TRANSPLANT must be 
the same as that which explains (1) in TRANSPLANT (COMPULSION). Graham 
thinks this seems obvious (Graham, 11). I don’t see why it should be obvious. The 
cases are very different due to the inability of the surgeon to refrain in the latter case, 
and it is no news that our moral intuitions and moral judgments tend to vary 
significantly in response to even seemingly minor alterations to cases. So without 
some reason why the explanation of (1) must be the same in both cases, I disagree 
with Graham that it obviously should be. Even if I were to concede the point that the 
explanation in both cases should be the same I would argue that it is more reasonable 
to think that the explanation of (1) that is common to both cases is (2`) rather than (2); 
(2) simply becomes more salient in cases such as TRANSPLANT, where moral 
impermissibility on the part of the source of the threat is relevant. I conclude here that 
Graham’s example should not persuade us to doubt that ‘ought’ does indeed imply 
‘can’. 14 In the next section I address the issue of whether we can have moral 
obligations we are causally determined to satisfy. 
 
 
 
                                                 
14
 I am very grateful to Carl Ginet for showing me some correspondence between himself, Pete Graham, 
and Michael McKenna regarding Graham’s paper. Some of my suggestions were inspired by objections 
to the paper made by Ginet and McKenna. However, I do not intend my objections to be representative 
of theirs. 
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1.5 Obligations We Are Causally Determined to Satisfy 
By this point I claim to have established that determinism is incompatible with 
moral obligations that an agent is causally determined to violate. Here, again, is the 
derivation intended to establish that result (from page 2): 
(1) Suppose some agent, Jack, performed some action, A, say, stealing from the 
poor-box. 
(2) If Jack’s doing A is morally wrong, then he ought to have refrained from 
doing A. 
(3) If Jack ought to have refrained from doing A, then he was able to refrain 
from doing A. 
(4) If determinism is true, then nobody is able to act differently from how they 
in fact act. 
(5) So, if determinism is true, then given that Jack did A, he was unable to 
refrain from doing A. 
(6) So, if determinism is true, then it’s not the case that Jack ought to have 
refrained from doing A. (3-5) 
(7) Therefore, if determinism is true, then doing A was not morally wrong of 
Jack. (2,6) 
I have argued that if determinism is true then at time t when I believe myself to have a 
moral obligation, it is already determined whether I will honor it or not. If it is 
determined at t that I will, at some future time, perform some action that violates my 
obligation, then OIC tells us that I cannot be under such an obligation (the derivation 
to (6)). But what should we think about cases where it is determined at t that I will not 
violate the obligation? OIC tells us only that I cannot be under an obligation to 
perform some action that I cannot perform (or to refrain from performing some action 
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that I am unable to refrain from performing). According to OIC, we need to have the 
ability to do A in order to be under an obligation to do A, so it may be thought that if 
we’re causally determined to do A, then we have the ability to do A, and so we can be 
under an obligation to do A, even though we are unable to refrain from doing A. That 
is, although determinism and OIC entail that we can be under no obligation to do A if 
we’re causally determined not to, we can still properly be under an obligation to do A 
if we’re causally determined to do A, because we still can do A. If this is correct we 
would be in a position whereby we can be under an obligation to do only that which 
we are causally determined to do, yet these obligations would be legitimate. 
In order to resist such a claim, Haji offers basically two considerations in favor 
of a principle he refers to as CK, which states that if one ought to do A, then one can 
refrain from doing A (and if one ought not to do A, then one can do A). I shall focus on 
the second, which seems to be the stronger of the two. This consideration is based on 
Fred Feldman’s theory of what it is for an act to be obligatory. The idea is that when 
one is faced with a moral choice there are several possible worlds accessible to one, 
i.e., possible worlds that would exist if the particular choice required to bring them 
about is made. ‘Roughly, a possible world is accessible to a person at a time if and 
only if it is still possible, at that time, for the person to see to the occurrence of that 
world.’ A world is ‘bypassed,’ and thus becomes inaccessible, once a person behaves 
in some way in which she does not behave in that world. 
‘Ks,t,p’ abbreviates ‘there is a world accessible to s as of [time] t in which state 
of affairs p occurs’ (K being a kind of possibility operator); ‘Us,t,p’ 
abbreviates ‘p occurs in every possible world accessible to s at t’ (U being a 
kind of necessity or unalterability operator). 
According to Haji, Feldman’s theory of moral obligation is as follows: 
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MO: A person s ought, as of t, to see to the occurrence of a state of affairs p if 
and only if p occurs in all the intrinsically best worlds accessible to s as 
of t.  
If we let ‘Os,t,p’ abbreviate ‘p occurs in all the intrinsically best worlds accessible to s 
at t,’ then MO validates OIC, since Os,t,p entails Ks,t,p. Furthermore, on this theory, 
unalterability implies obligation, i.e., if MO is true then 
UO: Us,t,p entails Os,t,p 
is also true (Haji 2002, 28-31). 
In other words, if p is unavoidable for you (if p occurs in every possible world 
now accessible to you) then p occurs in all the best worlds accessible to you. And if 
(according to MO) you ought to do a thing only if that thing occurs in the best worlds 
accessible to you, then it’s not the case that you ought to do something if that thing 
doesn’t occur in any world accessible to you, as in that case it also doesn’t occur in 
any of the best worlds accessible to you (there must be an accessible world in which 
that thing occurs in order for you to have an obligation to do it). This is essentially 
OIC. 
A potential problem for UO is that if Us,t,p entails Os,t,p then, in combination 
with MO, it may turn out that it is obligatory for you to bring about some morally 
abhorrent state of affairs, say, a murder, if it’s the case that the murder occurs in all the 
best worlds accessible to you (which would be true if it was unavoidable, i.e., if it 
occurs in all the worlds accessible to you). 
Due to this, Feldman proposes a different obligation operator, O*, which 
functions as follows: ‘‘O*s,t,p’ is true if and only if p does not occur in all the worlds 
accessible to s as of t, but p does occur in all the best of these worlds.’ So, you are 
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obligated to do a thing only if that thing occurs in the best worlds accessible to you, so 
long as there are other worlds accessible to you in which you don’t do that thing, i.e., 
so long as you can avoid doing that thing. This, of course, supports CK, which says 
that you ought to do a thing only if you can refrain from doing it. 
Despite the technical details, I can’t see that the part of this theory that 
supports CK is anything more than an ad hoc modification employed to avoid an 
unpalatable consequence. Haji claims that ‘if the theory does capture the nature of 
moral obligation, then there is a powerful theory-fuelled incentive to endorse both 
[OIC] and its complement CK.’ I don’t see anything obviously wrong with the theory 
(MO), however, it doesn’t seem to be the theory itself that supports the introduction of 
O*, but rather the fact that the theory delivers unintuitive results in cases where an 
agent’s alternatives for action are restricted to one. 
For these reasons, I don’t believe that Haji’s defense of CK would be adequate 
to persuade an opponent that we cannot have obligations we are causally determined 
to satisfy. Therefore, I offer the following analysis. However, it is not intended to be 
decisive. I offer it partly for the sake of completeness and partly because of my 
intuitive belief that determinism is incompatible with all of deontic morality (and a 
fortiori moral obligation): the idea that we can be obligated to do something that we 
will inevitably do seems to me only slightly less intuitive than the idea that we can be 
obligated to do things we won’t do. Although the above derivation would be 
unaffected if it turned out that we can have such obligations, it is in this sense 
incomplete. It establishes only that determinism is incompatible with some obligations 
and not others, and so leaves it open that, if we can have obligations we are causally 
determined to satisfy, then the division between the perceived obligations we actually 
have and the ones we don’t depends on actual (future) occurrences, i.e., whether or not 
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we turn out to perform, or not perform, the relevant actions that would amount to 
satisfying or violating them. Therefore, I offer these suggestions in an attempt to 
substantiate, to some extent, my belief that determinism is incompatible with all moral 
obligations. 
If the derivation to (6) is sound, i.e., if we cannot be under an obligation to do 
something we are causally determined not to do, then accepting that we can be under 
an obligation to do something we are causally determined to do would leave us in a 
strange position. It would mean that if we are uncertain that we will do A and also 
uncertain that determinism is false (perhaps the position that many of us are in) then 
we should be uncertain that we have an obligation to do A. From a practical 
standpoint, our level of confidence in the possibility that we have the obligation would 
be so low as to render it incapable of playing any significant role in deliberation. The 
function of obligations is to guide actions, and so they must be able to count as reasons 
for deciding how to act, and must thus be able to be recognized by us as fairly reliably 
true (or false) before the time we make our decision about whether to do A (and 
thereby come to know that we will do A). But if we can never be sure whether we have 
an obligation, due to the fact that we can never know beforehand whether or not we 
are causally determined to satisfy it, then obligations would, for those uncertain that 
determinism is false, seem to lose their action-guiding usefulness. For example, 
suppose an acquaintance of mine, Jim, is sick and in the hospital, and I am wondering 
whether I have a moral obligation to visit him. As I am reflecting on the truth of 
determinism and OIC (let’s say I am naturally somewhat unsympathetic), it may occur 
to me that if I am causally determined to visit Jim then I have an obligation to do so, 
but if I am causally determined not to do so then I have no such obligation, because I 
can’t have an obligation to do something that I won’t (can’t) do. This leaves me in an 
 21 
 
 
odd position. Since I have no way of knowing whether or not I am causally 
determined to visit him, the notion of moral obligation gives me no help in deciding 
upon the right thing to do. 
It may be objected here that my requirement of certainty is unrealistically 
stringent. That is, perhaps we can, and often do, decide upon a particular course of 
action motivated solely by the belief that we probably have, or may have, an 
obligation to so act. If this were the case then it would be false that an agent’s 
uncertainty as to the truth of determinism, combined with her acceptance of the 
derivation, would result in the undermining of the action-guiding usefulness of moral 
obligations she is causally determined to satisfy. 
To illustrate this, consider the case of Sue the student. While doing her grocery 
shopping, Sue realizes that the cashier has accidentally given her an extra $100 in her 
change. In the process of deciding whether to give the money back, Sue considers the 
fact that the supermarket is part of a multi-billion dollar chain of stores, which is set 
up in such a way that no one will be appreciably worse off for her keeping the money, 
except perhaps the cashier, who, Sue reasons, probably deserves to be reprimanded for 
making such a mistake anyway. It also occurs to Sue that she is in desperate need of 
textbooks that she doesn’t have enough money to buy, and because she is a very 
promising student and a good person, the world will be a better place overall if she 
keeps the money and uses it to buy the books. She feels that the only factor that could 
persuade her to give the money back would be a moral obligation to do so.15 Sue 
accepts the above reasoning, so she believes that if she is causally determined to keep 
                                                 
15
 It is necessary to eliminate other potential sources for Sue’s motivation to act, so that the obligation 
may be considered in isolation (I have more to say about this below). 
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the money then she has no obligation to return it.16 But, it may be argued, because Sue 
does not know at this point whether she is causally determined to return the money or 
to keep it, and she reasons (correctly) that if she is causally determined to return it 
then she can still have an obligation to do so, the obligation retains at least some 
action-guiding usefulness in spite of Sue’s acceptance of the derivation. 
My reply is as follows. It seems that there are variations of this case that must 
be considered in turn. One such variation relates to a range of descriptions of the case 
whereby Sue is more or less certain that she will be causally determined to return the 
money. It seems that in variations of the case in which Sue’s certainty that she will 
return the money approaches 0, i.e., her certainty that she will be causally determined 
not to return the money approaches 1, the possibility (from her perspective) that she 
has an obligation to return it would also approach zero. If she’s almost certain she will 
be causally determined to not return the money, then given her acceptance of the 
derivation from (3)-(6) above, she must be just as uncertain that she has an obligation 
to do so. Sue’s confidence that she has this obligation would be so weak in this range 
of cases that the obligation could not plausibly be of any significant guidance to her. 
Now take variations toward the other extreme, where her certainty that she will 
be causally determined to return the money approaches 1. In this range of cases Sue 
would be reasoning from the strength of her conviction that she will return the money 
to her obligation to do so. So her reasoning with respect to the action-guiding function 
                                                 
16
 I am assuming that Sue accepts the truth of determinism. Of course, if she were convinced of the 
falsity of determinism the argument thus far would give her no reason to question whether she has the 
obligation. That would take a different argument, which I will not attempt to formulate here. For an 
argument that indeterminism may be incompatible with moral rightness, wrongness, and obligation, see 
Haji (1999, 190-202). Haji (2002, ch. 6) argues that there is one kind of libertarian theory (Alfred 
Mele’s) that can accommodate some (although too little) deontic morality. I will not here consider the 
range of cases where Sue’s certainty as to the truth of determinism lies at different points on a scale 
between 0 and 1. In order for it to be productive to do so I would first need to establish a position 
concerning the compatibility of moral obligation with the falsity of determinism, as well as the practical 
implications of such a position – issues which are beyond the scope of this chapter. 
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of obligations would seem to be the wrong way around, rendering the obligation 
useless in terms of its action-guiding function. That is, she must be fairly certain that 
she will return the money in order to believe that she has the obligation to do so. But 
in this situation it would not be the obligation that would be motivating her (directly) 
to return the money, but, strangely, her belief about what she will in fact do in the 
future based on her assessment of her current psychological condition (the strength of 
her belief that she will in fact return the money). If she has fully internalized the 
derivation from (3)-(6)17 she must be reasoning about her situation in something like 
the following way: “I’m only going to return this money if I have a moral obligation to 
do so. I accept that if determinism is true and I’m causally determined to keep the 
money then I have no obligation to return it. But, I feel quite strongly that I do have an 
obligation to return it. But why do I feel like I have this obligation? I’m an intelligent 
person and so I shouldn’t just assume such things. Perhaps I have the obligation 
because not to return the money would be wrong. But it can’t be wrong unless I have 
an obligation to return it,18 and I’m only obligated to return it if I will in fact return it 
(and I have no other reason to return it besides being obligated to do so). So does it 
seem likely that I will return it?” etc. In terms of guiding her action, the obligation in 
this situation is psychologically secondary to, because derived from, her belief about 
                                                 
17
 Of course, implications of determinism are not the sort of thing that generally occurs to people when 
they are doing their grocery shopping, or at any other time. It may be psychologically near impossible, 
or at least very difficult, to reason in this way in practical situations. And even if it is possible it 
certainly seems to be very unnatural to do so. Nevertheless, we must assume that Sue is fully rational, 
that she does accept the derivation, and that she is prepared to subject her moral beliefs to rational 
scrutiny in this way. 
18
 I am assuming that Sue also accepts OW, which implies that her not returning the money can only be 
morally wrong if she is under an obligation to return it. I discuss this principle in section 1.6. Even 
though I have stipulated that there could be nothing other than the perceived obligation that could 
motivate Sue to return the money, I am happy for it to also occur to her that keeping the money would 
be wrong, in order to have the example be as realistic as possible (I really just want to exclude such 
things as fear, empathy, and conditioned responses from her reasoning). It might now be objected that it 
is Sue’s sense that keeping the money would be wrong, rather than her sense that she is obligated to 
return it, that can motivate her. I address this issue in section 1.6. Here I assume that Sue accepts what I 
have to say there. 
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what she will in fact do. So it’s not really or not fundamentally the obligation that’s 
(directly) guiding her action – it’s her belief about what she’s causally determined to 
do. The obligation here, I propose, is practically redundant, or near redundant, as it is 
not serving its essential action-guiding function. Sue can only believe she has the 
obligation to the extent that she believes she will return the money. Therefore, from a 
practical perspective, determinism also undermines these kinds of obligations. 
This conclusion may require some further explanation. Implicit in my 
argument here is the claim that obligations function to motivate us to do (or refrain 
from doing) things that we otherwise would not be inclined to do (or to refrain from 
doing). I think this claim is true. This is why I stipulated in this case that there could 
be nothing other than the obligation, as well as perhaps the sense that keeping the 
money might be wrong, that could motivate Sue to return the money.19 Otherwise, 
consideration of her fear of getting caught, her empathy towards the cashier, her moral 
conditioning, etc., could cloud our judgment as to the action-guiding force of the 
obligation. The obligation must be considered in complete isolation from these other 
potentially motivating factors. I think that as a general point, when we do consider 
obligations in isolation from these other sorts of factors, it becomes clear that their 
only function in a moral system is to guide our actions. That is, they are needed in a 
moral system due to the fact that we don’t always want to do what we believe morality 
requires of us. Kant (1785/1981, Ak 414) essentially makes this point when he 
contrasts the will of rational (human) beings with the holy (perfectly good) will: 
‘Therefore, no imperatives hold for the divine will, and in general for a holy will; the 
ought is here out of place, because the would is already of itself necessarily in 
                                                 
19
 This is also why I claimed that if Sue’s belief that she had the obligation were fairly weak (say, less 
than 0.5) then this belief would not be strong enough to outweigh her reasons for acting in such a way 
as to violate it. 
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agreement with the [moral] law. Consequently, imperatives are only formulas for 
expressing the relation of objective laws of willing in general to the subjective 
imperfection of the will of this or that rational being, e.g., the human will.’ 
When Sue is considering reasons for and against returning the money, it must 
be the case, in order for the example to be of any relevance, that the only reason she 
has for returning it is a perceived obligation to do so – after all, she needs the 
textbooks, etc. and so would prefer not to have the obligation. So if it were not that she 
felt the obligation fairly strongly she would have no reason to return the money. 
Considered as such in isolation, and given the fact that Sue has accepted the truth of 
the derivation, I think it becomes clear that in order for the obligation to serve its 
purpose and motivate Sue to do the thing that she otherwise would not do, she has to 
have a fairly high level of certainty that she does in fact have the obligation. If she 
lacks this high level of certainty then the obligation could not motivate her to act in 
accordance with it.  
However, if she does have a level of certainty sufficient for the obligation to 
motivate her to act in accordance with it, then, due to the fact that there are no other 
factors that are motivating her to return the money (as stipulated), as well as her 
acceptance of the derivation, she must already be fairly certain that she will return the 
money. But why would she feel certain that she will return the money in this case? 
Given that she has good reasons not to return the money (it would enable her to buy 
her books, etc.) and only one (possible) reason to return it (the obligation) it should 
seem much more likely to her, as a prediction, that she will keep the money rather than 
return it. Therefore, it should seem much more likely to her that she doesn’t have the 
obligation. So, even if Sue starts out believing that she probably does have the 
obligation, and we accept that she could thus be motivated to return the money on the 
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strength of this belief, her consideration of the derivation should result in her 
questioning this belief to the point where the perceived obligation cannot do the 
action-guiding work that is its only purpose. It seems then, that no matter what the 
strength of Sue’s initial conviction as to whether she has an obligation the obligation 
itself cannot play much of a role in guiding her actions. 
A somewhat different objection might be thought to pose a problem for my 
claim that determinism is inconsistent with obligations that we are causally determined 
to satisfy. Consider, for instance, a variation of the case of Jim given above. Imagine 
that Jim is not merely sick, but suffering from a terminal illness, and unaware of the 
severity of his condition. Jim has no family, and I have been able to use this fact to 
persuade his doctor to share the information about his condition. The doctor is the only 
other person aware of Jim’s impending death, but happens to be out of town for a few 
days on emergency medical business. I am considering whether I have an obligation to 
tell Jim the bad news or to keep quiet and allow his doctor to tell him in a few days 
(Jim is expected to live at least that long). On the one hand, I believe that as I am the 
only person in a position to give Jim the news right now, and as I do know him fairly 
well, I may be obligated to tell him myself; let’s say I am about 50% certain that I 
have this obligation. On the other hand, I feel that under the circumstances it is only 
proper for Jim’s doctor to tell Jim the news: I reason that the doctor was responsible 
for the prognosis, and information of this sort ought to be confidential between doctor 
and patient. Assume that I feel roughly 50% sure that I have an obligation to allow the 
doctor to tell Jim the news instead of doing it myself. As I only have two options in 
this case: to tell Jim myself or to keep quiet and allow the doctor to tell him, it might 
seem that either of these perceived obligations would be certain enough to guide my 
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actions.20 For instance, if I focus on the possibility that I have an obligation to tell Jim 
myself, then although I am only 50% certain that I have this obligation, this degree of 
certainty would be sufficient to motivate me to tell him. Furthermore, it would seem 
that even if I am uncertain that determinism is false and even if I accept the 
proposition that if I am causally determined to violate a perceived obligation then I 
don’t have that obligation, these considerations would be insufficient to completely 
undermine the action-guiding usefulness of either of these perceived obligations, i.e., 
either one could still motivate me to act. 
I think this is a persuasive case, but I am uncertain that it constitutes a clear 
counterexample to my claim. With respect to my predicament in the example, if I have 
accepted the argument up to this point, i.e., if I have accepted that I cannot have 
obligations I am causally determined to violate, then I am in a position whereby it is 
questionable for me whether any perceived obligation is really an obligation. That is, 
anytime I find myself wondering whether I might have an obligation to perform or 
refrain from performing some action, in order to be consistent with my acceptance of 
the derivation I must view my perceived obligation as conditional on the obtaining of 
the future state of affairs whereby I perform (or refrain from performing) the action 
required to satisfy it. 
So I cannot start out, in this case or any other, by asking ‘Where lies my 
obligation?’ I must begin by considering whether I have an obligation at all. 
Therefore, it seems that I must reason through my situation in two stages. First, I must 
consider the possibility that I am causally determined not to tell Jim of his 
                                                 
20
 This case is similar to the case of a moral dilemma, where it is thought that an agent can have equally 
compelling moral obligations to perform two mutually incompatible actions (that is, two actions that 
she cannot both perform). I have addressed moral dilemmas above. This case seems to be different, 
however, as here I am simply uncertain whether my obligation is to tell Jim or to refrain from telling 
him (I don’t believe that I have obligations to do both). 
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predicament. In this case I must believe that I couldn’t have an obligation to tell him, 
as I couldn’t satisfy that obligation. Under this supposition I have very little 
motivation to tell him on the basis of an obligation to do so. Next, I must consider the 
possibility that I am causally determined to tell him. In this case I must believe that I 
couldn’t have an obligation to refrain from telling him, as I couldn’t satisfy that 
obligation. Under this supposition I have very little motivation to refrain from telling 
him on the basis of an obligation to refrain. So in each case my perceived obligation 
is insufficiently strong to motivate me to act. Of course, because of the nature of the 
case I must either tell him or not (there are no other possibilities). But, it does not 
follow that I must do either of these things on the basis of an obligation to do so. And I 
have argued that a 50% certainty that I have an obligation is insufficient to motivate 
me in either case (whether I am causally determined to tell him or to not tell him). I 
may decide to tell him because I feel an overwhelming sense of sympathy for him or 
because I’m tired of deliberating about the matter or because I want an answer to the 
question of whether or not I am causally determined to tell him. Or, if I am 
particularly callous, I may simply walk away and forget the whole thing. But either 
way, it cannot because of any obligation that I do what I do. 
It seems then, that if determinism and OIC are true, an agent cannot be under a 
moral obligation with respect to an action irrespective of whether or not s/he is 
causally determined to act in accordance with the obligation. 
 
1.6 Moral Wrongness and Moral Obligation 
In this final section I provide support for the final conclusion of the derivation 
(7). My purpose here is to establish that if determinism is incompatible with moral 
obligation then it is also incompatible with moral wrongness (and the moral rightness 
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of obligatory right actions) due to the interdependence relations between these notions. 
As noted above, non-obligatory right actions provide an exception to this 
interdependence, in that these are actions that are considered morally right absent any 
obligation to perform them. I will not here provide an argument for the incompatibility 
of determinism with non-obligatory right actions. This section will differ in an 
important respect from the preceding ones. In the preceding sections I was arguing for 
a more controversial claim, that the truth of determinism leads, via OIC, to the 
undermining of moral obligation. Here, I will be defending a more intuitively 
plausible claim, that an act [omission] can be morally wrong only if the agent 
performing it [not performing it] was under a moral obligation to not perform it 
[perform it]. The direction of entailment here should be noted. The other direction of 
entailment, that we cannot be under a moral obligation to perform [not perform] some 
action unless it is the case that not performing [performing] the action would be 
wrong, is so intuitively plausible, that it will not concern me. In fact it is probably 
analytic. I am trying to establish the general claim instanced by premise (2), which I 
will refer to as OW (following Haji 1999, 183): 
OW: It is morally wrong for agent S to perform [not perform] action A iff S is 
under a moral obligation not to perform [to perform] A, 
and the less intuitive direction of entailment (left to right) will be the focus. I will not 
attempt to provide a positive argument for this claim, as I think it is intuitively 
plausible. I will only defend the claim against a putative objection. 
The objection I will consider involves an alleged counterexample. In 
responding to Haji, who stipulates that OW is a ‘standard principle of moral 
obligation,’ Derk Pereboom (2001, 147) describes a case in which he thinks it is 
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plausible that it is morally wrong for an agent to perform some action, yet it is not the 
case that the agent has a moral obligation to refrain: 
‘For example, suppose you say to an animal-abuser, “You ought not to abuse 
that animal,” but then you find out that he has a psychological condition 
(which he could have done nothing to prevent) that makes animal-abusing 
irresistible for him, so that he cannot help but abuse the animal. From my point 
of view, there is an appreciably strong pull to admitting that the “ought” 
judgment was false, but there is relatively little to denying that abusing the 
animal is morally wrong for him.’ 
I agree with Pereboom that it seems more reasonable to claim that abusing the animal 
is wrong for the animal abuser, than it does to claim that despite his condition he is 
under a moral obligation to refrain from abusing. Nevertheless, I take this as merely a 
prima facie judgment, and I think there are considerations compatible with the truth of 
OW that may explain why we mistakenly feel that OW fails here. 
First, our judgments about compulsive behavior are not straightforward. It is 
not clear that we believe that abusing animals can really be irresistible for this man, or 
similarly, that drinking really is irresistible for the alcoholic, or stealing for the 
kleptomaniac, etc. (I have more to say below about why this is important.) Second, 
there are important differences in connotations between the moral concepts of 
wrongness and obligation. Although this is a subtle point, it seems that judgments of 
moral wrongness are of a more general character, or seem to apply in a more general 
or universal way, than judgments of moral obligation. Very often we are thought to 
have obligations due to some agreement or contract we have made, or responsibility 
we have willingly taken on, whereas judgments of moral wrongness have more of a 
categorical feel: they seem to apply to types of actions, such as murder or animal 
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abuse, irrespective of any particular circumstances in which agents perform these 
actions. Of course, we do recognize certain ‘standing’ moral obligations such as 
obligations to refrain from lying, stealing, and so on – obligations that seem to apply 
categorically. On the flip-side, it is also true that there are certain actions we consider 
morally wrong only within some specific circumstances and not generally. Actions 
that serve to break promises are good examples of this kind of morally wrong action. 
So are actions that fail to account for specific needs or aversions of people with whom 
we interact. For example, showing a picture of a spider to someone or offering meat to 
someone would not be considered wrong unless we know (or have not bothered to find 
out) that the person in question is an arachnophobe or a moral vegetarian, respectively. 
Nevertheless, it does seem that the connotations of these notions differ: in contrast to 
wrong actions there are many more obligatory actions that are only obligatory because 
of the specific circumstances in which they are performed. So when we are presented 
with a case wherein the notions of wrongness and obligation both apply, but where 
any mention of specific arrangements (contract, promise, etc.) are absent, such as in 
Pereboom’s example, we feel less inclined to maintain the judgment of obligation 
when an element like compulsion is introduced, than we do the judgment of 
wrongness. 
So because we feel that instances of animal abuse are always simply 
(categorically) wrong, because we see these as falling under an action-type that we 
strongly feel to be categorically wrong, we are less likely to think that such judgments 
are undermined by (possibly dubious) claims about irresistible psychological 
compulsion. An upshot of this is that in cases of actions where we would ordinarily or 
prereflectively feel that the moral notions of wrongness and obligation both apply, it 
takes a much stronger and more convincing reason to persuade us to relinquish our 
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judgment that the action is wrong than it does to persuade us to relinquish our 
judgment that the agent performing the action is under an obligation not to perform it. 
Whether someone is under an obligation to act or refrain from acting in some way is 
an issue about which we feel less certain or less strongly, as obligation seems to be a 
less categorical notion than wrongness, i.e., our judgments about it seem more subject 
to fluctuation according to contingencies presented in particular cases. Thus we are 
more likely to have our intuitions compromised by certain features of cases that 
exploit this uncertainty, just like Pereboom’s use of psychological compulsion. 
I think that the abovementioned cases of the arachnophobe and the vegetarian 
serve to give us some insight into why we might think there is a problem with OW. It 
seems that in these cases the actions in question are (prereflectively) certainly wrong, 
but it’s not really clear in what sense the agents performing them were under 
obligations to refrain. Nevertheless, there is a third consideration that seems relevant. I 
think we also need to distinguish between two distinct kinds of implications of the 
notion of obligation. The case of promise-breaking can be usefully contrasted with the 
cases of the arachnophobe and the vegetarian (and the animal abuser) in order to 
highlight this distinction. It may even be useful, due to the difference in implications, 
to label these different kinds of obligations ‘type-1’ and ‘type-2,’ although the 
distinction here is subtle and intuitive – referring to (perhaps unrecognized) 
differences in implications and not to differences between types of action per se. I will 
refer to type-1 obligations as those for which the judgment of obligation is logically 
prior to any other form of moral assessment of actions. Promise-breaking seems a 
paradigm example of this kind of obligation. When a person performs some action that 
amounts to the breaking of a promise, all other forms of moral assessment of the 
person and the action are plausibly derived from, or dependent upon, the judgment that 
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an obligation has been violated. So the action of breaking the promise is wrong and 
the promise breaker bad, but only because the obligation has been violated. The fact 
that an obligation has been violated, it seems, is the only basis for these other moral 
judgments.21 On the other hand, type-2 obligations have quite different implications. 
These obligations are plausibly dependent upon other forms of moral assessment, and 
it is in cases of these kinds of obligations that OW seems less certain. With respect to 
the vegetarian example, if I know that a person is disgusted and offended at the idea of 
eating meat, then the intuitive force of the judgment that it is wrong of me to offer her 
meat is strong and obvious. But in what sense, if at all, am I under an obligation to 
refrain? It seems that my obligation in this case is only derivative, i.e., I am under an 
obligation to refrain from offering meat to a vegetarian only because doing so would 
be wrong, and I have a standing obligation to refrain from performing actions that are 
wrong. Yet am I under this obligation, even though it is merely derivative? Of course I 
am (barring, of course, considerations of determinism and OIC). At least it initially 
seems much more plausible that I am than that I am not, and I think that a good reason 
would need to be given for the rejection of the claim that I am. 
I think the reason we may be uncertain about the claim that I am under an 
obligation in the vegetarian case is that our judgment in this respect is made from 
                                                 
21
 In making these claims and distinctions I am assuming the perspective of commonsense morality 
rather than a revisionist view such as utilitarianism. For a relatively unsophisticated act-utilitarian, for 
example, all and only obligatory actions are the particular ones, given the circumstances, that maximize 
utility, so keeping a promise (or refraining from breaking one) will never be obligatory per se. 
Nevertheless, my distinction between type-1 and type-2 obligations could still be recognized by such a 
utilitarian, even though it would not relate directly to action-types such as promise-breaking, and may in 
fact not be a very illuminating distinction to recognize. That is, for an act-utilitarian who performs an 
action that fails to maximize utility, it’s unclear whether that action is wrong in virtue of the fact that 
the utilitarian has a standing obligation to maximize utility (thus violating her type-1 obligation), or 
whether it’s wrong, due to the fact that it fails to maximize utility, and the utilitarian has violated her (in 
this case, type-2) obligation to maximize utility in virtue of the fact that she has performed a wrong 
action. Either way, assuming the animal abuser is failing to maximize utility I don’t think such a 
utilitarian view can help to shed much light on whether he is under an obligation to refrain (although I 
think it may be difficult for a utilitarian to deny that he is under an obligation to refrain, assuming that 
the notion of obligation plays a role in her moral outlook at all). 
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under the shadow of the implications of type-1 obligations, i.e., obligations that are the 
primary, non-derivative form of moral assessment in the cases to which they apply (as 
in the case of promise-breaking). When we have this kind of obligation in mind, 
perhaps unconsciously, we are tempted to think that the other, weaker, derivative kind 
of obligation is, perhaps by comparison, not really an obligation at all. But, I suggest, 
we should appreciate that type-2 obligations are no less obligations because they are 
derivative and dependent on other forms of moral assessment, and thus intuitively less 
strong or obvious than type-1 obligations. 
Bearing this distinction between type-1 and type-2 obligations in mind, what 
do we now think of the case of the animal abuser? Perhaps if we temporarily remove 
the element of compulsion from the example we may get a clearer picture. He is not 
under a type-1 obligation, as neither the wrongness of his action nor our negative 
assessment of his character seem to be derived from an obligation on his part to refrain 
from abusing; we may assume that he has made no explicit promise or contract to 
refrain from abusing (he is not, e.g., a veterinarian). But is he nonetheless under a 
type-2 (derivative) obligation? If it were not for the fact that he is psychologically 
compelled to abuse (or that determinism and OIC are true) there would be no reason to 
think that he was not under this kind of obligation, as, I propose, we are always under 
obligations to refrain from performing actions that would be wrong to perform. So 
why should the fact of his compulsion leave unaffected the judgment that his action is 
wrong, while calling into question the judgment that he was under a (type-2) 
obligation to refrain? As in the vegetarian case, we may have the impression that the 
obligation, being a type-2 obligation, is somewhat weak, due to our (perhaps 
unconsciously) contrasting it with the more robust and obvious type-1 obligations and 
the strong intuition that, at least in general, abusing animals is morally wrong. I think 
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this is right. This kind of obligation is weaker, as it is derived from the wrongness of 
the action via the principle that we are always under obligations to refrain from 
performing actions that would be wrong to perform (as long as we are able to refrain, 
of course). Nevertheless, if I am right about type-2 obligations, in that they apply 
derivatively to any and all actions that are wrong, then if the wrongness of the action 
remains despite the compulsion, the type-2 obligation does as well, and the only way 
this kind of obligation can be cancelled is if the action is not wrong. 
Finally, if it is reasonable to conclude on the basis of the arguments presented 
thus far, that determinism undermines the wrongness of all particular actions of a 
certain type, then it is reasonable to conclude that it also undermines the wrongness of 
the relevant type. For example, if it is the case that no particular action that involves 
the deliberate killing of an innocent human being can be morally wrong if determinism 
is true, then I take it to follow that it is not the case that murder is wrong if 
determinism is true. My analysis of Pereboom’s example turns on the intuitive 
difference between moral wrongness and moral obligation, my claim being that we 
tend to think of the concept of wrong actions as applying more generally or 
universally than the concept of actions we are obligated to perform/not perform. This 
is perhaps another reason why we might be skeptical of OW (which states that an 
action is wrong only if we are under an obligation to refrain from performing it) when 
we apply it to the example. But I think this discrepancy between OW and our 
judgment about the example can be ironed out if we attend to the relevant intuitions 
and beliefs involved. Even though we generally tend to think of wrong actions in 
terms of abstract types of actions that are wrong –  e.g., murder, abusing animals – 
upon reflection, if we were to think about why we consider these types wrong, we 
should come to realize that we can only justify thinking the type wrong on the basis of 
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our belief that all the instances of the type are wrong. In this way, even though we may 
prereflectively consider the abstract type of action ‘abusing animals’ to be wrong 
simpliciter and irrespective of obligation, upon reflection I think we should come to 
see that the only reason this type could be wrong is that all the instances of it are, and 
if I am right about type-2 obligations, then in all the instances it seems that the agent 
in question is under an obligation to refrain. 
In this section I presented several considerations that come to bear on why we 
may be inclined to think that OW fails in Pereboom’s animal abuser example. One 
concerns the differences in connotations between the concepts of wrongness and 
obligation, my claim being that wrongness is more of a categorical notion, having 
connotations of generality and universality, whereas obligation has connotations of 
specificity and contingency. Another concerns the differences in two kinds of 
implication of the notion of obligation. Type-1 obligations imply the logical priority of 
the obligation over any other moral assessment of the actions to which they apply, i.e., 
any moral judgment other than that of obligation is derived from this judgment. By 
contrast, type-2 obligations imply a dependence of the judgment of obligation on some 
other moral judgment – in this case, a judgment of wrongness. Finally, and building 
on these two considerations, it seems that even though we generally think of wrong 
actions (as opposed to obligatory actions) as abstract types of actions, I think that with 
a little reflection we should come to see that we can only justify thinking that the types 
are wrong by means of our belief that all the instances of them are wrong, and all the 
instances, it seems, carry with them type-2 obligations to refrain. So if any action is 
wrong, there will be a corresponding obligation (albeit a relatively weak one) on the 
part of the agent to refrain from performing it. 
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I have now argued that an action cannot be morally wrong unless the agent 
performing it is under an obligation to refrain from performing it. From this claim it 
follows that the truth of determinism, combined with OIC, undermines judgments of 
moral wrongness of actions. 
 
1.7 Conclusion 
The arguments presented in this chapter have been aimed at illustrating some 
of the implications of determinism for what is perhaps the most fundamental and 
important of the moral notions: wrongness. My overall aim has been to try to establish 
that determinism undermines moral wrongness. The argument given on page 2 showed 
that if ‘ought’ implies ‘can,’ we can never genuinely be under moral obligations that 
we are causally determined to violate. After defending OIC from objections, I argued 
that due to the action-guiding function of moral obligations and the fact that we need 
to be confident that we have them in order for them to play this role, we have good 
reason to think that we can also not be under moral obligations that we are causally 
determined to satisfy. In the final section I defended the final conclusion of the initial 
argument concerning moral wrongness. I argued that judgments of all actions, right 
and wrong, that we believe ourselves to be under obligations to perform or refrain 
from performing, are straightforwardly undermined if the initial argument is correct. 
These include all wrong actions and obligatory right actions. 
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CHAPTER 2 
HOW BELIEF IN DETERMINISM THREATENS RATIONAL DELIBERATION 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Can an agent deliberate rationally while believing that her process of 
deliberation is causally determined by factors beyond her control? There are reasons to 
think that this should not be possible. While helping us to better understand why belief 
in determinism might conflict with deliberation, I will argue that these reasons also 
constitute compelling evidence for the conclusion that it in fact does so. I begin by 
considering several recent accounts according to which rational deliberation is 
compatible with the agent’s belief that she is causally determined. I contend that these 
accounts, while largely successful given one specific characterization of the problem, 
do not address the core issues from which it arises. Drawing on arguments from 
Thomas Nagel and Brian O’Shaughnessy, I respond to this compatibilist position by 
developing two complementary proposals for identifying these underlying core issues, 
which concern the motivation, sense of control, and psychological integration required 
for rational deliberation. I argue that an appreciation of these resulting requirements 
for rational deliberation makes it plausible that they cannot be met by an agent who 
believes that her deliberative process is causally determined. 
 
2.2 Motivating the Problem 
Aristotle was perhaps the first to identify the challenge to the compatibility of 
determinism with deliberation. He claims that if ‘everything is and happens of 
necessity…there would be no need to deliberate or to take trouble (thinking that if we 
do this, this will happen, but if we do not, it will not)’ (Aristotle, De Interpretatione 
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18b26). Relatedly, the ‘lazy’ or ‘idle’ argument, which appears to have originated at 
least as early as the Stoic Chrysippus in the third century BCE, runs as follows. ‘If it is 
fated for you to recover from this disease, then you will recover, whether you call in a 
doctor or not; similarly, if it is fated for you not to recover from this disease, then you 
will not recover, whether you call in a doctor or not. But one or the other is fated; so 
there is no point in calling in a doctor.’ Generalized, and interpreting ‘fate’ as fate-
determinism1 the argument appears to show that if determinism is true there is no 
point in doing anything. According to Cicero, ‘if we obeyed this we would do nothing 
at all in life’ (Cicero, On Fate 28-9). Although the conclusion of the argument 
concerns motivation for action rather than deliberation, it would seem that if there’s no 
point in doing anything then there’s no point in deliberating about doing anything. I 
argue below that deliberation is an active process that requires effort and motivation, 
so if the lazy argument applies to action in general, it would apply to deliberation as 
well. More recently, Richard Taylor (1966, 182) has argued that ‘if a man believes, 
concerning some of the actions he is going to perform, that there already exist 
conditions causally sufficient for his performing them, and conditions which therefore 
render them inevitable, then he cannot deliberate whether or not to perform them.’2 
                                                 
1
 For Chrysippus, ‘fate’ seems to incorporate both the modern mechanistic aspect of causal determinism 
as well as a teleological element involving the ‘one Cause’ or the ‘Reason of the universe.’ The 
relations between the notions of fate, providence, necessity, and causal determinism in Stoic philosophy 
are quite complex, but the one thread that seems to tie most of these elements together (with the 
possible exception of the teleological ones) is inevitability, which would seem to be implied both by 
‘determinism’ as well as the central notions of ‘fate’ (cf. Bobzien 1998, ch. 1; Long and Sedley 1987, 
340, 342-343). Although the inclusion in the lazy argument of the clause ‘whether you call the doctor or 
not’ suggests localized rather than global inevitability (i.e., it is only your living or dying that is 
inevitable rather than whether or not you call the doctor, or anything else) this does not matter a great 
deal for the purposes of this chapter. I include this argument as background primarily to indicate that 
the general concern I am discussing here is not new. 
2
 It will be apparent that while both the lazy argument and the quotation from Aristotle seem to concern 
inevitability per se, my focus, as indicated by Taylor’s claim, is on the implications for a deliberator of 
believing that such inevitability applies to her deliberative situation. It may be noted, however, that both 
of the earlier quotations could readily be interpreted in terms of the epistemic issue, as Cicero seems to 
have done with respect to the lazy argument. 
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Thomas Nagel provides a particularly illuminating characterization of the 
problem, although in a broader framework. He draws our attention to two seemingly 
irreconcilable perspectives we can adopt toward our actions. On the one hand, we 
naturally (and, he thinks, unavoidably) assume an internal standpoint when we act. 
Our sense of our own autonomy takes the form of certain beliefs we hold about 
ourselves and our relation to the world. We believe, for instance, that we are not 
causally determined to act in the ways we do by antecedent circumstances, whether 
these involve facts about the world or about us. We believe that we generally have a 
range of open possibilities available to us when we act, and when, by acting, we make 
one of those possibilities actual, the final explanation of why we did what we did is to 
be found only in our intentions, thereby our justifying reasons and purposes (Nagel 
1986, 115). We are, we might say, the ultimate source of our actions. 
In contrast to this internal standpoint we are also able to adopt an external view 
of our actions whereby we see them objectively, from the point of view of an observer. 
From this perspective we see ‘not only the circumstances of action as they present 
themselves to the agent, but also the conditions and influences lying behind the action, 
including the complete nature of the agent himself’ (113). Viewed this way, an action 
seems to happen to us rather than being something we do. Whether or not we think of 
our actions as causally determined, this view allows no room for any explanation of 
action that is not causal. So, viewing ourselves and our actions merely as causes and 
effects, ‘we cease to face the world and instead become parts of it; we and our lives 
are seen as products and manifestations of the world as a whole’ (114). Importantly, 
Nagel thinks that this objective view ‘produces a sense of impotence and futility with 
respect to what we do ourselves’ (112). Although he doesn’t specifically discuss the 
implications for deliberation, it would not involve an injustice to him to extend his 
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point here in the following way. When we adopt this view, our attitude toward the 
objects of our deliberation tends to take on an aspect of ambivalence or resignation, 
perhaps appropriately described as the generalized conclusion of the lazy argument, 
that is, “What’s the point in doing anything?” ‘The sense that we are being carried 
along by the universe like small pieces of flotsam’ (112) describes the spectatorial 
rather than participant attitude we take toward our own lives that results from taking 
an external point of view, and this seems to come into conflict with some of the 
prereflective assumptions we hold while engaging in a process of deliberation. 
 
2.3 Belief in the Availability of Multiple Possibilities for Action 
One feature noticeably absent from this picture is an explanation of why this 
drastic change in our attitudes occurs, or in Nagel’s words, ‘what intelligible belief 
[about our autonomy] is undermined by the external view’ (117). What is it about the 
internal perspective that is lost when we view our actions naturalistically – as simply 
parts of causal processes? What exactly is it about deliberation in particular that seems 
imperiled by the belief that the deliberative process and its results are determined? The 
one strand that seems common among the descriptions of the problem given above is 
that when we view an action from an external standpoint, or more specifically, as 
causally determined,3 we can no longer regard it as the realization of one out of a 
range of actions genuinely available to us. Peter van Inwagen (1983, 155) 
characterizes this aspect of deliberation in the following way. ‘[I]f someone 
deliberates about whether to do A or to do B, it follows that his behavior manifests a 
belief that it is possible for him to do A – that he can do A, that he has it within his 
power to do A – and a belief that it is possible for him to do B.’ But, it is argued, if 
                                                 
3
 According to Nagel, thinking of our actions as determined is not the only way to produce the effect of 
viewing them from the external perspective, but it is the easiest (110). 
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determinism is true these beliefs are false: it is never within our power to perform an 
action other than the one we are causally determined to perform. So it might seem that 
an essential feature of deliberation is lost if determinism is true. As Taylor explains,  
…the thesis of determinism entails that, in the case of any action that any man 
ever performs, there are conditions antecedent to his action which render it 
causally impossible for him to perform any other. Deliberation on the other 
hand, presupposes that an action which one contemplates doing, and 
concerning which he deliberates, has been rendered neither causally impossible 
nor causally inevitable by any conditions obtaining at the time of deliberation 
(Taylor 1966, 182). 
The claim is that engaging in a process of deliberation requires a belief that one 
genuinely has alternative possibilities for action. Belief that causal determinism is true 
is apt to conflict with this, since one will believe of any of the alternatives one is 
considering while deliberating, that it is either eliminated as a genuine possibility, or 
will occur inevitably, excluding any other possibility. Thus one will believe that only 
one alternative one considers while deliberating is genuinely open, which would 
contradict a belief required for deliberation given Taylor’s view. 
 
2.4 Deliberation-Compatibilism 
In order to resist this conclusion, deliberation-compatibilists such as Tomis 
Kapitan (1986), Dana Nelkin (2004), and Derk Pereboom (2008)4 advocate replacing 
the requirement of a belief in genuine or metaphysical alternatives on the part of the 
deliberating agent with an epistemic openness and consistency requirement which, it is 
                                                 
4
 See also Philip Pettit (1989) and John Searle (2001). 
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claimed, is possible for agents to satisfy even if they believe determinism to be true. 
Pereboom’s formulation is: 
(S) In order to deliberate rationally among distinct actions A1…An, for each 
Ai, S cannot be certain of the proposition that she will do Ai, nor of the 
proposition that she will not do Ai; and either (a) the proposition that she will 
do Ai is consistent with every proposition that, in the present context, is settled 
for her, or (b) if it is inconsistent with some such proposition, she cannot 
believe that it is, 
and, 
a proposition is ‘settled’ for an agent just in case she believes it and disregards 
any doubt she has that it is true, e.g., for the purpose of deliberation (Pereboom 
2008, 294). 
These authors agree, however, that epistemic openness by itself is not sufficient for the 
possibility of deliberation, as van Inwagen’s ‘two-door’ example shows. Here an agent 
finds himself in a room with only two doors, one of which he believes to be unlocked, 
the other locked and impassable, although he does not know which is which. Van 
Inwagen thinks the reason this man is unable to deliberate about which door to leave 
by is that I can’t deliberate about whether to perform a certain action unless I believe it 
is possible for me to perform it (van Inwagen 1983, 154). Here it seems as though the 
fact that the agent believes his options to be open in the sense required by (S) – he has 
no certain beliefs about what he will do, and each possibility he imagines is consistent 
with what is settled for him – is insufficient to allow him to deliberate about which 
door to leave by.5 Pereboom’s solution, following suggestions by Kapitan and Nelkin, 
                                                 
5
 Both Nelkin and Pereboom agree that, although the agent can’t deliberate about which door to open, 
he can deliberate about which door to try to open (Pereboom 2008, 297). I do not think this is clearly 
the case, however, as it seems to me as though genuine deliberation requires that the deliberator have, 
or at least believe himself to be capable of finding, some evaluative basis for differentiating between his 
options. Van Inwagen’s example is not described in much detail, but if we imagine that there is no 
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is to supplement the openness condition with a condition that captures the agent’s 
belief that his deliberation will be efficacious in bringing about each action he is 
deliberating about whether to perform – in this case, the opening of each door. To this 
end Pereboom offers: 
(DE) In order to rationally deliberate about whether to do A1 or A2, where A1 
and A2 are distinct actions, an agent must believe that if as a result of her 
deliberating about whether to do A1 or A2 she were to judge that it would be 
best to do A1, then, under normal conditions, she would also, on the basis of 
this deliberation, do A1; and similarly for A2 (Pereboom 2008, 299). 
As Pereboom points out, this condition is not met in the two-door example, but it is 
met in any normal case of deliberation even where the deliberating agent believes the 
truth of determinism and thus believes that she lacks genuine alternative possibilities. 
 
2.5 Interpreting the Problem 
In the discussion so far I have been assuming that the question of whether 
belief in determinism is compatible with deliberation is plausibly interpreted as a 
question of whether it is possible for a rational agent to deliberate and to believe that 
she lacks multiple alternative possibilities for action. It seems that Pereboom’s 
analysis, involving (S) and (DE), adequately answers this question. 
However, perhaps there are beliefs essential to the process of deliberation other 
than those concerning alternative possibilities, and these beliefs are inconsistent with 
belief in determinism. Then the deliberation-compatibilist conditions for rational 
                                                                                                                                            
detectable difference between the two doors such that the agent could find a non-arbitrary reason, based 
on some evaluative distinction, for trying one door instead of the other, the mental process he would be 
engaged in would not properly be called deliberation. (See Pereboom (2008, 298) for an opposing 
view.) Some of what I have to say in section 2.6 should clarify this point. 
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deliberation, although adequate for answering the formulation of the problem in terms 
of alternative possibilities, might nonetheless be missing something that is not 
captured by this formulation. I will now argue that there are such additional beliefs, 
and they concern one’s motivation and sense of control. The lazy argument provides a 
clue: what is the point of trying to work out what to do when you believe that 
whatever you will do is already fixed and unalterable due to causally determining 
factors beyond your control, and you are therefore not its ultimate source?6 But before 
attempting a more precise formulation, we need to be clear about what properly counts 
as deliberation and what does not. 
 
2.6 What is Deliberation? 
Let us begin with a rough characterization of the essence of deliberation: it 
involves a rational agent’s working out what to do from a range of perceived 
alternatives. This already captures several of the important characteristics. First, 
deliberation, often referred to as ‘practical reasoning,’ differs from theoretical 
reasoning in that its goal, or at least its end result, is intention-formation and action 
rather than simply belief-formation. When reasoning theoretically I am trying to work 
out what to believe; when reasoning practically I might be trying to work out what to 
believe, but I am also, and essentially, trying to work out what to do. Second, 
deliberation is a rational process undertaken by a rational agent. Perhaps this 
characteristic is not obvious, although for practical reasons I think it’s best to limit 
discussion of deliberation in the present context to rational deliberation. Finally, the 
                                                 
6
 Given my disagreement with both the deliberation-compatibilists and deliberation-incompatibilists 
such as Taylor and van Inwagen, that the basis of the problem is the incompatibility of belief in 
determinism with a deliberating agent’s sense of being the ultimate source of her actions, rather than her 
believing she has alternative possibilities for action, it would not be inaccurate, following current usage, 
to refer to my position as ‘source deliberation-incompatibilism’ in contrast to what we might call the 
‘leeway deliberation-incompatibilism’ of Taylor and van Inwagen. 
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essential subject-matter of deliberation is always perceived alternatives for action and 
their consequences, whether these alternatives involve simply performing or not 
performing a particular action, or performing one or a subset out of a range of actions 
not all of which can be performed. Now, as the deliberation-compatibilist analysis 
showed, a deliberating agent need not believe that each of her perceived alternatives is 
a genuine possibility for her, but she must at least be considering each of these 
alternatives as options for acting – otherwise, she would have nothing to deliberate 
about. 
This initial characterization clearly does not capture all that’s essential to 
deliberation, but before trying to refine the account further it will be useful to rule out 
of consideration candidates for deliberation that should not properly be considered 
instances of it. From the above points alone we can already see that deliberation is 
distinct from some other psychological processes in that it is active (Pereboom 2008, 
291; Taylor 1966, 168-9). In contrast to, say, daydreaming, reminiscing, worrying, 
remembering (as opposed to trying to remember), or enjoying a good sunset, 
deliberating is something that requires conscious effort and sustained concentration. It 
is also purposeful in that it has a decision to act as its goal (Taylor 1966, 168), and it 
clearly involves a strong sense of involvement in, and control over, both the process 
and the outcome of the process (the resulting action) on the part of the deliberating 
agent. Accordingly, we can exclude as candidates for deliberation certain 
psychological processes such as prediction, vicarious ‘deliberation,’ vacillation, and 
retrospective and hypothetical ‘deliberation.’ 
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(a) Mere prediction is excluded on the grounds that a sense of control over the 
predicted outcome is absent.7 It seems that the extent to which our attitude toward an 
outcome is merely predictive we have no sense of involvement in the process leading 
to the outcome. We are simply observers, perhaps involved to the extent that we might 
be adversely or favorably affected by the outcome, but lacking any ability to control or 
affect the outcome itself. (b) Vicarious deliberation, or deliberating about what 
someone else should do, can also not properly be considered deliberation. We may, for 
example, ‘deliberate’ about what a character in a movie or novel should do, realizing 
all the while that not only are we incapable of affecting what happens, but that the 
events in the story have already been written and played out – we are merely 
spectators with incomplete knowledge of how the events will unfold.8 
Simply vacillating between competing inclinations is excluded due to the 
vacillating agent’s not deliberately adducing and weighing reasons for perceived 
alternative actions, and to his decision’s being based only on the presence of his 
strongest desire at the time he makes it (Taylor 1966, 169-70). Here we may have a 
sense of involvement and even of control over our decision, but the process does not 
engage our reason: we are not weighing reasons for various actions against each other; 
we are simply acting in an unmediated way on present desires. We can assume that 
                                                 
7
 David Velleman (1989, 143) argues that the basis of deliberation is in part theoretical, and in part 
involves motives by which we theorize about our own actions. These motives induce us to seek 
hypotheses that are true of our actions, and also to perform actions that are true to our hypotheses. The 
motives incline us to do whatever we have predicted. So we get ourselves to do things by predicting that 
we will do them. These resulting predictions, if self-describing, constitute intentions to act. Velleman’s 
view is plausible, but I do not believe it threatens my account, as the predictions he has in mind as part 
of deliberative processes are not the relatively simple predictions I want to exclude from the category of 
deliberative processes, even if such predictions take the agent’s own actions as objects. 
8
 In some cases of vicarious deliberation we may feel as though we have some control over how another 
agent will act (say we are trying to help a friend decide what to do), but we recognize that the actions 
the other agent performs are always ultimately under the control of that agent rather than us, and our 
sense of involvement is present only to the extent that we think we can convince, coerce, or otherwise 
motivate the other agent to do what we want him to do. In this way vicarious deliberation amounts to 
little more than a combination of projection and prediction. 
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many non-human animals vacillate in something like this way, but are not capable of 
deliberating. Galen Strawson provides a useful illustration of this process of 
vacillation using the example of a dog choosing between jumping into one of two 
channels of a river in order to save either his master or his mistress (Strawson 1986, 
141-2). Retrospective deliberation, or deliberation about what one should have done 
when the time for action has passed, is not possible, again primarily due to the fact 
that a sense of control over the outcome cannot be present, as well as a realization that 
one is powerless to affect or alter what has already happened. 
Finally, hypothetical deliberation might take the form of either conditional 
deliberation or deliberation ‘off-line.’ Conditional deliberation occurs when a person 
considers what to do if a certain situation obtained in which a decision would be 
required. I think this is difficult to distinguish from genuine deliberation in any 
principled way, and in some cases may properly be thought of as such. This may be 
distinguished from deliberation off-line, where a person may deliberate as if in a 
situation where deliberation is required. This is not genuine deliberation in cases 
where the options considered are too far removed from the deliberator’s actual 
situation for him to feel a sense of personal involvement in the process and to form an 
intention relevant to those options as a result of the process. But again, some cases of 
off-line deliberation may be hard to distinguish from genuine deliberation, especially 
where the situation a person is deliberating about is considered likely to arise. In such 
cases it may be that a person forms a conditional intention that can be called upon 
should the type of situation actually arise. Perhaps vicarious deliberation could in 
some ways be considered a subcategory of off-line deliberation. 
Collecting the results of the previous three sections we can characterize 
deliberation as follows: 
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Deliberation is a practical, rational process engaged in by a rational agent in 
response to the recognition of future practical uncertainty relevant to that 
agent’s actual situation, that causes or activates a felt need to act so as to 
ensure that the uncertainty is resolved in a way favorable to the agent.9 Its 
subject-matter is perceived alternatives for action and their projected 
outcomes, and the process, which essentially involves adducing, comparing, 
and evaluating reasons for and against these perceived alternative actions and 
outcomes, carries with it a sense of the agent’s personal involvement in the 
process and outcome, a sense that the process and outcome are under the 
agent’s control, and a belief that the deliberative process will be causally 
efficacious in bringing about the agent’s preferred alternative, whatever that 
should turn out to be. 
 
2.7 Motivation and Control 
I have already stated my endorsement of the deliberation-compatibilists’ 
resolution of the issue of the compatibility of belief in determinism and its evident 
consequences with the central epistemic conditions required for deliberation. Since I 
agree with the deliberation-compatibilists that a determinist deliberator need not 
believe that it’s possible for her to perform each of the alternative actions she’s 
considering during a process of deliberation, I have conceded that such a deliberator 
need not have inconsistent beliefs when deliberating.10 We may now ask whether the 
                                                 
9
 I do not intend this to exclude altruistic motives. An agent might find it most favorable, for example, 
that agents other than her benefit from whatever she decides to do, perhaps even at great personal cost 
to her. 
10
 I concede this point reluctantly. From a practical, psychological standpoint it seems intuitively 
implausible that a person could deliberate over a range of actions whilst lacking a belief that it’s 
possible for her to perform each. However, I am unable to substantiate this claim directly. The 
remainder of this chapter can in some respects be seen as an attempt to put pressure on the deliberation-
compatibilists’ claim that a requirement of belief in genuine alternative possibilities is unnecessary for 
deliberation. 
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refined characterization of deliberation provides a clue as to what it is about 
deliberation that is threatened when the deliberative process and its results are 
believed by the deliberator to be causally determined by factors beyond the agent’s 
control.11 
Earlier I mentioned that what’s threatened most likely concerns motivation and 
a sense of control on the part of the deliberating agent. So perhaps the refined 
formulation might help to explain this. The aspect of deliberation, formulated as 
above, that seems most relevant to the agent’s motivational state involves the agent’s 
feeling a need to act so as to resolve her perceived practical uncertainty in a way 
favorable to her. So, could a belief that the process and outcome of deliberating are 
determined interfere with this motivational aspect of the process in a way that 
compromises the agent’s ability to deliberate? 
One possibility that stands out is that when we are conceiving of our 
deliberation and its result as determined we take on, to some extent, the attitude of a 
predictor or perhaps a vicarious deliberator. This change in attitude involves a sense of 
a split between what we might think of as our Cartesian selves and the other 
psychological elements involved in deliberation.12 One aspect of vicarious 
                                                 
11
 It may be thought that I have overlooked a simple solution to this compatibility problem, which is 
that the reason a person has difficulty deliberating while simultaneously considering her deliberation as 
causally determined is that deliberation requires too much concentration to be undertaken while at the 
same time applying an abstract notion like inevitability to one’s situation. I think this is mistaken, 
however. First, the inevitability implied by determinism is not particularly difficult to grasp, and 
second, it is fairly easy to deliberate while bearing some other relatively simple metaphysical 
proposition in mind such as that God does or does not exist or that one might be a brain in a vat. I do 
believe it is very difficult to conceive of one’s ongoing thoughts as causally determined, at least for 
very long, but depending on how deep such meditation goes I don’t see that this is necessarily an issue 
having to do with limitations on one’s ability to concentrate. Some of the explanations I give below of 
the difficulties of applying a belief in determinism to one’s deliberation seem to also apply to active 
non-deliberative thought, but I don’t go into any detail about this issue as it is not my primary focus. 
12
 In using the term ‘Cartesian self’ I am departing somewhat from Descartes’ usage in his Second 
Meditation. Here he attributes to the self all that cannot be doubted as illusory, for example, affirmation 
and denial, willing, imagination, and sensory perceptions (Descartes 1641/1996, 28). In using the term I 
am intending to denote a more minimal conception of the self that excludes any mental function, 
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deliberation, as described above, seems relevant: when we begin to view ourselves and 
our deliberative activity as merely parts of the deterministic causal nexus – as 
inevitable and unalterable – it may be that the sense of control we normally take 
ourselves to exert over our weighing of reasons and intention-formation is 
compromised, perhaps seen as illusory.13 14 We would take on what I described above, 
interpreting some of Nagel’s remarks, as a spectatorial attitude, much like the attitude 
we naturally adopt toward a character in a movie. We would predict what a character 
might do given what we take to be his beliefs and desires, and perhaps try to deliberate 
for him, or in his place, to weigh up the pros and cons of the various actions we 
imagine are available to him and work out the best thing for him to do, or the thing we 
would consider best to do were we in his situation. All the while we understand that 
we are unable to influence any of his future actions or any of the events that are 
inevitably going to unfold on the screen. 
So even though motivational aspects remain to some extent in a case of 
vicarious deliberation, our activity is more akin to theoretical reasoning than practical 
reasoning, which can be seen in the fact that the process by itself cannot cause the 
                                                                                                                                            
characteristic, property, etc., that is inessential to a basic awareness of one’s existence, or to whatever it 
is that is required for there to be, in Nagel’s terms, something it is like to be a thing (cf. Nagel 1974). As 
will be seen to be of particular relevance below, willing is excluded. 
13
 Below I claim that intentions are never willed (s. 2.8, n. 17). I do, however, believe that we ordinarily 
assume that we will our intentions, which is why considering them as determined can compromise the 
sense of control we feel we have over them, and thereby (to some extent) the whole deliberative 
process. 
14
 I am not ignoring the possibility that a determinist deliberator may endorse a kind of control that is 
compatible with determinism, such as John Fischer and Mark Ravizza’s ‘guidance control’ (see Fischer 
and Ravizza 1998, ch. 2). But the point here concerns the sense of control one ordinarily takes oneself 
to have when one deliberates, and even though I am unable to directly argue for it here, it is not 
plausible to me that one’s sense of one’s control when one deliberates allows being able to do only what 
one is causally determined to do. Fischer and Ravizza in fact claim that having what they call 
‘regulative’ control (which involves alternative possibilities) at certain important points in our lives is 
the ‘intuitive and natural picture of ourselves’ (28). Whether it is psychologically possible to deliberate 
on the basis of a belief in guidance control alone, and not regulative control, is a further question. 
Considerations raised in the remainder of this chapter should make it plausible that this would be 
insufficient. 
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formation of an intention to act. This could be due to differences in motivation 
involved in each process. In a case of vicarious deliberation we can be motivated to 
engage in a reasoning process that superficially resembles genuine deliberation in the 
sense that we recognize a practical uncertainty and are motivated to consider various 
alternative courses of action, adduce reasons for each, weigh these against one 
another, and come to a conclusion about what would be best to do. But all of these 
activities are of a quite distinct nature from their genuinely deliberative counterparts. 
First, my recognition of uncertainty cannot really be said to be the recognition of 
practical uncertainty on my own part: I am not motivated to work out what I should do 
but what someone else should do. This would be a key difference between the two 
processes. The end result of a reasoning process (be it intention-formation or merely 
belief-formation) would be determined by the kind of motivation that sets the process 
in motion. If I initially engaged in a process motivated by the thought “What should 
Sally do?” or “What would I do if I were Sally?” the resulting process by itself could 
only end with a resolution of this kind of question, i.e., “That’s what Sally should do” 
or “That’s what I would do if I were Sally.” These kinds of thoughts clearly do not 
express intentions (we cannot intend vicariously). The reason vicarious deliberation 
does not produce intentions, again, concerns control. I realize that I do not control the 
actions of the character in the movie, and I also realize, on a very basic level, that the 
scope of things a person can intend is limited to exactly the scope of things that (she 
believes) she can do. Brian O’Shaughnessy makes a similar point, albeit in a different 
context. In formulating an account of the conditions that must be met in order for an 
act to be intentional, he writes, ‘an intentional act must be the exercise of a power that 
is significantly contributory to the success of trying,’ and that ‘to perform an 
intentional [A]-doing…one must at least harbour an intention of trying to do [A]’ 
(O’Shaughnessy 1980, 326). An act is not intentional unless it is an exercise of a 
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power one takes oneself to have, and that one is exercising in an attempt to succeed at 
doing what one intends to do (325-27).15 16 
 
2.8 Causal Efficacy 
There will be an important difference between deliberation under the 
assumption of determinism on the one hand, and these cases of prediction and 
vicarious deliberation on the other, and it concerns causal efficacy. Staying with the 
experience of watching a movie as an illustration of both prediction and vicarious 
deliberation, we can see that there is something missing here that is present in a case 
                                                 
15
 I am assuming that believing that one has the power to do X is roughly equivalent to believing that 
doing X is under one’s control, and that, at least for a rational agent, trying to do X entails believing that 
one has the power to do X, or at least has a high probability of succeeding at doing X if one tries. 
16
 This section and the previous one involve claims that highlight certain fundamental differences 
between the processes of theoretical and practical reasoning, perhaps the most important being that 
intentions can’t be formed solely from theoretical reasoning, and that the motivation needed for 
practical reasoning requires a sense of control that is incompatible with believing the evident 
consequences of determinism. These claims are not uncontroversial. For example, Brian 
O’Shaughnessy’s account of deciding subsumes the processes of theoretical and practical reasoning 
under the one category of activity. He thinks that the event that completes a process of theoretical 
reasoning, which he refers to as ‘deciding whether,’ and the event that completes a process of practical 
reasoning (‘deciding to do’), although necessarily distinct from one another, are ‘reached along the 
same road’ (O’Shaughnessy 1980, 300-301). He gives only one example to substantiate this claim, 
which I believe can be plausibly interpreted in a way that preserves the distinction in question, although 
I am unable to go into any detail here. Furthermore, my claim, that purely theoretical reasoning can’t 
cause intentions, is lent some plausibility from David Hume’s views about the causes of actions, 
wherein he argues that ‘reason alone can never be a motive to any action of the will… and that it can 
never oppose passion in the direction of the will’ (Hume 1739/2000, 2.3.3.1). Indeed, my claim could 
be seen as a corollary of this so long as 1) practical reasoning always proceeds on the basis of some 
‘passion’ (desires count as passions on Hume’s account); and 2) what I have been referring to as 
‘theoretical reasoning’ is no more than a function of the understanding, in Hume’s sense. 1 seems to be 
true if the above formulation of deliberation is accurate, at least in the sense that what motivates a 
process of deliberation is a desire (‘felt need’) to find a favorable resolution to a practical uncertainty. 2 
also seems true if we consider Hume’s explanation of the role of the understanding. He thinks it works 
in two different ways: it informs us about ‘the abstract relations of our ideas’ as in areas such as 
mathematics and mechanics (2.3.3.2); and it informs us about ‘those relations of objects, of which 
experience only gives us information,’ in other words, the causal relations between physical objects and 
processes (2.3.3.3). The second of these perhaps best describes the kind of reasoning I have been 
referring to as ‘vicarious deliberation’ in that it involves the ascertaining of causal factors (e.g., the 
subject’s beliefs and desires) for the purpose of prediction, in order to derive a judgment about what 
would be best for the subject to do. 
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of genuine deliberation, even when the deliberator is considering her deliberative 
experience as determined. When we genuinely deliberate we believe, correctly, 
something like Pereboom’s (DE), that is, we believe that we, by way of our 
deliberation, are directly involved in the causal production of our action – we will 
cause it by way of our deliberation, whatever it is. In addition to the abovementioned 
fact about intention-formation, as well as differences in an agent’s sense of control 
over the process, this belief in efficacy is what most prominently distinguishes genuine 
deliberation from prediction and vicarious deliberation. When we ‘deliberate’ 
vicariously we understand that nothing we might think or do can have any effect on 
the outcome – we can only, for instance, hope for the best and wait to see what 
happens. So it might be objected that even if believing one’s deliberation to be 
determined robs one of a sense of control, this does not reduce one to the role of 
spectator, since one can still believe, correctly, that one’s deliberation will be causally 
efficacious in producing the action. So this absence of a sense of control would not 
result in the drastic change in attitude I am trying to explain. 
To answer this concern, we need to examine the notion of causal efficacy more 
closely. If we strip the term ‘efficacy’ of any of the connotations that don’t belong to it 
when it is qualified by ‘causal,’ we are left with the bare notion of something that 
causes. These connotations include, for instance, ‘effective’ and ‘efficient,’ and may 
involve notions such as ability, capability, accomplishment, purpose, competence, 
usefulness, desire-fulfillment, and importantly, control. In the present context then, for 
one’s deliberation to be causally efficacious is just for it to cause something – most 
immediately and obviously, an intention to act. So is the belief that our deliberation 
will likely cause an intention to act significant enough to prevent the thought that our 
deliberation is causally determined from reducing our deliberative attitude to that of a 
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spectator? It certainly adds something that’s missing in prediction and vicarious 
deliberation. 
But given the would-be determinist deliberator’s belief that the deliberative 
process she is experiencing is inevitable and thus ultimately beyond her control, as is 
whatever intention is formed as a result, it seems to me that a belief that her 
deliberation will cause an intention would neither prevent the onset of, nor diminish 
the effects of, a spectatorial attitude. An analogy may serve to illustrate this point. 
Imagine a normal process of deliberation where options are adduced and weighed, and 
an intention is formed as a result. Now consider Stacy, who is about to engage in such 
a process but becomes aware that whenever she is about to begin to weigh reasons for 
and against each option, a chip that has been implanted in her brain activates and alters 
the strengths of her desires relevant to the weighing process, although after she begins 
to weigh reasons the chip becomes inactive. So, for instance, if the decision to be 
made concerns a choice between ordering Chinese or Italian food for dinner, she 
knows that if she begins to try to find reasons for and against each alternative, the chip 
will activate and, say, strengthen her fondness of tomatoes and her dislike of reading 
through long menus. Stacy would believe correctly that her reasoning is efficacious 
here, but I propose that her sense that her deliberation is under her control would be 
compromised to the extent that she would find it very difficult to form an intention 
about what to do with respect to this particular decision.17 Although rather fanciful, 
                                                 
17
 This seems to imply that intentions are willed. I side with Brian O’Shaughnessy in thinking that 
neither beliefs nor intentions are directly willed: ‘Thus, while a man may do what he hopes may bring 
about his deciding to do [roughly, forming an intention], deciding to do is not and never can be an 
activity. In this sense we may say that, while the will can strew incentives before itself, it cannot 
directly determine its own direction. Indeed, were it to be able to do so, the flood-gates would break and 
the will carry all before it: mind, reason, sanity, world itself!’ (O’Shaughnessy 1980, 298, 301). Some 
libertarians (agent-causalists and non-causalists in particular) are likely to resist the claim that intentions 
are not directly willed. Although I think the claim is plausible, I am not able to defend it from such 
accounts here. I refer briefly to these accounts in the final section of my third chapter, and I discuss 
intention-formation in section 3.7. I think the claim applies in an interesting way to this case. It seems 
plausible that the reason Stacy would have trouble forming an intention about which kind of food to 
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this example indicates that a belief in the causal efficacy of one’s deliberation would 
not by itself help, or not help very much, to prevent or reduce the effects of believing 
one’s deliberation to be (determined and) ultimately beyond one’s control. 
There is something more specific to say about causal efficacy. It seems that the 
above list of some of the potential connotations of ‘efficacy’ might usefully be 
expanded by the addition of one more notion that does not belong to it in the present 
context – that of making a difference. It is natural to be motivated to deliberate on the 
basis of a supposition that if you don’t deliberate, or don’t deliberate correctly or well 
enough, then you will bring about a less than favorable outcome. We might formulate 
a supposition of this kind as follows: 
DM: I am able, via a process of deliberation, to bring about an outcome that is 
more favorable to me than the outcomes that would result if I either do not 
deliberate or do not deliberate well. 
Some thought or belief like DM arguably underlies the motivational aspect of 
deliberation mentioned earlier, i.e., the felt need to act so as to resolve a practical 
uncertainty in a favorable way. It seems plausible that a process of deliberation would 
                                                                                                                                            
order is that she would realize that any such intention would in some sense not really be her own, due to 
her belief that the desires that helped form it had been tampered with. So given that she is hungry it 
would be natural for her to try to form an intention directly, somehow bypassing the effects of the chip. 
If O’Shaughnessy is right she would be unable to do this. So the only options available to her would 
seem to be to choose at ‘random,’ to vacillate, or to submit to her desire for Italian food. Were she to do 
any of these, however, the intention that she forms would not be the result of a process of rational 
deliberation. Therefore, I think it’s plausible that Stacy’s belief that her deliberation with respect to this 
decision (should she attempt to engage in it) will be causally efficacious would not be sufficient to 
prevent her from adopting a spectatorial viewpoint toward it, and thus not sufficient for her to be able to 
engage in it. And I think the best explanation for this is that her sense of control over the entire process 
has been compromised. Of course, it is not compromised in the same way that I’m claiming one’s sense 
of control would be compromised when one is considering a process of deliberation to be causally 
determined. For instance, Stacy would realize that the outcome of her decision may not entirely or 
accurately reflect her propositional attitudes (she might not ‘really’ like tomatoes as much as she now 
seems to). However, the point of the example is to highlight the limitations of the role that belief in the 
causal efficacy of one’s deliberation can play in allowing one to engage in deliberation when one’s 
sense of control over the process has been compromised. So as long as the agent’s sense of control has 
been compromised, and to a similar extent in both cases, it’s immaterial how this has happened. 
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never begin (and if already underway, would cease) unless the agent were motivated 
to deliberate by a belief specified by a conditional of this form. And if the truth of DM 
is incompatible with a belief in determinism, then perhaps this is something that a 
determinist deliberator recognizes on some level, and another part of the explanation 
of why deliberation could be prevented or disrupted when one believes it to be 
determined.18 It would provide a further reason to think that a belief in the causal 
efficacy of her deliberation would not help to extricate a would-be determinist 
deliberator from her predicament, and allow her to be motivated in the right way to 
deliberate. That is, the belief that one’s deliberation is causally efficacious would not 
compensate, in a motivationally-relevant sense, for the sense of loss of control 
resulting from thinking of one’s deliberation as determined, if what is lying behind the 
notion of causal efficacy is this difference-making assumption. 
So, is a belief of the form specified by DM compatible with the agent’s 
applying her belief in determinism to her deliberative process? Under scrutiny, it 
might well not be. Take an example. Let’s say I’ve been watching an advertisement 
about vacations in Florida and it occurs to me that I have some time off in a few weeks 
and it might be fun to go. But then it occurs to me that I really should stay in town 
because my sister is due to have a baby right around that time and would probably be 
grateful for my moral support. This is, among other things, my recognition of practical 
                                                 
18
 It might be objected that I am ignoring what would be a compatibilist reading of ‘making a 
difference,’ whereby an agent’s belief in determinism would not be incompatible with her belief that, in 
deliberating, she can make a difference. Certainly, there is a sense of ‘making a difference’ that is quite 
compatible with the truth of determinism. We might, for instance, correctly say that my installing 
deadlocks on the doors made the difference between the burglar’s gaining entry or not, in that if I had 
not installed the locks, the burglar would have gained entry. However, I believe that these kinds of 
conditionals, although compatible with the truth of determinism, are subject to the same kind of 
problems that conditional analyses of ‘can’ and ability are subject to. For a refutation of these kind of 
conditional analyses, see Chisholm (1964). Furthermore, I believe that a suitably reflective determinist 
will appreciate that the compatibilist conditional reading of ‘making a difference’ is inapplicable to her 
situation, when she is considering how she is capable of affecting future states of affairs given her belief 
in determinism. 
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uncertainty that motivates me to begin to deliberate. The next step in a normal 
deliberative process would seem to involve my imagining various aspects of my 
perceived options: in this case, to go to Florida or stay home. Under normal 
circumstances I would weigh reasons for and against each option, perhaps arrive at 
some new beliefs along the way, and eventually form an intention either to go or to 
stay. My motivation for weighing reasons for and against each option is to at least a 
significant extent, if not entirely, based on an underlying or standing desire to act so as 
to bring about the most favorable option available to myself, my sister, and anyone 
else who might be affected, and to avoid any less favorable option. This type of 
thought or belief, again, is grounded in DM: “I’d better think hard and make sure I go 
over all the possibilities, because if I miss something or misjudge something, then 
things will end up worse than they otherwise might.”19 
Now let’s run through the process again, this time assuming that I believe 
determinism to be true and that I’m applying this belief to my deliberation. First, as 
I’m watching the advertisement about Florida and thinking that it looks like a fun 
place to be, I remember that I have some time off in a few weeks and also that my 
sister is due to give birth around that time. So an uncertainty relevant to my future 
predicament is recognized. At this point it occurs to me that determinism is true,20 so it 
                                                 
19
 I have been referring to these goings on in the minds of deliberators as thoughts or beliefs due to my 
not wanting to commit myself to their being consciously recognized. I certainly don’t think that the 
sentence in quotation marks here is something that persons ordinarily consciously think when they are 
embarking on a process of deliberation. But I do think that it, or something like it, is something 
deliberators believe, perhaps merely dispositionally or sub-doxastically, even if it is never consciously 
thought. 
20
 To a certain extent my stipulation that the truth of determinism occurs to the agent at this particular 
point in the deliberative process is arbitrary. It seems that the thought could occur to the agent at some 
other point and the effects would be similar, although if it occurred too late in the process the chances 
are that the agent might have already done enough weighing of perceived options to be fairly certain 
what to do, and so it would be harder to see exactly what the effects of the application of a belief in 
determinism would be. The question of whether being in a state of intending to do something is 
compatible with believing determinism to be true and applying this belief to one’s intention in some 
way is beyond what I can address here. 
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is either inevitable that I go to Florida or inevitable that I not go. I’m far from certain 
which is determined to be the case, and it’s also true that both my going and my not 
going are consistent with everything else that’s settled for me. I also believe that my 
deliberation and decision, whichever way it goes, will be causally efficacious in 
bringing about either my going or staying (I thus satisfy Pereboom’s conditions (S) 
and (DE)). But when I begin to imagine each scenario and to consider reasons for and 
against each one, I think that all these thoughts I’m now having were determined to 
occur to me just as they are doing, as are the thoughts I’ll be having two minutes from 
now, and two minutes from then, right up until I make my decision about whether or 
not to go. In fact, so I think, even before I was born it was determined that I would be 
trying to make this decision about whether or not to go to Florida and analyzing the 
process in exactly the way I am. So ultimately, I reason, none of this is really under 
my control – it just feels that way, or at least it did. 
So, what happens to my motivation to weigh reasons for and against each 
option in this scenario? It seems that whatever motivation remains would only be of a 
kind that motivates theoretical reasoning. This would not get me very far along the 
way to forming an intention about whether or not to go to Florida, as theoretical 
reasoning, I have claimed, won’t produce an intention. For the idea of trying to ensure 
that I ultimately do the thing that would be most favorable and avoid doing anything 
less favorable (a notion that relies on the truth of DM) cannot plausibly motivate me to 
work out what to do when I believe that whatever I think and whatever I ultimately do 
was determined to be just as it is and just as it will be. I do realize that my 
deliberation, or whatever other thoughts occur to me, may well be causally efficacious 
in relation to my ultimately going or staying. But as we have seen, there is nothing 
more to a thought’s being causally efficacious than its causing something. And my 
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belief that my thoughts may play a causal role in my future actions would not by itself 
be likely to provide me with enough sense of control over the process to enable me to 
genuinely deliberate, when I believe that either going or else staying is already fixed 
and unavoidable. The richly motivational thought described by DM would make little 
sense to me in this context, and so is unlikely to be available as a motivator. It doesn’t 
seem plausible that the thought, “I’d better think about this carefully or things will end 
up worse than they otherwise might,” can motivate me to deliberate when I believe 
that whatever I’ll do, as well as all the thoughts and other events that cause me to end 
up doing it, are already fixed. The motivating thought relies on the assumption that I, 
as deliberating self, am the ultimate source of control over which option will be 
realized. But if I believe that whatever will come to pass with respect to the subject of 
my uncertainty is inevitable, then my belief in such difference-making control would 
seem to be undermined: there is really no difference to be made. So the potentially 
motivating thought that relies on the assumption that I have this kind of control should 
also be unavailable to me. 
 
2.9 Integration and Detachment 
I have now provided one account of why applying a belief in determinism to 
one’s deliberation seems problematic. It explains why two factors that are 
psychologically required for rational deliberation – a sense of a particular kind of 
control and the right kind of motivation – would appear to be incompatible with a 
belief that one’s deliberation and its results are determined and inevitable. However, I 
don’t think we yet have the full picture. Perhaps a process of deliberation could be 
undertaken and completed on the basis of some other kind of motivation, and without 
the sense of difference-making control I have claimed is required. Perhaps we could 
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be suitably motivated to deliberate on the basis of a sense of curiosity as to what we 
are causally determined to do, even while recognizing that we lack the control 
required to ensure a favorable outcome and avoid a less favorable one. In an attempt to 
rule out such a possibility I will provide a complementary account, which is intended 
both to illustrate further interesting features of the psychological bases of deliberation, 
and to show the extent to which believing one’s deliberation to be determined can 
interfere with the process. The basis of the account is the observation that a certain 
level of psychological integration is required for deliberation. I will explain below 
how the two accounts are related. 
What is psychological integration? Nagel gives us at least a starting point. 
According to him, when we begin to adopt the external view of ourselves and our 
actions, we subject more and more aspects of ourselves to scrutiny – our desires, 
beliefs, feelings, impulses, motives, principles, habits, and the biological, 
psychological, and social factors that form them (Nagel 1986, 119, 114). Of particular 
relevance in the present context is his claim that as more and more of the self is 
‘swallowed up in the circumstances of action,’ the less the self is able to act. Taken to 
the extreme, he thinks this process of self-examination has dire consequences: 
At the end of the path that seems to lead to freedom and knowledge lie 
skepticism and helplessness. We can act only from inside the world, but when 
we see ourselves from outside, the autonomy we experience from inside 
appears as an illusion, and we who are looking from outside cannot act at all 
(119-20).  
In order to understand this point, and how it relates to determinism and 
deliberation, we need to look in more detail at this distinction between being ‘inside’ 
and ‘outside.’ From the internal perspective I experience my feelings, desires, 
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impulses, habits, etc., as well as my body (generally), as bound together in a single, 
integrated entity whose attention, when I think and act, is directed outward, toward 
things ‘external’ to me (be those physical objects, sensations, ideas, etc.) that are not 
experienced at that time as part of me as thinker, and that I can apprehend, adopt 
attitudes toward, alter, and influence – the objects of my thoughts and the purposes 
and goals of my actions. By contrast, one of the distinguishing features of the external 
perspective is that when I begin to subject myself to the scrutiny to which Nagel 
refers, the complex, multifaceted, unified entity that I prereflectively take to be my 
self ‘shrinks’ to exclude every mental item from which it can be distinguished and 
separated. It is in this way that I come to distance myself from all these mental items 
and consider them in the way I ordinarily consider things outside my skin.21 It does 
not seem that we need to be focused constantly on these mental items in order to 
occupy this perspective; what is essential to the external perspective is only that state 
of mind whereby the ‘other’ side of the self-other distinction includes as many aspects 
of our selves as possible, and the ‘self’ side includes as few as possible – this minimal 
‘self’ side is what I above referred to as the Cartesian self. 
Although it may not be necessary to be focused on aspects of one’s self in 
order to occupy this perspective, perhaps a useful way of understanding the distinction 
between the internal and external perspectives is to consider what happens when we 
try to observe ourselves acting. In cases of very simple and familiar actions, such as 
wiggling my toes, I am able to perform this action and observe my performance of it at 
the same time. I am able to observe the act of wiggling being performed, just as I 
                                                 
21
 It will be apparent that the metaphor I am employing here does not align precisely with Nagel’s. 
Where he illustrates this distancing effect by describing the self’s viewing these mental items from a 
position external to them, I am describing it in terms of the self’s shrinking away from these items. 
Although both metaphors capture the same basic idea (the sense of distancing), the ‘shrinking’ 
description is somewhat more accurate for my purposes, as it is more congenial to the idea that the 
distancing occurs in degrees. 
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would observe someone else’s performing similar movements, while at the same time 
feeling as though it is me who is causing and controlling it; I am, in a sense, inside and 
outside of the action simultaneously. Nevertheless, genuinely observing oneself acting 
seems impossible. As O’Shaughnessy explains:  
If one is to relate as observer to anything then one has to be ‘without’ it, 
whereas if one is intentionally to do anything then one has to be ‘within’ it. 
Now either we remain ‘within’ the action we are attempting to observe, in 
which case we may have a completely empty and self-delusive experience of 
observation – comparable to Wittgenstein’s example of the right hand 
attempting to pay the left hand money, or else we remain ‘without’ in some 
more or less serious sense and genuinely seem to observe the action. But, 
remaining ‘without’, we lose the action as ours in gaining the observation: we 
lose any ‘withinness’. The action becomes for us a mere event in the world, 
and we ourselves become dispersed and lost amongst the bric-a-brac of the 
world: we become of the world in our own eyes: we suffer the experience of 
loss of identity. (I say ‘experience’ because nobody can actually lose his 
identity) (O’Shaughnessy 1980, 32).22 
                                                 
22
 If this is correct, then why do we sometimes feel as if we are observing ourselves acting? I think the 
explanation is that the impression we can have of being an observer of our actions can only occur in 
cases where the action in question is one (or one of a kind) that we have performed so many times in the 
past that we are able, once we have initiated the action, to continue or complete it automatically. But 
what seems fairly clear is that at any particular time during the performance of an action, we can occupy 
only one of these two perspectives with respect to it. We can be consciously willing ourselves to act, 
and at that time occupying the internal perspective with respect to the action, i.e., we are more or less 
fully integrated as actor and our focus is directed away from ourselves, perhaps toward the goal of the 
action. Or else the action is being performed automatically, and we are able to occupy the external 
perspective with respect to its performance. In the latter case we are ‘detached’ from the action to the 
extent that we are able to perceive its occurrence from the point of view of observer. In a sense, our 
attention is still being directed outward in such a case, although it is directed toward something that is 
ordinarily (in typical cases of acting) experienced as an integrated part of our self – hence my 
description of the self as shrinking. 
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With some grasp of the distinction between the internal and external 
perspectives, we are in a position to see if this distinction is of any help in 
understanding why considering one’s deliberation to be causally determined is 
problematic. Two issues require our attention. One is how, and to what extent, 
conceiving of our thoughts and actions as determined places us in an external position 
with respect to them. The other is whether deliberation is possible from this position. 
As we have seen, according to Nagel, thinking of our thoughts and actions as 
determined does indeed seem to place us on the outside, in the position of spectator 
with respect to them. Exactly why this happens is so far unclear, as is the extent to 
which this reaction is universal. I suspect that when it does occur, it is the result of a 
sense that something fundamental to agency has been lost, or is at least temporarily 
unavailable or inaccessible. Above I argued that considering the implications of 
determinism might well rob us of the usual sense of control we feel ourselves to have 
over our thoughts and actions, thereby rendering a kind of motivation that is essential 
for deliberation unavailable (that of trying to ensure a more favorable outcome and 
avoid a less favorable one). But there is something else about the internal perspective 
that may be lost, and it primarily concerns the subject-object and the self-other 
distinctions just canvassed. 
When thoughts occur to us as psychologically integrated agents, we do not 
consciously focus on the fact that they do. Rather than thinking about, for example, 
what kinds of thoughts we are having, why they are occurring to us, what thoughts are 
coming next, whether we want to be having them, etc., we focus exclusively on their 
contents. As I’ve described it, our focus is directed outwards, toward things we 
experience as external to ourselves as thinker and actor. By contrast, when we are 
conceiving of our thoughts as determined and inevitable, our gaze tends to turn 
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inwards, toward the thoughts themselves. This is no doubt due to our recognition that 
the idea that everything is determined and inevitable, including all our thoughts, comes 
into conflict with the natural, prereflective belief we seem to have, that we are, in 
Nagel’s words, not completely determined to act in the ways we do by antecedent 
circumstances, and that the final explanation of why we do what we do is to be found 
in our intentions, and thereby in our justifying reasons and purposes. We might 
describe this prereflective view of ourselves as encompassing the idea that we are the 
ultimate cause or ultimate source of our thoughts (more about this below). Even if 
compatibilism about determinism and free will is correct, it seems that our initial 
reaction to the consideration that our thoughts, and in particular our active, purposive 
thought-processes, are inevitably caused to be as they are by circumstances ultimately 
beyond our control, can alter the normal, prereflective perspective we have toward 
them. It is plausible that this change in perspective is caused by a conflict between our 
idea of inevitability and our sense of being the ultimate cause of our thoughts. On the 
one hand, we have a sense of the implications of determinism and their application to 
our own thoughts, e.g., that each thought we have is merely an inevitable consequence 
of its causal antecedents. On the other, there is the sense we ordinarily have, when 
viewing things from the internal perspective, that when we are engaged in an active, 
purposive thought-process (as opposed to, say, passively observing or daydreaming) 
we, as psychologically integrated thinkers, create the new thoughts we have, in the 
sense that we are their ultimate source. Central to this view of ourselves is the 
impression that when we think and act we are something over and above a mere 
collection of thoughts – thoughts which are simply caused by other thoughts, and 
ultimately by things other than thoughts; we are an independent entity who has 
thoughts, and yet is fundamentally distinct from them.23 Our thoughts seem, after all, 
                                                 
23
 This description seems to cohere fairly well with the view of the self described by agent-causal 
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to be things we can view as objects, from a perspective external to them. This kind of 
view of ourselves could be strongly challenged by the belief, implied by the truth of 
determinism, that all the thoughts that occur to us do so inevitably, and were 
determined to be exactly as they are, and exactly as they will be, since before we were 
born. 
A natural reaction to this apparent incompatibility, then, is to mentally 
‘withdraw’ into that sense of being or self, which we prereflectively assume to be 
distinct from our thoughts, which are now considered to be ultimately beyond our 
control and alien to us. So even if, due to our considering our thoughts as determined, 
the self that we ordinarily experience as constitutive of our identity has almost 
completely shrunken due to the self-observation brought on by such considerations, 
we still believe we are essentially an entity distinct from any thoughts we might have. 
But our experience reveals to us that we can only withdraw to a certain extent, as 
ultimately, there seems to be little, if anything beyond our thoughts into which to 
withdraw.24 In this state, each time we are aware of a new thought occurring to us we 
immediately become alienated from it as we attempt to distance ourselves from it. 
Even if we only get to this rather deep point once during such an exercise of self-
reflection, the experience leaves us, while we are mindful of the implications of 
                                                                                                                                            
theorists. Despite differences between agent-causal views, their proponents all seem to agree that the 
self that causes thoughts and actions is an entity distinct from, and irreducible to, mental events such as 
the thoughts to which I have been referring. The self as agent-cause is a temporally enduring entity (as 
opposed to a mere collection of temporally fleeting mental states and events) which, despite its ability 
to directly cause free acts, is not itself caused (or, at least, not causally determined) to act as it does by 
prior states and events. Prominent recent examples of such accounts are Timothy O’Connor (2000), and 
Randolph Clarke (2003). Although my descriptions of our prereflective sense of our own agency do 
reflect some of the views of agent-causalists, I do not intend such descriptions to indicate my 
endorsement of causation of events by substances (the agent-causalist’s central claim) nor any details of 
particular agent-causal accounts. 
24
 There is, one would think, an obvious limit to the extent to which we can view our own thoughts as 
objects. Aside from the potential regress that would be involved if we were to try to ‘step back’ from 
every thought we have and focus on it from an external perspective, there is also the threat of what we 
might call psychological disintegration, or what O’Shaughnessy refers to as the experience of loss of 
identity. 
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determinism, in the strange position of feeling as though we are detached from, and 
external to, our own thoughts. 
Given these reasons why considering our thoughts as determined can place us 
in an essentially external position with respect to them, we now need to see whether 
deliberation is possible from this perspective. The account above, for why we can’t 
observe ourselves acting, is also relevant here. Suppose it’s true, as I’ve argued, that 
the explanation of why we can’t do this stems from the requirement that, when we 
intentionally act, we occupy the internal perspective in relation to our action. Then in 
order to find out whether we can deliberate from this perspective we need only to 
know whether the process of deliberating shares those characteristics of intentional 
action that are the basis of this practical incompatibility. I gave toe-wiggling as an 
example of an action that, while it seemingly can be performed from the external 
perspective, really only seems this way due to the action’s being of a kind that is so 
familiar and simple that we can get the impression that we are consciously willing our 
performance of the action at times when this is actually not the case. I think we can 
see more clearly why this can’t be the case if we look at a more complex action. 
Writing is an apt example. Sometimes, as we are writing, we seem able to view our 
activity from an external perspective, even if only for an instant. This seems to be 
because, just as in the toe-wiggling case, we have performed this kind of action many 
times before, and so we are able, once we have initiated the action of writing a 
particular word or sentence, to carry the action to completion automatically. We are 
even able to perform some other complex intentional actions at the same time, such as 
talking. But there are limits to this. We cannot, for example, complete a word that is 
relatively unfamiliar to us, or a sentence with relatively complex grammatical 
structure, unless we are, in O’Shaughnessy’s terms, ‘within’ the action. And this holds 
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for more than just actions. It seems that in order to engage in any intentional activity 
of any complexity or novelty requires that our relation to such activity be internal. 
Relating as observer to any such activity seems for us psychologically impossible. 
Examples bear this out: think of, say, composing a grocery list or trying to remember a 
dream. Deliberation, one of the activities that requires the most from us due to its 
complexity and novelty (we cannot ‘rehearse’ a process of deliberation and ‘perform’ 
it again later), would be no exception to this rule. Our relation to our reasons for acting 
needs to be an internal one. If we are detached from such reasons, viewing them from 
the perspective of observer, then they cannot – via the production of an intention – 
motivate us to act.  
In summary, the Florida example in the previous section was intended to show 
how applying a belief in determinism to one’s deliberative situation can result in the 
loss of a sense of control over one’s deliberative process. This would render a 
motivational element essential to deliberation unavailable: the belief that one can, by 
way of one’s deliberation, ensure a favorable outcome and avoid an unfavorable one 
(DM), or more fundamentally, that one can make a difference to how things will turn 
out. Without this key motivational element, I claimed, one’s reasoning is restricted to 
the theoretical. 
Then in this section I considered the notion of psychological integration, and 
argued that believing one’s deliberation to be determined can result in the adoption of 
an external view toward one’s thoughts and actions – a position from which one is 
unable to deliberate. These are the essential points of my proposal: 
(a) Viewing our own thoughts as determined and ultimately beyond our control 
conflicts with the prereflective assumption that we are the ultimate source 
of our thoughts, and thus distinct from them. 
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(b) We react to this apparent incompatibility by attempting to withdraw from 
our thoughts as they are occurring to us – to retreat into the distinct entity 
in which we assume ourselves to essentially consist. 
(c) The position we find ourselves occupying if we attempt to distance 
ourselves from our own thoughts in this way is the same as the one we 
occupy when we attempt to observe our own actions, especially the 
complex ones. The common factor is that both deliberating and 
deliberately acting have the requirement of ‘withinness.’ But our relation to 
such activities must be an internal one, and so once we are distanced, we 
can no longer deliberately act or deliberate. 
As these two accounts of the effects of viewing one’s deliberation as determined – one 
focusing on difference-making control, the other on detachment and the internal-
external distinction – do not obviously coincide, I shall now attempt to reconcile them 
into a single account. 25 
 
2.10 A Unified Account – Control, Motivation, Detachment, and Dissociation 
The first step toward reconciling these accounts relates to the initial change in 
attitude toward one’s deliberation that can occur when one views it as determined, 
which I have described as a sense that one’s control over the process and the outcome 
is compromised and perhaps even seen as illusory. It seems plausible that when we 
                                                 
25
 The fact that I have given these two, largely distinct accounts may seem problematic, as it seems 
evident that even theoretical reasoning requires that an internal relation hold between the subject and 
the process. So if both practical and theoretical reasoning require this internal relation then, it may be 
argued, either it’s not the case that considering one’s deliberation as determined results in the adoption 
of a completely external perspective, or it’s not the case that we are unable to carry out complex and 
novel reasoning processes when trying to adopt this perspective, or I’m wrong to claim that theoretical 
reasoning is still available to one who is viewing their thoughts and actions as determined. However, I 
think some of this can be cleared up if we pay more attention to detail and make some distinctions that 
have previously been ignored. The unified account I present here is essentially an attempt to do this. 
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begin to view our deliberation as determined, we immediately feel as though we are in 
control of less than we had previously assumed – that is, our range of control seems 
diminished. How deeply this loss would be felt depends on how thoroughly we are 
applying these implications of determinism to our situation, and perhaps also on 
whether we have any preconceived compatibilist beliefs or tendencies toward such 
beliefs. At the very least we are likely to feel immediately that we lack control over 
some anticipated distinct event such as the outcome of our expected deliberation – 
whether we will, for example, end up deciding to go to Florida or not. I think the 
explanation of why it is the imagined outcome of our deliberation that is most 
immediately affected in this way, rather than, say, our present thoughts, is that we are 
more clearly able to conceive of them and distance ourselves from the former. The 
proposition ‘I will end up in Florida for my vacation or I will not,’ is a straightforward 
disjunction with simple content about future states of affairs, whereas applying the 
notion of inevitability to the thoughts we are now having or are about to have is more 
difficult. It’s a very strange exercise, and requires some concentration, to try to 
conceive of the very next thought that will occur to you as determined, and to keep 
applying this idea to new thoughts as they occur to you. But the distinct proposition 
that it is determined and inevitable that you will either go to Florida for your vacation 
or not go, is, like the proposition that it is determined whether you will recover or die 
from an illness (the lazy argument), relatively simple to apprehend. 
Now it seems possible that an agent would cease to apply the concept of 
determinism to anything further at this point. Such an agent may have come to believe 
that his vacationing in Florida is not an open possibility – it will either inevitably 
occur or inevitably not occur – but he has subjected no other aspect of his life to his 
belief that determinism is true (perhaps he has become a kind of localized fatalist with 
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respect to his vacation). But even here it appears plausible that he would lack the 
motivation to deliberate about whether to go to Florida. For an essential motivating 
element of deliberation, the belief or presupposition that you must deliberate or 
deliberate well so as to ensure a favorable outcome and avoid an unfavorable one, 
seems to be psychologically incompatible with the belief that whether you will go or 
not is inevitable given past states of the world and the laws of nature. It is plausible 
that while the psyche of such an agent is basically integrated in the sense I have 
described, his impaired sense of control over this particular decision, and the resulting 
loss of the motivation required for deliberation, places him in a spectatorial role with 
respect to the decision as to whether to go to Florida. He can still engage in a process 
of prediction as to whether he will end up in Florida, and it seems that he may be able 
to reason about this decision to a certain extent, in the sense that he can identify 
reasons for and against, and even evaluate them against one another. But even if such 
processes do not result in any degree of psychological disintegration, that is, even if he 
does not start to question or otherwise examine his relevant desires, beliefs, or 
thought-processes, something will be missing. These thoughts are restricted to what I 
have been calling theoretical reasoning, and alone cannot cause him to form an 
intention to go to Florida or an intention not to go, while he is maintaining his belief 
that whether he goes is determined. He lacks the sense of control required to fully 
engage in these processes in the way that he must for them to allow him to form 
intentions. He can predict, vacillate, flip a coin, or try to persuade himself that 
determinism is false, but cannot deliberate about whether to go to Florida while 
conceiving of either his going or not going as determined and inevitable. 
This is perhaps the least intrusive way in which belief that determinism is true 
could interfere with one’s deliberation. In this case the agent is in a limited spectatorial 
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role, his psyche can remain basically integrated, and his ability to reason is only 
impaired to the extent that he is unable to reason through a particular decision as a 
deliberating agent. But just as spectators in general, though by definition lacking 
control over what they are observing while they are in a spectatorial role, still feel as 
though they control their own thoughts, the agent in this example feels a loss of 
control only with respect to something quite external to his psyche – the decision to go 
to Florida or not. But what might happen when an agent considers the implications of 
determinism for his situation more thoroughly?  
If our agent is reflective enough to consider the implications of determinism, 
not just for his decision as to whether to go to Florida for his vacation, but for his 
thoughts and actions generally, he may start to feel his control compromised in a more 
fundamental way. The scope of what he sees to be determined is likely to broaden to 
include not only his future actions but his present thoughts. Due to perceiving an 
incompatibility between this self-conception and his prereflective view of himself as 
fundamentally the ultimate source of his thoughts, he may experience a kind of 
psychological withdrawal into a deeper self, in an attempt to distance himself from his 
determined and ultimately uncontrolled thoughts. From this position he would be, 
using Nagel’s description, unable to act at all. Nor, I have claimed, is he able to 
deliberate. For from this (almost completely) external perspective, his own conscious 
thoughts would be immediately separated from himself as they occur, and the self he 
has withdrawn into would be unable to reason, even on a theoretical level. At the 
extreme, we might describe his predicament as that of being detached from his 
(conscious) will. 
This extreme scenario is, I think, unlikely to occur for any longer than an 
instant due to human cognitive limitations, and the nature of the will. Velleman (1989, 
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173) gives a plausible characterization of the will as a locus of autonomy, which 
‘contains motives by which it can restrain, redirect, and reinforce our other motives for 
acting, in accordance with our own conception of those motives.’ If this is accurate, 
then these motives of the will are not simply contingent desires, but ‘ground level’ 
motivational elements, that probably form the basis of all active human cognition. As 
such, they are likely to be highly resistant to complete detachment from the self in the 
way I have been describing, that is, as viewed from the external perspective, as part of 
the self that is uncontrolled in virtue of its nature and activity being determined and 
inevitable. Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that a complete split between the self 
and the will may be possible. Dissociative disorders are fairly common, and although 
unlikely to be caused by philosophical reflection alone, they provide evidence of the 
sort of detachment that might occur in this extreme scenario, even if only very 
briefly.26 
I have now described two extremes with respect to the predicament of a would-
be determinist deliberator. The scenarios depicting these extremes represent two 
                                                 
26
 Depersonalization disorder, one of the dissociative disorders, is characterized by ‘a feeling of 
detachment or estrangement from one’s self… The individual may feel like an automaton or as if he or 
she is living in a dream or a movie. There may be a sensation of being an outside observer of one’s 
mental processes, one’s body, or parts of one’s body…[and] a sensation of lacking control of one’s 
actions [is often present]’ (American Psychiatric Association 1994, 488 (emphasis added)). According 
to DSM-IV, episodes of dissociation also occur with (at least) the following disorders: dissociative 
amnesia, dissociative fugue, dissociative identity disorder (formerly multiple personality disorder) as 
well as obsessive-compulsive disorder and some other anxiety disorders (417-23, 477-491). Although I 
am reluctant to endorse descriptions of the disorder that refer to a person’s being detached from 
themselves, such a description is understandable. Exactly what the self amounts to is mysterious, but 
given the above account of detachment, it seems plausible that if enough of what is ordinarily 
considered or experienced as part of the integrated self becomes detached from a deeper and more 
fundamental self or consciousness, a person may well have the experience of a split within the self, 
which would explain this experience of feeling that everything happening to one is really happening to 
somebody else and that ‘identity is disappearing.’ This detachment would also explain feelings of loss 
of control experienced during episodes of depersonalization and perhaps most acutely experienced by 
sufferers of obsessive-compulsive disorder. Although the relation holding between the self and the will 
is unclear, it seems possible that the conscious will, as the basic acting or striving part of the self, is 
inessential to it, and therefore could become fully detached also, resulting in a passive, perhaps 
catatonic observational state resembling the minimal conception of the Cartesian self referred to above 
(s. 2.7, n. 12). 
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magnitudes on a single continuum ranging from mild to severe impediment to 
deliberation. Thus the task of reconciling the two accounts previously presented (the 
first in sections 2.7 and 2.8; the second in section 2.9) is resolved in locating each 
account on this continuum. On one end of the scale the effects of applying a belief in 
determinism to one’s deliberative situation are limited to a proposition about a 
particular future uncertainty: whether or not I will do A. In this case the subject’s 
psyche remains integrated and ‘outward-looking’ but, I suggest, her lack of a sense of 
control over whether or not she will do A restricts her motivation to reason about it so 
as to exclude the essential difference-making element required for genuine 
deliberation. On the other end of the scale, a subject’s reflection about her own 
thoughts and motivational states might well go so deep that virtually all the contents of 
her psyche are detached from whatever is essential to her self, possibly even including 
the fundamental motivational elements I have been referring to as the will. 
Could it really be that applying a belief in an abstract notion like determinism 
to one’s thoughts could result in the shutting down of one’s entire conscious 
motivational system, leaving one essentially without a conscious will? Actually, I 
think this is possible. But, as I’ve mentioned, this is the extreme case, and the self-
reflection involved at this level, due to its nature, requires a great deal of 
concentration, so even if a person is reflective enough to reach this point, she is not 
likely to remain in this will-less state for very long. Concentration is itself willed or 
involves willing, so there will be a point at which one’s ability to further meditate on 
the problem will be inconsistent with the effects of such meditation. But perhaps a 
very temporary catatonic state of will-less awareness might ensue, immediately 
followed by the reactivation of the will and its reintegration into the self. Furthermore, 
a suitably reflective agent engaging in such a process will almost certainly fluctuate 
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between various levels of integration, sense of control, and motivation, and so the 
effects I have been describing are likely to occur only sporadically. 
 
2.11 Conclusion 
There is more than one reason to doubt that an agent can be rational and 
deliberate while believing this very process to be causally determined. While the 
deliberation-compatibilist may be correct to claim that the epistemic requirements 
concerning alternative possibilities can be consistently met, there are practical, 
psychological factors essential for deliberation that can conflict with the agent’s belief 
that her deliberation is determined. This belief can conflict with suppositions about 
motivation and control required for deliberation, and with the psychological 
integration that deliberation demands. As noted at the outset, the accounts I have 
provided here are intended for two purposes. One is to help us to better understand 
why it is that rational deliberation has been thought to conflict with belief in 
determinism. But I have also hoped to make credible that once we come to appreciate 
the nature of this apparent conflict, it should become plausible that there is indeed a 
conflict, and that an agent who applies her belief in determinism to her deliberative 
situation carefully and thoroughly should find that she is unable to rationally 
deliberate. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE CONSEQUENCES OF INDETERMINISM FOR RATIONAL 
DELIBERATION 
 
3.1 Introduction 
I argue in chapter 2 that applying a belief in causal determinism to our 
deliberative situation is likely to prevent us from being able to deliberate. I give two 
related reasons for this. One reason is that the perceived inevitability of what we will 
do robs us of a sense of control over our deliberation, resulting in the unavailability of 
the particular kind of motivation required for deliberation: trying to ensure a favorable 
outcome and avoid an unfavorable one. This puts us in the role of spectator to our own 
actions, a position from which only theoretical reasoning is possible. The other reason 
is that when we see our deliberative activity as causally determined we tend to start 
viewing all our thoughts as determined, and we begin to adopt a spectatorial or 
external viewpoint with respect to them. This is the result of a psychological conflict 
between the idea that our thought processes are determined and inevitable, and our 
prereflective belief that we are the ultimate cause of our thoughts, i.e., that we are not 
causally determined to think and act as we do. Once our capacity to ultimately cause 
our thoughts begins to be questioned, this conflict tends to force our attention to the 
thoughts we are having as they are occurring to us, thereby detaching them from us.1 
Due to the fact that we are unable to observe ourselves acting, when we become 
detached from our own thoughts in this way we should find ourselves unable to 
deliberate – deliberation being the kind of purposeful activity that requires us to stand 
in an internal psychological relation to it, i.e., we must not be detached from our 
                                                 
1
 ‘Detachment’ in this context describes the mental distancing that occurs – to the extent that this is 
possible – when our occurrent thoughts themselves become objects of our thinking. 
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reasons for acting. The question to be addressed here is whether a conception of free 
agency that posits indeterminism as an essential factor is similarly problematic with 
respect to our ability to deliberate. In simplest terms, can libertarian accounts of free 
agency be of any help in giving us back those elements essential for deliberation that a 
deterministic conception makes unavailable? The focus of this chapter will be 
restricted primarily to libertarian accounts referred to as ‘event-causal’: causal 
accounts of free agency that do not assume an irreducible relation between a substance 
(agent) and an event.2 
 
3.2 Why a Deterministic Self-Conception is Problematic for Deliberation: 
Difference-Making Control and Ultimate Control 
The description of determinism given in the first premise of Peter van 
Inwagen’s Consequence argument, 
If determinism is true, then our acts are the consequences of the laws of nature 
and events in the remote past (van Inwagen, 1983, 56), 
is unsettling because determinism would challenge some very fundamental beliefs we 
hold about our capacities as free, rational agents, and our experience of intentionally 
thinking and acting. There are at least two such beliefs that seem to be incompatible 
with belief in determinism, and they both concern control. One of these, discussed in 
chapter 2, is our belief that in choosing and acting we are able to make a difference to 
                                                 
2
 My focus is restricted in this way for two reasons. One is logistical, in the sense that many of the 
central points in my argument, as well as its conclusion, seem to apply to all or most non-agent-causal 
libertarian accounts (as I explain in the concluding section), whereas agent-causal accounts would 
require separate treatment, which is beyond the scope of this chapter. More generally, I agree with 
Robert Kane’s view that libertarians ought not to appeal to ‘special kinds of entities, or special forms of 
agency or causation, that are invoked specifically to salvage libertarian intuitions and are not needed to 
account for free agency generally – whether libertarian or nonlibertarian’ (1996, 116-17). I do claim in 
chapter 2 (s. 2.9, n. 23) that we tend to prereflectively experience our agency in ways that somewhat 
reflect the agent-causalists’ central claims. But as I mention there, I do not intend to be thereby 
endorsing any such claims. 
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how things will turn out. This belief underlies a motivational element essential for 
deliberation, which I described as a felt need to act so as to resolve a practical 
uncertainty favorably. This belief in difference-making control has the consequence 
that there is a range of possible ways the future could be. But it implies more than this. 
Despite arguments that aim to show that the availability of alternatives for action is 
compatible with determinism (for example, Hume 1748, Ayer 1954, Lewis 1981), and 
despite deliberation-compatibilists’ arguments that we don’t need to believe that we 
have alternatives in order to deliberate (for example, Kapitan 1986, Nelkin 2004, 
Pereboom, 2008), it is plausible that when we consider all future events concerning 
ourselves as determined and inevitable, we will come to believe that there is no way to 
avoid them – that we lack the kind of control that would enable us to make a 
difference to how things will turn out. 
The other aspect of our ordinary self-conception that seems to be incompatible 
with belief in determinism, which is even more clearly identified by the first premise 
of the consequence argument, is the belief that we have ultimate control over the 
initiation of our thoughts and actions, in the sense that they are not merely the 
extensions of causal chains, but are created solely by us, the agent, as they occur. This 
belief is captured well by Chisholm (1982, 32): ‘Each of us, when we act, is a prime 
mover unmoved. In doing what we do, we cause certain events to happen, and nothing 
– or no one – causes us to cause these events to happen.’ We might describe this as the 
belief that we are the ultimate source of our thoughts and actions. However, in using 
this description we must be careful to distinguish the notion of the source of our 
actions being within us (say, in our brain) from the notion of ourself, the agent, being 
their source. It is only the latter notion that captures the experience we have (or 
perhaps it’s safer to say our belief about the experience) of deliberately initiating 
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causal chains – for example, a new line of thought, a new idea, or an intention. So, 
being the ultimate source of our actions requires us to have ultimate control over them. 
Control requires a controller. Therefore, the notion of being an ultimate source 
involves more than the idea that a causal chain is initiated within us; it must be 
initiated by the agent as controller, in such a way that it is not merely a causal 
consequence of previous thoughts and other events. It seems clear then, that belief in 
determinism is also incompatible with belief that one has ultimate control. I now turn 
to the question of whether rational deliberation requires belief in ultimate control as 
well as belief in difference-making control. 
 
3.3 Requirement of Belief in Ultimate Control for Deliberation, and How Such 
Belief Can Be Compromised 
In chapter 2 I used an example involving a manipulating device to illustrate 
one way in which an agent’s sense of control over her deliberative process could be 
compromised. I refer there to the agent’s sense of a general loss of control over the 
process, but the example can serve to show more specifically how an agent’s sense of 
losing ultimate control over a deliberative process would undermine her ability to 
deliberate. Here is the example. 
Imagine a normal process of deliberation where options are adduced and 
weighed, and an intention is formed as a result. Now consider Stacy, who is 
about to engage in such a process but becomes aware that whenever she is 
about to begin to weigh reasons for and against each option, a chip that has 
been implanted in her brain activates and alters the strengths of her desires 
relevant to the weighing process, although after she begins to weigh reasons 
the chip becomes inactive. So, for instance, if the decision to be made concerns 
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a choice between ordering Chinese or Italian food for dinner, she knows that if 
she begins to try to find reasons for and against each alternative, the chip will 
activate and, say, strengthen her fondness of tomatoes and her dislike of 
reading through long menus. 
I claimed that Stacy would be correct to believe that her reasoning is efficacious in this 
situation, but that her sense that her deliberation is under her control would be 
compromised to the extent that she would find it very difficult to form an intention 
about what to do with respect to this particular decision. 
For present purposes it is unimportant whether the chip actually does function 
in this way. It does not even matter whether the chip exists, only that Stacy believes it 
does, and that she believes it sometimes works in this way. The point is that if she 
believes there is some reason to be uncertain that the strength of her desires relevant to 
the weighing process are really her own, in the sense that she, and nothing else, is their 
ultimate source, it seems very likely that she would in some sense disown her desires 
to the extent that she could not trust them to lead her to a decision that is really her 
decision – a decision that is an accurate expression of what she considers to be her true 
self. Realizing this, it’s plausible that she would not be able to deliberate at all, as any 
desire that would ordinarily serve to help her evaluate her perceived options in a 
deliberative situation would be perceived by her as external, or detached from the 
process (in the sense described in chapter 2). 
Interestingly, we have more than thought experiments to evaluate my claim 
that believing one is the ultimate source of one’s thoughts is required for deliberation. 
In a phenomenon referred to as thought insertion, some schizophrenic patients claim 
to experience thoughts they did not produce. Although the ‘inserted’ thoughts 
sometimes have propositional form (I am worthless/stupid/evil; I am becoming a 
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robot; the government is spying on me), more often they take the form of commands 
believed to be issued by, for example, the government, evil beings, or aliens, that 
require patients to perform particular actions or tasks. The kinds of commands range 
from the relatively harmless (go to the store; stab myself in the arm with a pen), to the 
more dangerous (remove a bomb from my neck; kill my psychiatrist’s family). The 
inserted thoughts are often experienced as voices, but sometimes simply as alien 
thoughts that are neither produced by, nor able to be controlled by the patient. 
According to one patient: ‘… when I am thinking in this way, without being able to 
stop it… I have no mastery over the course of these ideas… it seems to me as if it is 
not me who generates them…’ (Parnas and Arnorsson 2001, 108). Although there is 
no clear consensus about the nature or underlying causes of thought-insertion, a very 
appealing suggestion commonly found in the literature since Freud describes patients’ 
experiences of lacking ‘authorship’ over their thoughts as a kind of withdrawal or 
distancing from those thoughts – an inability to include the thoughts in processes of 
practical reasoning. There appear to be two common strands of opinion on how best to 
characterize the phenomenon. As Christoph Hoerl (2001, 189) writes: 
According to one view, patients’ reports of thought insertion reflect an 
experience in which the boundary between the self and the world has 
dissolved, or at least an uncertainty, on the part of the patient, over how to 
draw this boundary. According to the other view, patients reporting thought 
insertion should be interpreted as articulating a distinction between thoughts 
that occur to them and thinking as something they do. Thus, what they mean is 
that they lack a sense of active participation in the occurrence of certain 
thoughts. 
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The distinguishing feature of this second view is the passive relation that an 
agent can seem to bear to her own thoughts: the thoughts ‘occur to’ her, rather than 
their being produced by her. It seems appropriate to describe this relation as one of 
externality or detachment, in the sense described above. The agent experiences herself 
as a mere spectator of her thoughts, rather than their author. So it is understandable 
that she might infer the source of these thoughts to be something other than her (aliens 
or evil beings, for instance).3 Hoerl (194) goes on to explain his own suggestion as to 
the likely causes of thought-insertion. Although somewhat more complex, it appears to 
be along similar lines. 
There is a specific breakdown in schizophrenic patients’ reasoning abilities, 
which sometimes has the result, as we might put it, that the patients simply 
find certain issues settled. What they lack is a sense that certain thoughts, 
which come into their minds, are still theirs to consider, because the ability to 
take relevant alternatives into account is disrupted. If this is true, however, it 
may well be able to explain a sense in which the patients also do not 
experience themselves as having settled the issue. They are mere bystanders to 
the occurrence of those thoughts and thus may form the impression that those 
thoughts have been imposed on them by an outside agency. … In short, the 
phenomenon of thought insertion arises because of a withdrawal, on the part of 
the patient, from certain forms of active engagement in reasoning. 
Although some writers on the subject of thought-insertion (for example, John 
Campbell, 1999) have hypothesized that the phenomenon is best characterized as a 
                                                 
3
 The inference I refer to here is almost certainly not as straightforward as I describe it. Mentally 
healthy agents also often seem to experience certain thoughts as simply occurring to them. Artistic and 
intellectual inspiration are perhaps examples of this kind of experience. However, there is at least one 
important difference between these two kinds of cases, relating to what I will call integration and 
ownership. I have more to say about this below. 
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breakdown in the mechanism that mediates the causation of occurrent thoughts by 
background beliefs, desires, and interests, this view by itself seems unable to 
accommodate cases in which thoughts described by patients as alien, or as not having 
originated with them, actually cohere well with their background attitudes and beliefs, 
and seem to have been produced by them. Due to the prevalence of cases like this, 
Hoerl reasons that for a thought to ‘belong to me’ it must not only cohere with my 
current beliefs and desires; it must also play a certain role in affecting the future 
background of beliefs, desires, and interests that I have, where this is determined by 
the active use I make of that thought in further deliberation. One patient describes his 
situation as one in which his ‘concerns’ have withdrawn to an ‘ideological domain.’ 
Hoerl thinks this kind of description is a good indication that ‘information is not 
gathered in a way that is informed by an active interest in making up one’s mind. 
What seems to be lacking is a certain form of self-determination, in which one uses 
one’s experiences and reasoning to form the shape of one’s future set of beliefs, 
desires, and interests.’ Similarly, ‘the point of identifying herself as the subject to 
whom certain occurrent thoughts belong may indeed be lost to someone who has 
withdrawn from activity to such an extent that her thinking is purely guided by what 
[Richard] Moran calls “theoretical questions”’ (2001, 199). 
In order to try to clarify these suggestions, it seems that we can distinguish at 
least two ways in which the relation between a person’s background beliefs and 
desires and her current thoughts might play a role in her having an experience of an 
inserted thought. According to Campbell, a thought might be experienced as alien due 
to its failure to be produced by these background beliefs and desires in the appropriate 
way (perhaps in a way that is minimally coherent with them). It would follow that if a 
thought, such as a desire to kill, did not cohere with one’s background beliefs and 
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desires, one could not easily make sense of it as an expression of oneself, and so may 
have the impression that it had originated with an agency or source external to oneself. 
This hypothesis would be plausible in cases where the alien thoughts in fact do not 
cohere well with the subject’s background beliefs and desires, or are clearly not 
produced by them. But often this does not seem to be the case. For instance, the 
subject may often have had the desire to kill, and may believe that killing is sometimes 
the right thing to do. She may even have a grudge against her potential victim. The 
second possibility incorporates the first, but includes what we might call a forward-
looking component. The suggestion is that in order for a thought to be experienced by 
a subject as her own, not only must it be produced by her existing background beliefs 
and desires in an appropriate way; it must be recognized or entertained by its subject 
in such a way that it is able to produce, or play some part in producing, further beliefs 
and desires that cohere with existing ones – to ‘form the shape of one’s future set of 
beliefs, desires, and interests’ as Hoerl puts it. This will be the case if that thought can 
be utilized in a process of deliberation – an intention-producing and belief-producing 
process. So rather than its being the case that the alien-thought-experience results 
merely from a breakdown in the mechanism that produces thoughts from existing 
background beliefs and desires, as in the first suggestion, this proposal highlights the 
possibility that a thought fail to be incorporated into a reasoning process that is 
capable of producing further beliefs and desires. The emphasis here is on what we 
might call the ownership of a thought rather than its authorship alone, and the idea 
points to a close connection between the experience of ownership of a thought and the 
experience of active participation in reasoning and deliberation. If this is right, it 
seems that at least part of the reason why a person experiences a thought as not 
belonging to her is that she stands in a passive relation to it. We might say that the 
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thought fails to be integrated into the subject’s psyche. This distinction between 
authorship and ownership of thoughts might be characterized as follows. 
AUTHORSHIP:  The experience of authorship of a thought consists in the 
experience of the thought’s being actively produced or initiated by the agent as 
an expression of her agency (this essentially captures the notion of being the 
ultimate source of one’s thoughts, as described in the previous section). 
Further, a thought one experiences having authored is likely to cohere with 
one’s background beliefs and desires. 
OWNERSHIP: The experience of ownership of a thought consists in the 
experience of the thought’s being integrated with the agent’s background 
beliefs and desires in such a way that she stands in an internal relation to it (as 
described in chapter 2). Such a thought will be capable of playing a part in 
mental processes that produce further thoughts, e.g., beliefs and desires. 
I argued in chapter 2 that deliberation is essentially an active process that 
requires the agent to stand in an internal psychological relation to it. The phenomenon 
of thought-insertion, as well as the thought-experiment involving external 
manipulation of an agent’s preferences, seem to indicate that unless one can assume 
that a thought has been authored by oneself, that thought cannot play a part in 
deliberation. Hoerl’s view on the nature of thought-insertion seems to indicate a 
further point, which is that in order for a thought to be utilized in a process of 
deliberation, the thought must be integrated into the agent’s psyche sufficiently for it 
to be capable of producing further beliefs and desires. In terms of the above 
characterizations, an agent must not only experience authorship of a thought, but also 
ownership of it. 
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Now, it is true that we often experience certain thoughts unexpectedly. On 
occasion we may even be surprised or shocked by the thoughts we have. For instance, 
a particularly violent image may ‘enter our heads’ as we are falling asleep, or we may 
hear an annoying and unwanted ‘little voice in our head’ which ‘tells us’ that we 
should do something we feel strongly inclined not to do.4 Surely we don’t always 
believe ourselves to have ultimate control over the production of these kinds of 
thoughts, and yet it may seem as though they could sometimes play a part in 
deliberation. So, is my claim that deliberation requires us to believe that we have 
ultimate control over our thoughts relevant to the deliberative process too strong? 
In order to find out, we need to look more closely at the process by which an 
unexpected thought might be supposed to enter into a deliberative process. However, I 
should first emphasize a distinction made in chapter 2 between thoughts to which we 
bear an internal relation (those that are integrated into our psyche, forming part of 
what we experience as our self) and thoughts that are external to us, and which we 
experience as objects of our thinking. Part of my argument there implied that an agent 
must maintain an internal relation to the aspects of her psyche that are utilized for 
evaluating her options during a process of deliberation. For example, a desire to 
indulge in chocolate cake cannot be utilized in a deliberative process aimed at working 
out whether to attempt to satisfy that desire so long as that desire is itself being 
questioned or examined by the agent (as may happen, for example, if the agent starts 
to wonder whether her desire for chocolate cake has been prompted by her having 
recently seen an advertisement for chocolate cake – a type of factor she ordinarily tries 
                                                 
4
 It is interesting to note that disorders such as Obsessive Compulsive Disorder have been characterized 
as the inability to rid oneself of unwanted thoughts. We could perhaps see some mental disorders, 
including the thought-insertion that can occur with schizophrenia, as extreme cases of what I am 
referring to as ‘unexpected thoughts.’ 
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to ignore when deciding how to act).5 The agent must stand in an internal relation to 
the desire in order for it to be effective in helping her evaluate or decide something. If 
this is accurate, then it would seem that in order for an unexpected thought to be of 
any help to an agent in working out what to do, it would first have to be internalized or 
integrated. At the least this would involve its being made consistent with other 
relevant aspects of her psyche, for example, her attitudes, desires, interests, and 
preferences concerning chocolate cake, as well as perhaps food and eating more 
generally. In the simpler terminology used above, even if the agent does not initially 
experience authorship of a thought, she must experience ownership of it in order for it 
to play a part in her deliberation. And, as I explain below, with a sense of ownership is 
likely to come a sense of authorship. 
There seem to be several possibilities with respect to the nature and outcome of 
the process of integrating an unexpected thought. One possibility is that the thought is 
rejected and forgotten, fails to be integrated, and plays no part in deliberation. Another 
is that the thought is modified in some way so that it can be integrated or owned. On a 
variation of the above example, the initial thought might be an unexpected desire for 
chocolate cake, triggered by the agent’s noticing a chocolate cake on display at the 
supermarket. The desire is unexpected perhaps in part due to the agent’s inability to 
remember previously having desired chocolate cake, and the fact that the desire does 
not cohere well with some of her other desires and beliefs (for instance, she does not 
                                                 
5
 In some respects my claims here reflect the Stoic idea that agents have the ability to suspend judgment 
with regard to propositions such as ‘It is fitting for me to eat chocolate cake,’ which correspond to 
impressions such as the agent’s noticing the picture of cake on the advertisement (cf. Long and Sedley 
1987, 322; Pereboom 1994, 593). On the Stoic view, however, the agent’s desire to eat the cake would 
not come about prior to the agent’s having assented to the proposition that it is fitting for her to eat it. 
This view thus attributes to agents a degree of control over, and responsibility for the formation of their 
desires that is not present on the picture I have given, where the desire to eat chocolate cake is 
experienced directly as a result of the agent’s recognizing the picture of the cake. Nevertheless, my 
notion of an agent’s being detached from a desire due to her examining or questioning it is similar to the 
Stoic idea of an agent’s suspending judgment of a proposition involving her eating cake. 
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want to put on weight, and believes that foods such as chocolate cake are high in 
calories which will contribute to weight gain). She thus treats the desire with 
suspicion, so it is not integrated at this point. Perhaps though, the agent considers this 
desire for a moment rather than simply dismissing it (by, say, entertaining her desire to 
not put on weight), and remembers that she had recently decided to experiment with 
tasting new foods and try to worry less about her weight. She now begins to endorse 
the desire for chocolate cake, as she finds it to be consistent with the more general 
desire to try new foods and worry less about her weight. So the desire for chocolate 
cake comes to be integrated, and she can utilize it in a decision-making process aimed 
at working out, e.g., whether her budget will allow her to buy some, how much to buy, 
whether she should buy the one she has noticed or a different one, etc. In a case like 
this though, it is plausible that what remains of the original unexpected desire once it 
has been integrated would be experienced by the agent as a thought that she has 
initiated – an idea that she, qua agent, has actively produced – as she has now found a 
way of justifying it and having it cohere with some of her background beliefs and 
desires. She may believe throughout this process that her desire for the cake was 
initially triggered externally. But due to her ability to distinguish between external 
stimuli that trigger desires in her and those that don’t, she is unlikely to continue to 
regard the desire as alien due merely to its having been triggered by an external 
source. Upon reflection, if she continues to wonder why the desire initially seemed 
alien, she would be more likely to account for this by remembering that it initially 
seemed not to cohere with her other desires, rather than its having been triggered by 
the cake. Importantly though, it seems implausible that she would continue to regard 
the initial desire for chocolate cake as a desire that was hers but that she did not 
produce (a desire that she owns yet did not author), especially once the ongoing or 
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recurring desire for chocolate cake which had the initial desire as its basis, has played 
a part in further deliberative processes, and has thereby become more familiar to her. 
Exactly how this process of integration works is unclear, but it is very likely 
similar to the case of artistic or intellectual inspiration. The inspirational idea may 
initially be experienced as unexpected and perhaps alien, but unless it is immediately 
rejected and forgotten, in time the inspired agent will come to regard the idea as 
something she owns, and further, something she produced. The more she works with it 
and becomes familiar with it, the more it will begin to cohere not only with further 
thoughts she is likely to have on its basis, but with her previous thoughts and 
background aspects of her psyche (beliefs, desires, etc.) – it will become an integrated 
part of her self. And once this process has taken root, as in the previous example, it 
seems unlikely that the agent would continue to regard the idea as something she did 
not produce, especially because her doing so would have to involve her similarly 
regarding any subsequent thoughts that had been built upon or derived from the 
original, as fully or partially alien. 
Yet another possibility with respect to an unexpected thought is that the 
thought is not entirely rejected or forgotten, but remains to be considered at a later 
point. Here though, the agent will be in a position of uncertainty with respect to the 
thought until it is either integrated or rejected and forgotten, and it could therefore not 
plausibly function in a way that would help her to evaluate something else. There are 
perhaps other possibilities to consider, but in none of those discussed here does it seem 
that unexpected thoughts provide a clear counterexample to my claim that deliberation 
requires that one believe oneself to have ultimate control over one’s thoughts relevant 
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to the deliberative process.6 Of course, we cannot ignore the possibility that an 
unexpected thought might be experienced as integrated and owned, yet not initiated by 
the agent. I have tried to show, with the above two examples, that this would be 
psychologically implausible. But I am unable to conclusively establish this. 
Nevertheless, this should not adversely affect my argument overall. Even if my 
contention were to be restricted to the claim that an agent needs to believe that she has 
ultimate control over her thoughts relevant to the deliberative process in the ownership 
sense alone, and not also in the authorship sense, event-causal libertarian accounts, as 
will be seen below, cannot clearly provide this. 
This evidence from thought-insertion, as well as my claims about unexpected 
thoughts, are inconclusive and speculative. But it is important to reiterate the 
dialectical point made above, which is that, as argued in chapter 2, applying a belief in 
determinism to one’s deliberative situation should result in one’s inability to 
deliberate. Above I provided some support for the relatively uncontroversial claim that 
believing that one is causally determined is incompatible with believing that one is the 
ultimate source of one’s thoughts and actions. The considerations raised in this section 
have been aimed at establishing the plausibility of the claim that belief that one is the 
ultimate source of one’s thoughts relevant to a deliberative process is required for 
deliberation. If this claim is indeed plausible, then it would seem that finding grounds 
to think that we can be the ultimate source of our thoughts in a deliberative process, 
and thus that we can exercise ultimate control over them, is of the upmost importance. 
                                                 
6
 I am not here claiming that an agent must be the ultimate source of a thought in order for it to be 
capable of playing a role in a deliberative process. If the authorship of a thought (a desire, for instance) 
is not questioned by its subject, and if the thought coheres minimally with her background beliefs, 
desires, etc., there seems no reason why the subject could not stand in an internal relation to the thought 
and utilize it in a deliberative process. My focus here is restricted to thoughts that strike an agent as 
alien to some extent – as perhaps not cohering particularly well with her current stream of 
consciousness or her background beliefs and desires, and thus being experienced to some extent as 
alien. My point is that once the agent becomes suspicious of the origin of a thought, she then stands in 
an external relation to it, and it cannot play a part in her deliberation until it is (re)integrated. 
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Once the question of control over our thoughts arises, we are not warranted in 
simply assuming that the falsity of determinism would be sufficient for the kind of 
control required, nor that belief in the falsity of determinism would be sufficient for 
belief that we have such control. What we require from an account of deliberation that 
assumes an indeterministic factor as an essential component is reason to think that the 
sense of ultimate control that is unavailable to agents who consider their deliberative 
situation to be causally determined would be attainable due to this indeterministic 
factor. We need a good explanation of how indeterminism could be of any help. For 
example, the libertarian assumption that there are alternatives to the events that 
actually occur does not warrant the further claim that we can control which of those 
alternatives becomes actual. And (more importantly for present purposes) given the 
assumption that causal chains may begin in our brains, we are not warranted to make 
the further claim that they are produced by us or that we are in control of their 
initiation. I will use Robert Kane’s account as an example, due to its 
comprehensiveness and detail with respect to the points that will primarily concern 
me. In the concluding section of the chapter I will relate my findings to other non-
agent-causal libertarian accounts. 
 
3.4 The Basics of Kane’s Account of Deliberation 
According to Kane (1996), a process of deliberation may be influenced by 
indeterministic occurrences that would be beneficial to the deliberating agent. Far 
from undermining the rationality of the agent, or his control over the process, 
indeterminism can play a creative role (164), ‘opening doors’ in deliberation, and 
making possible ‘new beginnings’ (165). 
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If undetermined occurrences play a role in deliberation leading to practical 
choice, they do so by initiating processes of thinking about, or imagining, 
remembering, or attending to various facts, memories, images, and scenarios 
that may be relevant to deliberation. We refer generally to the items thus 
thought about, remembered, or attended to as ‘chance-selected considerations.’ 
Some of them are passed over as irrelevant to deliberation, but others are 
acknowledged by the agent as relevant. This acknowledgment of relevance 
amounts to the adoption into the preference set for one or another option of 
reasons not previously regarded as relevant to the deliberation, or not 
previously seen as relevant in this way (p. 163). 
Kane thinks it’s plausible that these chance-selected considerations ‘may well up from 
the unconscious mind,’ influencing the stream of consciousness, ‘suggesting new 
options, new consequences of the options, and new ways of viewing the 
consequences’ (160). Although these considerations are ‘chance-selected,’ and thus 
we are not able to control which of them are going to enter our consciousness, they are 
not completely beyond our control. By what Kane refers to as a ‘Taoist effort,’ we can 
relax our mind, opening ourselves up to new thoughts, thereby allowing ourselves to 
be receptive to new chance-selected considerations (165). Kane specifies that these 
Taoist efforts require us to resist our natural tendencies to think in familiar ways, and 
so they are made against resistance. So the efforts are reflected in the brain by 
movement further from thermodynamic equilibrium, and this makes the process 
sensitive to undetermined influences on the micro-level (166). These micro-level 
undetermined influences (we can assume from what he says earlier) are then amplified 
chaotically, resulting in the macro-level phenomena that are the introduction of new 
considerations into the deliberative process. So deliberators can do more than just 
passively wait for these chance-selected considerations to occur. We can make ‘efforts 
 97 
 
 
to temporarily relinquish conscious control over thought processes in order to be 
receptive to new considerations that may come to mind – that is, efforts-not-to-make-
an-effort to control [our] thoughts’ (165). 
These Taoist efforts are not the only kind of indeterministic effort that can 
have a positive influence on deliberation. Kane thinks that agents can also make 
indeterministic efforts of the following kinds: ‘(1) efforts not to quit deliberating too 
soon or not to choose too hastily, (2) efforts to focus attention on considerations that 
have come to mind in order to determine all their consequences, (3) to avoid 
suppressing relevant considerations that one may be resistant to considering, (4) to 
galvanize oneself to pursue relevant sources of new information, and (5) to avoid 
deceiving oneself (or rationalizing about) the relevance of various considerations or 
their consequences’ (167). I address these other kinds of effort briefly in section 5b 
and in more detail in section 5e. Of particular significance for our present concern, 
Kane points out that it is through our making such efforts that ‘we exercise control 
over our practical deliberations throughout their duration’ (168). This is the point that 
I will be contesting. 
 
3.5 Antecedent-Determining Control and Ultimate Control 
Before assessing Kane’s account for its ability to secure the control required 
for deliberation it will be useful to try to clarify the distinction he draws between 
‘antecedent-determining’ control and ultimate control. He describes antecedent-
determining (AD) control as ‘the ability to be in, or bring about, conditions such that 
one can guarantee or determine which of a set of outcomes is going to occur before it 
occurs, whether the outcomes are one’s own actions, the actions of others, or events in 
the world generally’ (1996, 144). As this kind of control is compatible with the truth 
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of determinism, it cannot by itself be exhaustive of the control required of a libertarian 
account of deliberation. Kane’s notion of ultimate control is less clear. Here are the 
two most illuminating things he says about it: ‘…it does not follow that because you 
cannot determine which of a set of outcomes occurs before it occurs, you lack control 
over which of them occurs, when it occurs. When the conditions of plural voluntary 
control are satisfied, agents exercise control over their future lives then and there in a 
manner that is not antecedently determined by their pasts’ (144). Similarly, ‘Though 
you can’t guarantee in advance for any one of the options taken separately that it will 
occur, you have complete control over the options considered as a set, in that you can 
do whichever of them you will to do when you will to do it, for the reasons you will to 
do it, on purpose, without being coerced, compelled, etc.’ (1999, 117). Plural 
voluntary control is defined as follows: ‘Agents have plural voluntary control over a 
set of options (e.g., choosing morally or prudentially, or vice versa) when they are able 
to do whichever of the options they will to do, when they will to do it…, for the 
reasons they will to do it…, on purpose rather than accidentally, by mistake, or merely 
by chance…, without being coerced or compelled in doing it… or in willing to do it…, 
or otherwise controlled in doing or willing to do it by any other agents or mechanisms’ 
(1996, 143). 
Part of the difficulty in assessing Kane’s account of deliberation stems from 
the difficulty in understanding what kind of control he has in mind here. As it is an 
indeterministic account, we must assume that it is an element of indeterminism that 
gives this kind of control a particular significance in his overall view and that 
distinguishes it from the kind of control that we could have if determinism is true (AD 
control). In order to identify this distinctive indeterministic element we must isolate it 
from the components in these definitions that are compatible with determinism. As I 
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see it, the only distinctively indeterministic aspect of Kane’s notion of ultimate control 
is the idea that you have control over which member of a set of outcomes occurs when 
it occurs (rather than before it occurs) in a manner that is not antecedently determined 
by your past. But it is not clear exactly what this amounts to. It is important to 
remember that Kane’s account is not agent-causal, whereas the notion of being the 
ultimate source of one’s actions, as described in section 1 above, seems to be most 
naturally interpreted as involving causation between the agent and her thought in a 
way that is not clearly reducible to causation between mental events. Therefore, any 
descriptions given by Kane involving agent-causal language must be treated with 
suspicion, especially if he is using them to explain a causal connection that would be 
mysterious without the assumption of agent-causation. For example, Kane claims that 
‘[a] free action for which the agent is ultimately responsible is such that its occurring 
rather than not here and now, or vice versa, has as its ultimate or final explanation the 
fact that it is caused by the agent here and now’ (1995, 120 (my emphasis)). But it is 
illegitimate for descriptions involving causation by agents to play any irreducible 
explanatory role in accounts that reject the agent-causal relation, as Kane’s explicitly 
does (cf. 1996, 115-17). Therefore, such descriptions must be either treated as 
shorthand for reductive explanations purely involving event-causation, or else 
rejected. 
My strategy will be to assess Kane’s account in terms of whether it plausibly 
captures the idea that an agent can be the ultimate source of her thoughts in a way that 
can be psychologically internalized by the agent and allow her to stand in an internal 
psychological relation to them. 
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3.6 The Search for Ultimate Control on Kane’s Account 
We now need to look for some aspect of Kane’s account in virtue of which an 
agent could believe that she is the ultimate source of her thoughts,7 i.e., that she has 
ultimate control over them. As we have seen, and as will become more apparent 
below, Kane is not altogether clear about precisely what he intends to denote by 
‘ultimate control.’ In order to account for any terminological discrepancies, therefore, 
I will reserve the capitalized version (‘Ultimate Control’) for the kind of control we 
are looking for, i.e., the kind of control that an agent needs to believe she has in order 
to deliberate. As a further note about my approach, the following is intended to be a 
conceptual analysis of Kane’s account of the process of deliberation, in order to 
pinpoint where control would be relevant. Deliberation often occurs very quickly, and 
the phases described below may overlap one another to some extent. But I think it’s 
legitimate to break things down in this way, as it seems the most promising method of 
obtaining an explicit picture of just what kind and degree of control could be involved. 
 
3.6a The Irrelevance of AD Control 
Since I’ve already argued in chapter 2 that belief in determinism is 
incompatible with belief that one has the kind of control required for deliberation, that 
is, that one is the ultimate source of one’s thoughts, I won’t focus much attention on 
parts of the deliberative process on Kane’s account where it is clear that the only 
control available to the agent is AD control. For example, although he does not make 
it explicit, it is implied by some of what Kane says that deliberators, on his account, 
                                                 
7
 I have generally been referring above to the requirement of ultimate control over one’s thoughts and 
actions. Henceforth I will be restricting my focus to an agent’s thoughts, until I look at the possibility of 
an agent’s exercising ultimate control over her intention-formation, in section 3.7. In doing this I do not 
intend to exclude mental actions such as willing and trying as potential sources of ultimate control. 
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would sometimes be adducing and weighing reasons deterministically, that is, there 
would be no indeterminism involved in that part of the process. We know that on his 
account of the Taoist effort, indeterminism only plays a part in the process when 
agents make efforts to resist familiar modes of thought. This resistance creates tension 
in the will, giving rise to indeterminacies that are amplified chaotically and amount to 
the coming to mind of new ‘chance-selected’ considerations (CSCs). But he claims 
that deliberation can proceed without the Taoist effort’s being made: ‘The point is not 
that Taoist efforts [to resist normal ways of thinking and relax the mind] must be made 
or always are made in practical deliberation’ (1996, 165). Kane also claims that we 
relinquish conscious control over thought processes when we make Taoist efforts 
(165). This implies that we can be in control of the process up to the point at which we 
relinquish it by making the Taoist effort. But notice that whatever kind of control we 
have before the point at which we make the Taoist effort, it could not be ultimate 
control, as the process up to this point involves no effort to resist normal ways of 
thinking, and therefore there is no tension in the will which would give rise to the 
indeterminacies that must play a part in our exercising ultimate control. Of course, we 
may feel as though we are in control of this part of the process, but phenomenological 
evidence such as this cannot legitimately be used to establish that we are in fact in 
control. An incompatibilist such as Kane should certainly not give such evidence 
much weight if it were being used to establish, for example, that we can be in control 
of our thoughts and actions if determinism is true. Due to these considerations I think 
we can safely restrict our search for Ultimate Control on Kane’s account to those parts 
of a deliberative process that are likely to include indeterministic occurrences. 
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3.6b Initiation of the Taoist Effort 
We now need to turn our attention to parts of the deliberative process where 
Ultimate Control is likely to be found. As the Taoist effort seems the obvious 
candidate, we should start there. Kane describes the Taoist effort in general terms as 
an effort made by a deliberator to relax her mind, with the intention of finding new 
considerations relevant to her decision (1996, 165). Although Kane does not do so, I 
think a distinction must be made between the Taoist effort itself and its initiation, i.e., 
the precise point in time at which the effort begins. This will allow us to more 
accurately assess the account for Ultimate Control. Now, there is some evidence that 
Kane thinks an agent is in control of the initiation of the Taoist effort. He says that 
voluntary efforts are under our control, or at least that the indeterminacy involved in 
voluntary efforts is relevant to control and responsibility (1999, 117). Also, he claims 
that we consciously intend to make the effort before it is made, so it looks as though 
this may involve at least AD control, provided that the intention causally necessitates 
the effort’s being made. 
So far this is quite general, merely providing some evidence that Kane thinks 
we can control the initiation of the Taoist effort in some respect. But he goes into more 
detail in a response to Clarke, who asks how the agent controls whether an effort is 
made. Kane (1999, 116, n. 10) claims, first, that it’s not the case that the effort is 
something someone controls by doing something else. Rather, the effort is ‘the agent’s 
doing something in order to control something else (e.g., which choice is made or 
whether an overt action is performed).’ The agent does cause her effort, but this means 
only that she makes it, not that she causes it by doing something else (which he thinks 
would lead to a regress). He goes on to explain that on the neural level this effort-
making ‘would be a complex neural process involving circulating impulses in a 
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recurrent neural network.’ This process, in turn, is caused by the neural processes that 
realize the agent’s reasons for making the effort (her beliefs, desires, etc.) These 
comprise the agent’s motivation for making the effort – they cause the effort to be 
made. He is careful to remind us, however, that these reasons do not determine the 
effort, because the effort is indeterminate, meaning that its effects are undetermined, 
and also that its onset (whether it occurs) is undetermined.8 Further, the reasons do not 
determine the choice that results from the effort, because it is undetermined whether 
the effort will succeed. 
We need to look at this more carefully. Let’s start by assuming that the agent 
has a reason for making the effort, e.g., a desire to have new considerations relevant to 
her decision occur to her, and a belief that it may help if she tries to relax control over 
her thoughts. About a reason such as this Kane says both that it motivates her to make 
                                                 
8
 Kane explains what he means by ‘indeterminate,’ as well as the distinction between ‘indeterminate’ 
and ‘undetermined’ by drawing on the postulated indeterminacy of properties of physical systems (e.g., 
the position and momentum of particles) by quantum physicists. He uses an analogy to illustrate his 
idea that an effort of will could be indeterminate: ‘Imagine an isolated particle, such as an electron, 
moving toward a thin atomic barrier. Whether or not the particle will penetrate the barrier is 
undetermined. There is a probability that it will penetrate, but not a certainty, because its position and 
momentum are not both determinate as it moves toward the barrier’ (1996, 128, 172-3). To help explain 
this further, Kane distinguishes two kinds of indeterministic worlds. In what he calls an ‘Epicurean’ 
world ‘all properties of physical systems, such as position and momentum, are determinate at all times, 
but… (unlike the classical Newtonian world, as usually envisioned) the laws allow different 
(determinate) futures given the same (determinate) past.’ This is contrasted with a ‘non-Epicurean’ 
world, which is ‘like the quantum world of modern physics (on standard interpretations of it) that 
allows for both indeterminateness of physical properties and the possibility of forks in history’ (172-3). 
So for an effort of will to be indeterminate is for it to correspond to a complex macro process in our 
brain, involving many neuron firings and connections which have indeterminate physical properties on 
the quantum level. These quantum indeterminacies are amplified chaotically such that the strength of 
the effort is indeterminate, and therefore its effects are undetermined. A potential source of confusion 
here is Kane’s reference to indeterminate processes or events, e.g., ‘indeterminate acquiring or 
possessing of reasons’ (1999, 117). It is unclear why Kane refers to these events as indeterminate rather 
than undetermined, given that other uses of ‘indeterminate’ refer to properties such as the position and 
momentum of a particle and the strength of an effort, where there is a reasonably clear analogy to 
quantum physics. But whatever precisely he means by this, I think it is consistent with the quantum 
analogy given above, and will not adversely affect my analysis below, if we assume that an 
indeterminate event or process is one that is indeterministically caused, i.e., undetermined by its causes. 
Surely he does not mean by ‘indeterminate’ in this context that after an agent has acquired a reason 
there is merely a probability that, i.e., no fact of the matter whether, the agent now possesses that 
reason. 
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the effort and that it causes her to make it. Now let’s look at the precise point at which 
the effort is initiated. Again, Kane claims that the effort is indeterminate, which for 
present purposes we are understanding as its having a probability less that 1.0 of 
occurring given what would be its causes: ‘[The] reasons or motives which causally 
influence the effort do not determine it exactly because it is not exactly anything; it is 
an indeterminate effort’ (1999, 16, n. 10). He also says that the (initiation of the) effort 
is caused by the agent, but not by her doing something else. 
Assuming this is coherent, we need to know whether the agent controls the 
initiation of the effort. One possibility is that she doesn’t. If this is the case, then we 
can move on to consider whether she controls the effort post-initiation. There is some 
evidence that Kane would agree that the agent does not control the initiation of the 
effort, when he says, for example, as mentioned above, that Clarke’s question of how 
the agent controls whether an effort is made is misleading if it presupposes that the 
effort is something someone controls by doing something else, rather than being the 
agent’s doing something in order to control something else. The possibility that 
control enters the process at a later stage rather than at the point the effort is initiated is 
discussed below in section 6c. But to be safe, for now let’s proceed on the assumption 
that Kane thinks the agent does control the initiation of the effort. Now given that 1) 
her reasons cause her to make it, 2) she causes it, 3) she does not cause it by doing 
something else, and given the further assumption that 4) she does not agent-cause it, 
we have to assume that there is a direct causal link, albeit an indeterministic one, 
between her reasons for making the effort and the effort’s being made. So given that 
there is no agent-causation in play, the expression ‘she causes it’ is presumably to be 
understood to mean that her reasons cause it, and plausibly that she is consciously 
aware of causing it. But this raises the question ‘How might the agent be in control of 
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her reasons causing her effort, or whether her reasons cause her effort?’ After all, we 
can certainly have reasons for doing something that do not cause us to do it and that do 
not cause it to occur. So what is the extra factor that makes it the case that her reasons 
change from being dormant to being active and initiating the effort? It can’t be that the 
agent performs some mental action that, in turn, causes her reasons to cause the effort, 
as this is ruled out by claim 3. So it would seem that the only possibility remaining as 
to how her reasons become active and cause the effort to be made is to be found in the 
indeterminism. Unless we have some other way of understanding claim 2 in 
conjunction with claims 3 and 4, the indeterminism involved with claim 1 is the only 
factor remaining which is a potential explanatory ground for the agent’s control over 
her initiating the effort. But indeterminism is not an extra factor that supplies a cause; 
‘indeterministic’ is merely a term used to describe a type of causal link where the 
cause doesn’t necessitate the effect. Certainly we can say that a reason became an 
active cause indeterministically, i.e., it was dormant and then indeterministically 
became active and caused the initiation of effort, with nothing in turn, or concurrently, 
causing this activity to take place at that point. But this supposition will surely do 
nothing to enhance the agent’s control. That is, without some extra factor in play it is 
implausible to suppose that the agent controlled this, or that this constitutes the agent’s 
control. 
My point here can be brought out more clearly if we look at something Kane 
says about our having control over indeterministic occurrences. He says that ‘the 
important point for control and responsibility would again be whether these 
indeterminate acquirings or possessings of reasons just “happen” or “occur” 
spontaneously to the agents or whether they result in part from the agents’ voluntary 
efforts or doings’ (1999, 117). This passage is directed at Clarke’s suggestion that the 
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agent’s acquiring reasons might be indeterministic processes. But the contrast Kane 
makes here is illuminating nonetheless. It is illuminating because in using it he seems 
to be implying that indeterministic occurrences can be under the control of agents by 
virtue of their resulting from voluntary efforts of agents. But this strategy is 
inadequate to establish control unless we assume that the phenomenology involved 
with a voluntary effort is a reliable indicator of actual control. Now if we do assume 
this, then it clearly does not enhance the account, for as mentioned above, it is 
illegitimate for Kane to rely on phenomenological evidence in this way. But if we 
don’t take such evidence on face-value then we need an explanation of how the 
initiation of an effort that results in indeterministic occurrences is in turn under the 
control of the agent. And this is precisely what we don’t have. 
Of relevance here, Clarke (2003, 89) says that ‘if efforts preceding decisions in 
cases of moral conflict are supposed to contribute in this way to active control, then 
what is needed is an account of the freedom with which the agent acts in making these 
efforts.’ Clarke claims (2003, 90) that Kane has responded (in correspondence) that 
the efforts preceding decisions are not directly free (given incompatibilism), i.e., they 
are free only in a compatibilist sense (uncoerced, uncompelled, etc.) But, according to 
Clarke, ‘given the assumption of incompatibilism, we cannot get freedom-level active 
control for the decision by adding together the compatibilist “freedom” of the prior 
effort with whatever direct active control is exercised in making the subsequent 
decision, unless the latter is already (by itself) freedom-level active control… 
Freedom-level active control cannot result by addition in this way.’9 So we lack an 
adequate control-relevant explanation, in purely event-causal terms, of how the effort 
                                                 
9
 And as Clarke points out (90 n. 28), Kane’s notion of doubling, which refers to the agent’s trying to do 
two incompatible things at once (see, for example, Kane 1999, pp. 111-14), would not be of any help. 
 107 
 
  
is initiated. Aside from phenomenological evidence, there seems no reason to assume 
that our doing something amounts to our controlling our doing it. 
In terms of ultimate control in particular, there may be another explanation 
available to Kane here, which is to concede that the agent has very little AD control 
over the initiation of the effort, but to claim that she does control it in the sense that 
she has ultimate control over it. He concedes that indeterminism diminishes AD 
control, but thinks that this is the cost of our exercising ultimate control. So we need to 
take another look at what Kane says about ultimate control and work out whether it 
applies to this part of the process. As mentioned above, Kane gives very little detail 
about the nature of ultimate control. We can at least be sure, however, that he thinks it 
applies at the point at which an agent chooses one out of a range of perceived options. 
Ultimate control is exercised when we choose which member of a set of outcomes 
occurs as it occurs, even though we can’t guarantee which will occur before it occurs: 
‘Though you have diminished antecedent control over each of the options taken 
separately (you cannot guarantee in advance for any one of them that it will occur), 
you have complete or “plural” voluntary control over the available options at a given 
time considered as a set in the sense that you can do whichever of them you will to do, 
when you will to do it, for the reasons you will to do it, on purpose, without being 
coerced or compelled’ (1999, 117 n. 13). 
In explaining what kind of determining power ultimate control is, so that it 
doesn’t look entirely negative (just the absence of determinism), Kane explains two 
notions that he thinks play a positive role in that account. 
1. When there is conflict in the will due to an agent’s desire to do two 
incompatible things, there will be resistance in the will to whichever is 
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chosen, so effort is needed to resist and overcome the opposing desire (115-
16). 
2. If the choice or action is the end result of a trajectory of the agent’s prior 
effort, then the agent is responsible despite its being undetermined whether 
the effort would succeed (116). 
It’s unclear how these descriptions help to clarify the notion of ultimate control 
in a positive way. Ultimate control must involve something more than a combination 
of AD control, sense of control, and its simply being undetermined which of the 
competing reasons will win out. That further thing, let’s assume, is the agent’s prior 
(prior to one of the reasons winning out) effort to have a reason prevail. On this 
assumption, the agent exercises ultimate control over the prevailing of that reason 
because that was what she was trying to do. But we may wonder why it would be that 
these efforts are instances of ultimate control rather than AD control. On the evidence 
we have from Kane, it appears that there is no indeterminism in play at least up until it 
occurs to the agent that making a Taoist effort is a good idea. So in order for ultimate 
control to apply to this part of the process, we would have to suppose that beginning at 
the point at which this occurs to the agent there is tension in her will, because she both 
wants to make the Taoist effort and also does not want to make it. We must bear in 
mind that the tension must be in place before the effort is initiated in order for the 
agent to have ultimate control over its initiation.10 
In the first place, it’s questionable whether this is what would be occurring to a 
deliberator at this point in the process. In order to exercise ultimate control over the 
                                                 
10
 It is important to point out that this ‘doubling’ of effort plays a central role in Kane’s account of 
moral and prudential decisions, where it has more intuitive appeal. Here I am taking the (small) liberty 
of applying the notion explicitly to the case of deliberation in an attempt to make sense of ultimate 
control in this context. 
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initiation of the Taoist effort, the agent would first need to be consciously attending to 
her reasons for relaxing control, and also (simultaneously) consciously attending to 
her reasons to go on deliberating in a familiar way. Ultimate control on Kane’s 
account is in place only when an agent is simultaneously trying to make two 
incommensurable sets of reasons win out and cause a decision, as in moral and 
prudential choice situations (see 1999, ch. 8). So in order for ultimate control to be in 
place at this point in the deliberative process, the agent must be simultaneously trying 
to make an effort to relax conscious control over her thoughts and to not relax control 
and just go on deliberating without the Taoist effort. But first, the idea of trying to 
make an effort seems problematic on a psychological level (and may involve an 
unhelpful regress). If we add to this that the agent is not only trying to make an effort 
to relax, but also trying to make an effort not to relax, I think we end up with an 
unacceptable tangle of tryings and efforts. And again, to square this with other parts of 
Kane’s account where ultimate control is relevant to effort-making (e.g., moral and 
prudential choice), the agent would have to be trying both to make the effort (trying to 
make her reasons for making the effort prevail) and not make the effort (trying to 
make her reasons for not making the effort prevail) in order to make a decision to 
make the effort. But again, this seems unacceptable, and given this reasoning, a 
regress looms. Since an exercise of ultimate control always requires there to be prior 
tension in the agent’s will due to her trying to make competing sets of reasons prevail, 
in order for the agent to exercise ultimate control over the initiation of any particular 
effort it seems that we would need to keep positing further prior (competing) efforts in 
which the required tension could be found. As a final point, Kane says that ‘since in 
practical choice situations agents are not making efforts to do what they think they 
ought to do against prevailing inclinations, such efforts cannot play the same role in 
practical choice as they do in moral and prudential choice – or, for that matter, in the 
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efforts sustaining purposes… . As a consequence, indeterminism cannot enter into 
practical choice in the same way it enters into other categories of SFWs’ (1996, 159). 
From all of this it seems reasonable to conclude that agents could not exercise ultimate 
control over the initiation of the Taoist effort. 
So, according to this analysis of Kane’s account, we possess reduced AD 
control over the initiation of the Taoist effort (due to the indeterminism), and we have 
no ultimate control over it. So we can conclude that we cannot have Ultimate Control 
over the initiation of the Taoist effort. We can therefore assume that the agent has less 
control over this point in the deliberative process on Kane’s account than she would if 
it were purely deterministic. This analysis also applies to the other indeterministic 
efforts mentioned by Kane, and given in section 3 above. These are: ‘(1) efforts not to 
quit deliberating too soon or not to choose too hastily, (2) efforts to focus attention on 
considerations that have come to mind in order to determine all their consequences, 
(3) to avoid suppressing relevant considerations that one may be resistant to 
considering, (4) to galvanize oneself to pursue relevant sources of new information, 
and (5) to avoid deceiving oneself (or rationalizing about) the relevance of various 
considerations or their consequences’ (1996, 167). Kane gives examples of these other 
prudential efforts, but does not go into any more detail about how the indeterminism 
enters into the deliberative process via such efforts, than he gives with respect to the 
Taoist effort. So without more information we can also conclude, for the reasons given 
in this section, that agents would have diminished AD control, and no Ultimate 
Control, over the initiation of these other kinds of efforts. (I address these other kinds 
of efforts again in section 3.6e.) 
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3.6c The Taoist Effort and CSCs 
Even if an agent lacks Ultimate Control over the initiation of the Taoist effort, 
might she not have control in the post-initiation phase? Here, according to Kane, the 
agent is in the process of making an effort to relax her mind, which, because it goes 
against familiar ways of thinking (the deterministic adducing and weighing of reasons 
described in 6a above), creates tension in the mind which stirs up indeterminacies. 
These indeterminacies are amplified chaotically and amount to the coming to mind – 
from unconscious to conscious – of new chance-selected considerations (CSCs). So 
the question to be addressed in this section is whether an agent can have Ultimate 
Control in this phase, in particular, over the coming to mind of the CSCs. 
One immediate difficulty in assessing this aspect of Kane’s account is that he 
suggests in some places that we are in control of the entire Taoist effort and in others 
that we lack control of at least some parts of it. On the control side, he says, ‘To the 
extent that we succeed or fail in our efforts to make such [informed, prudent] 
decisions, we exercise control over practical deliberations throughout their duration’ 
(1996, 168).11 Yet he also says that agents would either lack control or have 
diminished control over at least some parts of this phase of the process: ‘By definition, 
reflecting agents cannot control exactly which “chance-selected” considerations are 
going to come to mind at any moment. But they can willfully put themselves in a 
frame of mind that is receptive to new chance-selected considerations’ (165). Another 
(potential) problem is ascertaining just where in the process the indeterminism plays a 
role. For instance, he says that ‘the indeterministic effort of will corresponds to the 
                                                 
11
 Additionally, he claims that ‘these additional ideas [the efforts, including the Taoist effort]… involve 
giving agents a more active role in practical deliberation by way of efforts of will through which the 
agents might exercise greater control over the deliberative process – without eliminating the creative 
role of chance-selected considerations’ (164). 
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entire chaotic process in the brain, including the micro indeterminacies and their 
amplifications.’ In order to explain this, he says, more specifically, that while the 
effort is being made, ‘the micro indeterminacies are being fed upward to the neural net 
as a whole, which is continually reorganizing in response to micro indeterminacies and 
is in turn influencing individual neurons.’ So, he claims, ‘the indeterminism and the 
effort are “fused”’ (151). But it’s hard to see exactly what this fusion amounts to, and 
how to distinguish the specific parts of the process that are undetermined from those 
that are determined. Kane does concede that the indeterminate efforts are mysterious, 
but claims that this is due to the difficulties of understanding consciousness and 
quantum indeterminacy. 
Perhaps we can clear this up if we imagine some of these parts of the process 
occurring simultaneously. We could be in (AD) control of making the effort, which is 
an example of an effort of will sustaining a purpose (1996, 166), and during the effort-
making phase (what we experience as making an effort) CSCs indeterministically 
occur to us as a result of the tension created by our effort, and yet we’re not in control 
of which and when they do (1999, 116). But we go on making the effort while this is 
happening. So in a sense we’re in control of the effort all the way through, but only in 
one direction, i.e., ‘towards’ the indeterministically produced CSCs. This is probably 
why Kane claims that the effort and the indeterminism are ‘fused’ – the indeterminism 
is a property of the effort, so the effort is indeterminate (1996, 151). So we could be 
simultaneously in control of something (our making the effort) and not in control of 
something else, the direct results of that effort in the form of the occurrence of CSCs. 
We may have the experience of making an effort throughout this part of the process, 
with considerations coming to mind while the effort is being made, like sporadic 
effects of a continuous cause. It seems that this is the only way to reconcile Kane’s 
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claims that on the one hand, the effort includes the indeterminacies (1996, 151), and 
we are in control during the entire effort (1996, 168), and on the other hand, that 
reason relaxes control (to allow for chance-selected considerations)…’ (165), and 
agents have no control over when and which CSCs will arise (1999, 116). 
To collect results, it seems as though an agent would have very little, if any, 
AD control during this phase. According to Kane, agents have no control over when 
and which CSCs occur, and phenomenologically, an agent would have relinquished 
(or at least relaxed) conscious control over this part of the process in order to put 
herself in a frame of mind whereby she is receptive to the occurrence of CSCs. In 
terms of ultimate control, certainly an agent doesn’t have any kind of control over 
which and when CSCs occur. But she may feel like she is in control of making the 
effort to relax her mind and freely associate (the Taoist effort). As long as it makes 
sense to be making an effort to not be making an effort, and succeeding in not making 
an effort (while simultaneously making the effort to do this), this picture could be 
plausible. But there still may be a problem. For one thing, it seems fairly clear that 
whatever exactly Kane means by ‘ultimate control,’ given his aims it would have to 
apply at the point at which one of the agent’s competing sets of reasons prevails and 
leads to a choice being made (or in the case of efforts sustaining purposes, the 
prevailing of an intention over temptation to do otherwise). Now Kane does say that 
efforts of will cannot play the same role in deliberation as they do in moral and 
prudential choices or in efforts of will sustaining purposes, but without more detail 
about the role they do play in deliberation we will have to use their role in these other 
categories as a guide. 
The picture must be something like the following. When making-the-Taoist-
effort an agent has two incommensurable sets of reasons: one for making the effort to 
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relax her mind and one for not making it, and she is trying simultaneously to make 
both sets prevail. This tension causes the process to be sensitive to indeterminism so 
that the strengths of the efforts to make each set prevail are indeterminate, and which 
set of reasons prevails is undetermined. When one set does prevail (e.g., the reasons 
for making the effort to relax her mind) the agent exercises ultimate control at that 
point, as this is the end result of the trajectory of a prior effort of the agent. In moral 
and prudential decisions we must assume that after the point at which one of the sets 
of reasons prevails, there is no longer any tension and the process becomes 
deterministic once again. Now, due to the Taoist effort’s being a ‘frame of mind’ like 
a meditative state (1996, 165), rather than a decision (or, more precisely, the formation 
of an intention, as in the moral and prudential case), in order for CSCs to occur to the 
agent throughout this phase, the agent must continually be in tension as a result of her 
effort to make both of her reason sets prevail. But if she exercises ultimate control 
during the entire phase, and ultimate control is only in place when one of her reason 
sets prevails (it would be control over that set’s prevailing), it must be the case that she 
is continually trying to make both of her reason sets prevail and succeeding at making 
one of them prevail. Perhaps this is why Kane says that the effort-making ‘would be a 
complex neural process involving circulating impulses in a recurrent neural network’ 
(1999, 166 n. 10). Here’s the point, though: According to Kane, ultimate control is 
exercised only at the point at which one of the sets of reasons prevails. And once one 
of the sets has prevailed the agent can no longer be in tension trying to make them 
both prevail. But CSCs occur only when the agent is in tension, as it is the tension 
which gives rise to the indeterminism – the element of chance which is an essential to 
CSCs. But while the agent is in tension she is not exercising ultimate control. So it 
seems that, to be very specific, the agent is only able to exercise ultimate control at the 
precise point when no CSCs could be occurring. So what exactly is she exercising 
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ultimate control over? The only possibility is that she exercises it over her success at 
relaxing her mind. And this would clearly be of no help to an agent who requires good 
grounds to believe that she has Ultimate Control over her thoughts during a process of 
deliberation. 
 
3.6d Regaining Control 
If we left the analysis here, we would have completed our search for Ultimate 
Control in the parts of the deliberative process where Kane indicates it is most likely 
to be found, i.e., the Taoist effort and the occurrence of CSCs. But we should also look 
at the possibility that Ultimate Control is in play in other parts of the process. It is 
important to note that Kane does not say much about parts of the deliberative process 
after CSCs have occurred to the agent.12 So the accuracy of the analysis given in this 
section will depend on whether some of my previous assumptions about Kane’s 
account are correct. Importantly, I’ll continue to assume that at least some of the 
phases of deliberation can occur simultaneously. Even on this assumption, though, it 
will be necessary to identify and isolate the different causal and phenomenological 
                                                 
12
 In his chapter 8 (1996) Kane does describe stages in decision-making processes where he thinks an 
agent exercises ultimate control over her choosing between perceived alternatives for action. It may be 
thought that such descriptions could be helpful in illuminating the parts of a deliberative process with 
which we are presently concerned, i.e., after the Taoist effort has been made and the CSCs have 
occurred. This does not seem to be the case, however, as the kinds of decisions discussed in chapter 8 
(moral and prudential) essentially involve a conflict between what the agent believes she ought to do 
and what she desires to do (126). It is this conflict or tension in the agent’s will, and the agent’s struggle 
to resolve it, that magnify the indeterminacies that play the essential role in allowing an agent to 
exercise ultimate control over her decision. But the important point is that the process is completed once 
this conflict is over and the agent has decided to either do what she believes she ought to do, or give in 
to temptation (i.e., ‘set her will’ one way or the other). By contrast, in ‘practical choice,’ or what I am 
referring to as ‘deliberation,’ the tension is caused by the agent’s competing sets of reasons for making 
the Taoist effort or not making it (or by her competing reasons for making the other efforts involved in 
deliberation, e.g., efforts not to quit deliberating too soon). But the deliberative process does not end 
once one of these sets of reasons prevails. Hence, the descriptions given in chapter 8 of how the agent 
can exercise ultimate control are of little help here. Kane does mention, and briefly illustrate, five kinds 
of indeterministic efforts other than the Taoist effort, which he claims can enhance the agent’s control 
over her deliberation. I discuss these in section 3.6e. 
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strands in the process, in order to avoid any unnecessary confusion that may result 
from the complexity. 
So let’s assume that the agent has tried to relax her mind in an effort to have 
new considerations occur to her. The tension this has created due to the attempt to 
relax being made against resistance has stirred up indeterminacies and new 
considerations have indeterministically come to mind from the unconscious. We’ll 
take the simplest case first. This is basically linear. At this point the agent, for 
example, experiences a memory or imagines a scenario which had not occurred to her 
previously. It seems plausible, and consistent with Kane’s account, that at this point 
the agent is no longer making a Taoist effort to relax her mind in order to be receptive 
to new considerations, as she now has something new and significant relevant to her 
deliberative situation to ponder in the stage that now begins, i.e., the weighing stage. 
I’m assuming for this case that the Taoist effort requires her whole stream of 
consciousness, so she doesn’t both keep making the Taoist effort and deliberate about 
the new consideration with respect to her decision. So now she’s back to deliberating 
deterministically (i.e., the causation in this phase is deterministic only). She regains 
full AD control. Why ‘full’? Because during the ‘fishing’ stage of the effort, according 
to Kane, when she is receptive to new CSCs occurring to her, she had relinquished full 
AD control, but not all control. So we can assume that she had AD control over her 
making the effort, but not over what thoughts occur to her as she is making it. But, to 
look closely, she did not consciously will to regain full AD control; it was the 
occurrence of the new consideration that caused her to cease making the Taoist effort 
and begin pondering the new consideration, and this she did not control specifically. 
So we can fairly safely conclude that she did not control the initiation of her returning 
to deterministic deliberation. 
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Now let’s look at a more complex possibility. Again, the agent makes the 
Taoist effort, and a previously unattended-to consideration becomes conscious. But 
she doesn’t recognize it to be particularly relevant, so she continues to make the effort 
(which, we must remember, is an effort, and so requires concentration). So what 
happens to the new consideration? Let’s say she keeps it in short-term memory. But 
there’s no indeterminism involved with this, as there’s no ‘against-the-grain’ effort 
being exerted with respect to this particular consideration.13 Once she’s accumulated a 
few of these new considerations she wants to take stock, so she ceases making the 
Taoist effort. What causes her to do this? ‘Wants to take stock’ may be misleading. As 
with the simplest case above, and bearing in mind that we don’t have an agent-cause, I 
think it’s plausible that it’s the accumulation of enough relevant considerations that 
causes her to discontinue the Taoist effort. At this point she begins to deterministically 
evaluate and weigh her new considerations into her deliberation.  
There’s one more possibility, which is that the deterministic phase and the 
‘making of the Taoist effort’ phase occur simultaneously post-initiation-of-the-Taoist-
effort phase. If this is the case then during the Taoist effort not only do CSCs come to 
mind, but what we might call DSCs (deterministically-selected considerations) come 
to mind also. But if we add to this another strand of thought, which would have to be 
not fully conscious, whereby she is not making the effort (so that DSCs can come to 
mind) we’d be assuming a bit too much of the agent. She’d have to be actually making 
the Taoist effort and not making it at the same time. And even if this is possible, the 
compartmentalization required would allow us to consider these processes in isolation 
from one another, and assess the agent’s control relevant to them separately. 
                                                 
13
 Actually, this is not so clear. Kane (1999, 117) reminds us that he postulates efforts to keep reasons 
before one’s mind in the face of temptations to self-deception or backsliding. But I doubt the agent 
could be making these two indeterminate efforts simultaneously, i.e., an effort to relax her conscious 
control and an effort to hold on to a consideration. They’re opposing tendencies. 
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3.6e Other Indeterministic Efforts 
The fact that Kane spends relatively little time explaining how indeterministic 
efforts other than the Taoist effort might enhance an agent’s control over a deliberative 
process perhaps indicates a belief on his part that these other efforts are of 
comparatively little significance in terms of the control required for deliberation. But 
even if this is so, our search for Ultimate Control on Kane’s account must be thorough, 
so we should not dismiss these other indeterministic efforts too quickly. The aim of 
this section is to try to see what kind and degree of control these efforts might involve, 
and to assess this control in terms of our requirement of Ultimate Control established 
in sections 1 and 2. Once again, the indeterministic efforts in question are: ‘(1) efforts 
not to quit deliberating too soon or not to choose too hastily, (2) efforts to focus 
attention on considerations that have come to mind in order to determine all their 
consequences, (3) to avoid suppressing relevant considerations that one may be 
resistant to considering, (4) to galvanize oneself to pursue relevant sources of new 
information, and (5) to avoid deceiving oneself (or rationalizing about) the relevance 
of various considerations or their consequences’ (1996, 167). 
I have established in section 5b that agents would have diminished AD control 
and no Ultimate Control over the initiation of these efforts. So we should begin by 
looking at what kind of control an agent might have by way of the efforts post-
initiation. Given what we know of Kane’s account we can assume that in order for 
there to be a possibility of an agent’s exercising ultimate control by virtue of making 
these efforts it must be the case that there is tension in her will as a result of her trying 
to make two incommensurable sets of reasons prevail. So, to take the effort not to quit 
deliberating too soon as an example, she must be both trying to have her reasons for 
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continuing to deliberate and her reasons for quitting prevail. This tension will give rise 
to indeterminism, making it the case that it is undetermined which reason will prevail, 
and whether she will thus go on deliberating or quit. But when one of the reasons does 
prevail, she will exercise ultimate control over its prevailing. This description seems 
fairly straightforward. But besides my difficulty in understanding just what kind of 
control this would be (given that she does not agent-cause the prevailing of one of the 
reasons, and that, due to the indeterminism, she does not antecedently control which 
one prevails), I am prepared to concede that the agent does exercise ultimate control at 
this point. The important question is whether this is significant in terms of the kind of 
control required for deliberation. I established in section 1 that the kind of control at 
issue is the ability of an agent to be the ultimate source of her thoughts, in the sense 
that they are not merely causal consequences of previous thoughts and other events. In 
section 2 I described this requirement as a belief in one’s own authorship of a thought, 
and I gave some real and imagined examples as a way of making it plausible that 
agents who (for whatever reason) begin to question whether a thought has really been 
produced by them, stand in a detached, external relation to that thought, and cannot 
utilize it in a process of deliberation. With this in mind, we are in a position to see 
whether these other indeterministic efforts could give agents reason to believe that 
they have this kind of control. 
The effort not to quit deliberating too soon would result in the agent’s 
exercising ultimate control over the prevailing of whichever of her reasons (to keep 
deliberating or quit) indeterministically prevails, due to that event’s being the end 
trajectory of the agent’s effort of will to have it prevail. Let’s assume that the reason 
that prevails is the reason to continue deliberating. At this point the agent’s 
deliberation will cease to be interrupted by thoughts of quitting, at least for the 
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moment, and she will continue to deliberate. So would this instance of ultimate control 
be helpful in terms of her sense of authorship over her thoughts relevant to the 
deliberative process? I think the answer must be that it wouldn’t, or wouldn’t very 
much. The precise moment at which the agent exercises ultimate control is the 
moment at which she has overcome what might best be described as a temptation to 
quit deliberating. But this event is not really a part of the deliberative process itself; it 
has no content of its own, and doesn’t seem to relate to the content of any particular 
deliberative process, i.e., the particular practical uncertainty the agent is trying to 
resolve and the particular beliefs, desires, inferences, etc. relevant to resolving it. To 
use Kane’s own example to illustrate my point, ‘Jane may be tired of deliberating 
about [where to go for] her vacation, but, recalling a previous disastrous vacation, she 
may make the effort… to go on deliberating rather than decide too hastily’ (1996, 
167). As a result of this she may believe that she is the author or ultimate source of her 
action to go on deliberating. But it is unclear how this would help her to stand in an 
internal relation to the thoughts relevant to working out what to do about her vacation. 
At best she would stand in an internal relation only to the prevailing of her effort to 
keep deliberating. 
 It is unnecessary to analyze each of the other kinds of indeterministic effort (2-
5) that Kane claims could enhance the agent’s control over the deliberative process, as 
the general point above seems to apply to each of them. Therefore, I think it is safe to 
ignore these other efforts. 
 
3.7 Intention-Formation 
Although I am unaware of any explicit discussion of intention-formation by 
Kane in his account of deliberation, this is perhaps the part of a deliberative process 
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where control of some kind, and certainly Ultimate Control, would be most desirable. 
That is because the formation of an intention seems to be the final point in 
deliberation, where there is no further practical uncertainty on the part of the agent, 
and the process comes to an end. It is perhaps relevant that Kane says that 
indeterminism doesn’t give us more compatibilist (AD) control, but it does give us a 
different variety of control, i.e., ultimate control. In self-formation, he claims, we can’t 
determine what we’ll choose before we choose it, but we can determine what we 
choose when we choose it (1999, 115). This seems intended to be relevant, at least 
primarily, to moral and prudential decisions, as here the indeterminism plays a more 
central role in the decision, i.e., actually makes the difference as to what it will be. But 
can it also be applied to intention-formation, i.e., if this is an ‘effort’?14 
It seems unlikely that intention-formation is directly intended or willed (Brian 
O’Shaughnessey (1980, 298, 301) makes this point, and I have endorsed it in chapter 
2).15 And it’s very doubtful that an agent would be simultaneously trying to form an 
intention and not form that same intention. So the only tension there may be would 
result from the agent’s simultaneously trying to form two different, incompatible 
intentions, e.g., to go to Hawaii for her vacation and to go to Colorado for her 
vacation. But by the stage in a deliberative process when an intention is formed the 
                                                 
14
 It may be thought that ‘deciding’ and ‘forming an intention’ are semantically or extensionally 
equivalent. I do not believe this to be the case, however. For one thing, ‘decision’ can refer to more than 
just the point at which a process of deliberation comes to an end due to the formation of an intention – it 
can refer to the whole process (for example, “I am in the process of making a decision”). The term 
‘choose,’ I believe, is similarly equivocal. But even if ‘decision’ were to refer only to the end point of a 
deliberative process, O’Shaughnessy seems correct to claim that not all intendings involve a decision: 
‘Thus, I see a cup begin to topple off the table and lurch forward wildly in an attempt to catch it’ (1980, 
297). Here it seems that this ‘instrumental act striving’ is an expression of an intention (to catch the 
cup), yet at no point was I uncertain of what to do. Therefore, ‘no decision was reached in forming the 
intention that found expression in my act.’ Clarke (2003, 3) makes a similar claim. 
15
 See Clarke (2003, 3) for an opposing view. Clarke claims that we can form intentions by intending to 
form them, but thinks that this does not involve a regress, as the two intentions will have different 
content – the content of the prior intention being, for instance, to make up one’s mind (26). 
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agent would favor reasons for the alternative on which the intention is based,16 and 
combined with the overriding ensuring/avoiding motivation which (I argued in chapter 
2) motivates the entire process, an intention would more than likely just occur. Exactly 
how intentions occur as results of deliberative processes is unclear, but perhaps they 
are caused to form by a combination of the overriding ensuring/avoiding motivation 
and the relative strength of the reasons for one of the alternatives. Nevertheless, 
without some additional type of factor by virtue of which the agent could exercise 
Ultimate Control over this part of the process (excluding agent-causation), we have no 
reason to think that she would have anything more than AD control over it. And even 
AD control would be unlikely given that it requires an agent to be able to guarantee or 
determine an outcome before it occurs, which would make little sense in the context of 
an agent trying to work out what to do.17 On the other hand, if none of the agent’s 
                                                 
16
 Absent time constraints, it would seem irrational or at least capricious for an agent to form an 
intention during an earlier phase of the deliberative process, for example, the Taoist effort, as the agent 
has not yet weighed her alternatives and yet is in a situation where this is clearly required. And for this 
reason it seems unlikely that the agent would have any sense of control over its formation. (This would 
be similar to her forming an intention as a result of vacillating between alternatives. See below.) Even if 
she did have a sense of control over it, it is implausible that she could have ultimate control over it, as 
this would require her to be, for example, directly trying to form an intention to go to Hawaii and 
directly trying to form an intention to go to Colorado (in order for the indeterminism relevant to this 
decision to be present), as well as trying to be receptive to new considerations that will help her make 
the decision about whether to go to Hawaii or Colorado. Her trying to form an intention during the part 
of the process where she is weighing her reasons for each alternative (which is not explicitly discussed 
by Kane) would result in a similar problem, i.e., it is implausible that a person could, or would even try 
to undertake these parts of a deliberative process simultaneously. 
17
 We must not ignore the possibility that an agent might have resolved her practical uncertainty, i.e., 
worked out what to do, but not yet formed an intention to do it. In this case it is not inconceivable that 
the agent has AD control over the formation of the intention, as she would be able to determine what 
the intention would be before it is formed. Clarke (2003) holds a view like this. He claims that ‘making 
an evaluative judgment is not yet forming an intention; it is not yet committing oneself to perform the 
action that one thereby judges best’ (114-15). I do not think this view is correct. I think that if an agent 
has not formed an intention to do A, then the agent has not really decided that doing A is best; at least 
she has not made an all-things-considered judgment that it is best. But I cannot argue for this here. 
Further, it is not clear that the expressions ‘having worked out what to do’ and ‘having judged an action 
to be best’ are equivalent, so my disagreement with Clarke may be superficial. But even if Clarke is 
correct, and it is possible for an agent to have AD control over the formation of an intention in a case 
where she has already worked out what to do, or worked out what is best to do, she could not have 
ultimate control over the formation of the intention. If she has already worked out what to do there 
would no longer be any tension in her will giving rise to the indeterminism required for ultimate 
control. 
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reasons are stronger, and yet she is directly trying to form an intention rather than 
continuing to adduce and weigh reasons, she would be vacillating, which is not 
deliberation and couldn’t really enhance her control over the formation of the intention 
(I discuss vacillation briefly in chapter 2). In either case, if an intention just occurs 
there would be no veridical sense of control on the part of the agent. Further, if an 
agent believes that this is how she will form an intention, then dissociation from the 
process is likely to result. 
 
3.8 Simple Breakdown 
We now need to remove all aspects of compatibilist-level (AD) control from 
Kane’s account of deliberation in order to find out what kind of control might remain. 
It looks like the only place ultimate control could be relevant in any important way is 
during the Taoist effort. My analysis shows that here the agent exercises ultimate 
control over her relaxing her mind so that CSCs can indeterministically occur to her. 
But this is perhaps not entirely accurate. The analysis actually showed that CSCs 
occur only during the stage where the agent is in tension, i.e., when she is trying both 
to relax and not relax. This tension is required for the indeterminism essential for the 
production of CSCs. So ultimate control cannot be exercised at the point when the 
CSCs occur, but only when one of these efforts prevails. The agent exercises ultimate 
control over which one prevails when it prevails. Therefore, she can never exercise 
ultimate control during the part of the process when CSCs occur. The precise point at 
which ultimate control would apply is the point at which the agent has succeeded (or 
failed) in relaxing her mind, and is no longer trying to do anything, except maybe the 
ensuring/avoiding I claim would motivate the whole process. In other words, double 
trying is resolved into the success of one or the other of the tryings. Now the 
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deliberator is going to be in this relaxed ‘ultimate control state’ very momentarily 
before she returns to deliberating in the familiar way (adducing and weighing reasons 
deterministically). At this point, the process would somehow start up again or loop 
back to the beginning. 
  To make this clearer, we can break the process down into its key phases as 
follows. 
1. Deterministic adducing and weighing of reasons. The agent has AD control, 
but no ultimate control. 
2. Taoist Effort to relax is initiated. The agent has no ultimate control over the 
initiation, and diminished AD control over it. 
3. The agent is making an effort to relax and to not relax, which is the tension 
that produces the CSCs. The agent has no AD control over the occurrence of 
CSCs. She has some AD control over making the effort. She has no ultimate 
control, as this is only relevant in the post-tension stage when one of her 
competing reasons for relaxing and not relaxing prevails. 
4. The agent succeeds at relaxing (relinquishing AD control). There is no 
longer tension in her will, so there are no CSCs occurring. She has ultimate 
control, but only over her succeeding at relaxing AD control. If deliberation 
is to continue, the agent would now presumably return to phase 1 (at least 
the weighing part). It must also be possible, as success/failure is 
indeterministic, that she fails, i.e., her reason for not relaxing prevails. Here 
she would have ultimate control over failing to relax. Unless she now either 
forms an intention and thereby resolves her practical uncertainty, or ceases 
to deliberate due to some other factor, she would return either to phase 1 in 
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order to either continue to weigh the reasons she has, or to phase 2 in order 
to make another Taoist effort to find new ones. 
What’s unclear is how the agent moves from phase 4 back to phase 1 or 2. I’ve already 
determined in section 6c that the effort involved in phase 3, i.e., the agent’s trying both 
to relax her mind and to not relax it, would continue as the result of the effort (the 
CSCs) occurs. But if the effort in phase 3 is continuous, then phase 4 would never 
occur, i.e., the agent would never succeed at either relaxing or not relaxing her mind, 
as by Kane’s account ultimate control is only exercised at the precise point at which 
one of the agent’s reasons prevails, and there would be no further tension at this point 
– the tension comes about from the agent’s trying to resist familiar ways of thinking. 
Kane does say that the making of the effort is a complex neural process involving 
circulating impulses in a recurrent neural network. So whatever precisely this means, 
it looks as though the agent might move through phases 1-4 very quickly. But they 
can’t occur simultaneously, as they’re not compatible. No matter what the nature of 
the complexity, we can’t have two incompatible activities going on in the one neural 
network. So it actually looks like the effort cannot be made continuously, but only 
repeatedly, and very quickly. 
So my conclusion, that we can only ever exercise ultimate control over our 
succeeding or failing at our effort to relax (relinquish AD control), seems correct. And 
our ultimate control over the success (or failure) is, in a sense, a mere byproduct of 
this dual effort. We can have ultimate control only at stage 4, and only over our 
succeeding at either relaxing AD control or not relaxing it. It does not seem that this 
can be of much help in securing more control over a process of deliberation than an 
agent would have if determinism were true. 
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One final point about my overall argument requires clarification. In section 2 I 
claimed that my argument there did not conclusively establish that a deliberating agent 
requires a sense of authorship (ultimate control over the initiation) of her thoughts 
relevant to the deliberative process in addition to a sense of ownership of them. It 
should now be clear that even this restricted condition cannot be met by Kane’s 
account. The explanation of this is as follows. If it is correct that believing that one is 
causally determined is incompatible with believing that one has Ultimate Control over 
one’s thoughts, then we are not warranted in simply assuming that the falsity of 
determinism would be sufficient for this kind of control; we need an indeterministic 
account that provides reason to think that we have it. Now, even if the sense of control 
required for deliberation is control in the ownership sense alone and not also the 
authorship sense, and thus our search for control in an indeterministic account of 
deliberation is restricted to this kind of control, Kane’s account does not provide it. 
Leaving aside the kind of control that is available if determinism is true (AD control), 
we have seen that the only kind of control a deliberator can exercise on Kane’s 
account is what he refers to as ‘ultimate control.’ Although I have not been able to 
ascertain precisely what this kind of control amounts to, my analysis of Kane’s 
account showed that it could only be exercised at a point in the deliberative process 
where it could not plausibly be of any help to a deliberator who needs to believe that 
she exercises control of her thoughts even in the ownership sense alone. She has 
ultimate control only over her succeeding or failing to relax her mind, and at this point 
in the process there are no new ideas relevant to her practical uncertainty occurring to 
her, and she is not weighing her reasons for action or forming an intention as to what 
to do. 
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3.9 Conclusion 
It seems that all Kane’s account can add to a deterministic conception of 
deliberation is the diminution of control. I have tried to establish in sections 3.2 and 
3.3 that an agent cannot deliberate unless she believes herself to have Ultimate Control 
over the initiation of her thoughts relevant to the deliberative process. We have seen 
that Kane’s account cannot provide the basis for an agent’s belief that she possesses 
this kind of control. With the background of chapter 2 (i.e., that a deterministic 
conception won’t plausibly allow for deliberation) it should be fairly clear that if an 
agent attends to her deliberative situation closely, then whether or not she believes 
herself to be causally determined, it will be unlikely that she will be able to consider 
herself to have Ultimate Control over her thoughts. Therefore, it appears that once the 
question of control arises, the only way an attentive agent can deliberate is with the 
belief that she is an agent-cause. 
As mentioned above, I have used Kane’s account due to its detail and 
comprehensiveness with respect to the process of deliberation, but I have not shown 
that other non-agent-causal libertarian accounts18 could not fare any better at securing 
the control required for deliberation. In particular I have not examined non-causal 
accounts.19 Although I am unable to go into any detail concerning these accounts, a 
                                                 
18
 For example, Mele (1995) and Ekstrom (2001). These are examples of ‘deliberative-indeterminist’ 
event-causal accounts, where the indeterminism is posited at a stage in the deliberative process prior to 
intention-formation. According to Mele, we can exercise ‘ultimate control’ over the making of a 
decision only if beliefs relevant to that decision come to mind indeterministically during the 
deliberative process. On Ekstrom’s account, an agent can act freely only if the preference causing her 
intention to act is generated by considerations that occur to her indeterministically. Kane’s account of 
deliberation can also be seen as a deliberative-indeterminist account due to the occurrence of CSCs 
prior to decision and intention. Other event-causal theorists propose that a free action or decision must 
be indeterministically caused by its immediate causal antecedents, for instance, the agent’s reasons for 
acting. Kane’s (1996) account of moral and prudential decisions is the most well known of such 
accounts. 
19
 For example, Ginet (1990, 1997, and 2007) and Goetz (2008). Noncausal accounts require that there 
be some undetermined element in the causal production of an action in order for the action to be free. 
For some noncausalists this amounts to the requirement that the action not be caused at all, and for 
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general point arising from the foregoing discussion may be illuminating. It seems that 
the main difficulty faced by non-agent-causal libertarian accounts with respect to the 
control required for deliberation relates to a more general and commonly recognized 
difficulty for such accounts. In the absence of an agent-causal relation (a factor which 
gives rise to problems of its own) it’s difficult to see how the indeterminism in such 
accounts could serve to enhance an agent’s control over her thoughts and actions from 
what it would be if such accounts were purely deterministic. Although libertarian 
accounts seem to have an advantage over purely deterministic accounts in that they 
provide for a range of possibilities of thought and action (‘alternative possibilities’), 
the difficulty lies in understanding how agents are able to control which of the 
possible thoughts and actions they produce, in a way that allows them to exercise 
greater control over them than would be available on a deterministic account. 
Although proponents of these accounts have provided detailed responses to this 
criticism, what is needed in terms of deliberation from a psychological standpoint is a 
coherent notion of agent-control that is distinct from the AD control available on 
deterministic accounts, and that could enhance an agent’s sense of her control over her 
thoughts relevant to the deliberative process. Kane’s ultimate control can be seen as a 
                                                                                                                                            
others that the action is not deterministically caused. All noncausalists seem to agree that free actions do 
not need to have any internal causal structure. According to Ginet, every action either is or begins with 
a causally simple mental action, i.e., an action that ‘does not contain within itself two distinct, causally 
related events’ (1990, 12). This differs from an unbidden mental occurrence due to its ‘actish 
phenomenal quality’ (13), which is explained as follows. ‘[T]he simple mental event of my volition to 
exert force with a part of my body phenomenally seems to me to be intrinsically an event that does not 
just happen to me, that does not occur unbidden, but it is, rather, as if I make it occur, as if I determine 
that it will happen just when and as it does.’ This phenomenal quality is sufficient for the mental event’s 
being an action. The only further condition for the action to be a free action of mine, is that I am its 
subject, and I am not in turn controlled or determined by something else, or causally necessitated by 
antecedent states and events (1997, 89). Goetz denies that a choice, or any mental act, has an intrinsic 
actish feel. He claims that the active nature of a mental event consists solely in its being the exercise of 
a mental power (2008, 11). His view also has a distinctive teleological aspect: A choice is ‘an 
intrinsically active and essentially uncaused mental action that is ultimately and irreducibly explained 
teleologically by a reason.’ Such a choice is free only if it’s the case that when making it for a reason, 
R1, the agent also has a reason, R2, to choose otherwise, and the alternative choice is causally open to 
him (35). 
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potential way of providing this. But as I have tried to show, it does not successfully do 
so. 
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